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ABSTRACT 
The Transatlantic Renewal of Textual Practices: 
Philology, Religion, and Classicism in Madame de Staël, Herder, and Emerson 
Ulrike Wagner 
 
This dissertation demonstrates how the rise of historical criticism in Germany 
transformed practices of reading, writing, and public address in the related fields of 
classicism and biblical criticism in a transnational context. In the late-eighteenth and 
early-nineteenth centuries, writers on both sides of the Atlantic rendered these practices 
foundational to the goals of self-formation, cultural and spiritual renewal, and 
educational reform. In this process, Germaine de Staël’s De l’Allemagne (1814) played 
a key role in disseminating new historically informed modes of teaching, preaching, 
translating, and reconstructing secular and religious texts among Transcendentalists. I 
show that her cultural study epitomizes crucial characteristics and functions of the 
historically informed textual practices that Johann Gottfried Herder’s works articulated 
paradigmatically in Germany and which we find refracted in reviews, addresses, essays, 
and translations by many Antebellum American scholars, especially Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. 
By bringing together intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic in the context 
of their responses and contributions to century-old classical and religious debates, this 
study presents a different perspective on terms such as individual autonomy or spiritual 
freedom that have come to be seen by the critical literature as paradigmatic for our 
understanding of the nineteenth-century relationship between German and American 
culture and its mediation by Staël. Unlike in the discourse of idealism that dominates 
the existing body of scholarship on the transnational impact of German Romanticism, 
Staël, Emerson, and his cohort do not associate these terms with abstract philosophical 
concepts but with specific exercises and practices the subject can deploy in different 
ways. 
The first chapter focuses on Staël’s discussion of how the learning of foreign 
languages and one’s historical engagement with them fosters the individual’s 
independent judgment and thinking. I concentrate on her investigation of how 
Winckelmann and Herder engage with ancient cultures by feeling themselves into the 
strange worlds of the past and by turning these acts of imaginary displacement into an 
occasion for creative reconstitutions of Greek art and Hebrew Scripture so that they 
serve Germany’s spiritual and cultural revival. The second chapter explores how Herder 
renders practices of empathetic immersion and historical investigations foundational to 
his philological activities and translations. I work out his treatment of sacred and secular 
texts as sites for the anthropological making of meaning and of what he calls the human 
imperative of “Selbstschöpfung” or “self-shaping.” The third chapter examines how the 
relationship between historicism, philology, and the rise of new models of education, 
cultural reform, and religious experience that figure so prominently in both Staël’s and 
Herder’s works resonate in a myriad of Transcendentalist texts. I look at how American 
classicists and critics like James Marsh and George Ripley discuss and adopt German 
techniques of self-abandonment, empathy, and poetic philology to refashion practices of 
preaching and teaching. The fourth chapter investigates how Emerson takes these 
contemporary debates about the value of scholarship and historical inquiry for 
educational reforms and the reinvigoration of religion a step further by developing the 
practices others highlight in the works of Herder or Friedrich Schleiermacher into fully-












Reverberations of a Great Divide: From De la Littérature to De l’Allemagne in        
Light of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes and the Vorzugsstreit 
 
24 
Rethinking the Past through the Lens of Language Education, and Winckelmann 34 
Staël’s Herder, Religious Revival, and France’s Cultural Recovery 
 
48 
Chapter II: Der Mensch siehet nur, wie ein Mensch siehet: Modern Functions of 
Ancient Greek and Hebrew Literature in Light of Herder’s Anthropological Thinking 
 
64 
Herder’s Winckelmann, Classical Scholarship, and the Use of History  73 
Personified Beginnings: Arguing Animals, Grumpy Trees, and the Birth of Poetry 86 
Origin as Contest and Creation in Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie 
 
104 
Chapter III: Transcendentalism’s Critical Instruments: German Historical Scholarship 
and the Transformation of Religion and Classicism in New England 
 
124 
Herder, Schleiermacher and the Power of Philology 135 
Religious Sociability and the Reinvention of the Ministry 167 
 
ii 
Classicism, Self-Culture, and the Rise of the Art of Liberal Education 
 
187 
Chapter IV: Emerson in his Time 
 
207 




Ejaculations of a few imaginative men: Emerson on Religion 233 











In keeping with its topic, the writing of this dissertation has spanned several 
years of travelling between Germany and America, and its completion would be 
unthinkable without the generous institutional and individual support I received on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  
In New York, I thank my advisor Dorothea von Mücke for guiding along the 
formation and refining of this project through her careful reading and the detailed 
feedback she always provided at each stage of the writing process. I am grateful to Ross 
Posnock for his abiding trust and support at points when even I doubted the feasibility 
of the approach I had chosen for exploring new facets of the relationship between 
German Romanticism and American Transcendentalism. I thank Lydia Goehr for 
showing me what making a commitment to scholarship and teaching as a way of life 
means, and for being an inspiring and untiring fellow traveler between Germany and 
America. I am very grateful to William Dellinger for his constant support in all practical 
matters of making my graduate student life work, and to Mary Helen Dupree for giving 
me advice on how to navigate through each stage of the graduate program. Richard 
Korb has taught me to teach and make teaching matter in ways I had not known. And 
the hassles of writing a dissertation would never have been filled with so many 
delightful moments and helpful conversations without my friends and fellow writers 
Jennifer Cameron, Dehlia Hannah, Dalia Inbal, and Julia Nordmann.  
 
iv 
In Cambridge I would like to thank the professors and students in the 
department of Germanic languages at Harvard for hosting me as a visiting researcher 
over several semesters, and for discussing individual chapters with me in their 
colloquium. The writing of chapters 3 and 4 would not have been possible without the 
research I was able to conduct in Harvard’s libraries and archives. A graduate 
fellowship at Trinity College in Hartford introduced me to the liberal arts model of 
education, and helped me complete portions of the dissertation. 
 A GSAS Columbia University fellowship, a doctoral research fellowship at the 
Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, and a Elsa-Neumann dissertation fellowship did not only 
make it possible for me to spend uninterrupted portions of time on my work but also 
enabled me to engage in many invaluable conversations with Berlin-based scholars over 
my research. Especially the chapters on Herder and Staël gained from my membership 
of the SFB “Transformationen der Antike” and the PhD-Net “Das Wissen der Literatur” 
at Humboldt Universität. I thank Joseph Vogl and above all Andrea Polaschegg whose 
support of my project went far beyond what I could ever have hoped for. Her comments 
on those parts of the dissertation concerned with Herder’s religious thinking were 
immensely helpful. My thanks also to Ernst Osterkamp and his doctoral students for 
discussing Staël’s relationship to Goethe, Kant, and Winckelmann with me. At the Freie 
Universität, I am deeply indebted to my former mentor Winfried Fluck who was the 
first to spark my interest in this dissertation’s topic and provided continuous advice over 
the years of its unfolding. Johannes Voelz has read all chapters and commented on 
nearly every thought that has gone into writing them. 
 
v 
 Finally, I want to thank my family, and in particular my mother Juliane Koberg-
Wagner, for bearing with me and supporting me even though they often could not help 
but wonder how I could possibly invest such enormous amounts of time into a single 
piece of writing. And I know that this dissertation would not exist if it weren’t for the 
unfailing commitment to me and my work by Swen Voekel and Christiane Caemmerer. 
Christiane has supported my scholarly interests in every way possible since the day I 
can remember, and Swen’s love, loyalty, and intellectual integrity have been an 





The Transatlantic Renewal of Textual Practices: Philology, Religion, and 
Classicism in Madame de Staël, Herder, and Emerson demonstrates how the rise of 
historical criticism in Germany transformed practices of reading, writing, and public 
address in the related fields of classicism and Biblical criticism in a transnational 
context. In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, writers on both sides of 
the Atlantic rendered these practices foundational to the goals of self-formation, cultural 
renewal, and educational reform. In this process, Germaine de Staël’s De l’Allemagne 
(1814) played a key role in disseminating new historically informed modes of teaching, 
preaching, translating, and reconstructing secular and religious texts among 
Transcendentalists. I argue that her cultural study epitomizes crucial characteristics and 
functions of the textual practices that Johann Gottfried Herder’s works articulated 
paradigmatically in Germany and which we find refracted in critical writings by 
American scholars, especially Ralph Waldo Emerson. 
The study adds to existing critical debates about how historicism transformed 
classical and religious scholarship in two ways: it provides detailed examinations of 
facets of Staël’s, Herder’s, and Emerson’s works that have received little or no critical 
attention, and it contributes to the existing body of scholarship on the transnational 
impact of German Romanticism. Critics have drawn attention to the vital impact of 
German eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinking on the rise of American 
Transcendentalism and acknowledged De l’Allemagne’s intermediary role, but they 
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have only highlighted Staël’s and the Transcendentalists’ concern with the philosophy 
of the self as an entity emerging into its autonomy. By contrast, I focus on how authors 
as diverse as Herder, Schleiermacher, Emerson, Staël, Winckelmann, George Ripley, 
and James Marsh explore how identities and worldviews were formed through the 
languages and literatures of ancient cultures. Informed by their historical and 
philological investigations, these authors foreground the modern use of critical practices 
and exercises as vehicles for the formation of the self, the development of educational 
reforms, religious experience, and a new understanding of aesthetic value. 
The works I investigate suggest that we ought to read ancient texts by feeling 
ourselves into the strange worlds of the past and to make the empathetic exercise an 
occasion to divest ourselves of things we take for granted and regard as normative in 
our own lives. These acts of imaginary displacement help us see Hebrew scripture or 
Greek myths as living records, telling us how others experienced the world. Such 
practices, Transcendentalists and European critics show, are conducive to the 
development of our mental flexibility and also draw our attention to different styles of 
existence that could inspire and enrich our own cultural and spiritual lives. They discuss 
how to employ our emotional capacities and turn historical and philological 
investigations of the past into processes that serve our own purposes such as the 
creation of an individual style, the writing of our biographies, or the creation of an 
aesthetic or spiritual experience. Such innovative and individualized ways of tapping 
the cultures of the past for contemporary purposes mark a new direction in the late 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries.  
3 
 
“A Clash of Cultural Ideas” 
Of course, by the time Staël, Herder, and Emerson took up questions about the 
values of antiquity for their own time, the engagement with the past, and with antiquity 
more particularly, was already centuries, even millennia, old, and it is against the 
backdrop of changing notions of the uses of antiquity that we must place the 
transformation wrought by these thinkers. The most prominent European-wide debate 
about the modern role and function of classical culture in the tradition of which all three 
authors worked was the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. It emerged in the late-
seventeenth century and divided French cultural loyalties into two parties, the Ancients 
and the Moderns [to prevent confusion, please take note of my use of upper-cased 
characters to distinguish the seventeenth-century battle party, “the Ancients,” from “the 
ancients” as a historical group1]. The position of the Moderns gained wide public 
attention when Charles Perrault recited his poem “Le siècle de Louis le Grand” in the 
Acadèmie Française in 1687. Perrault and his supporters suggested that the age of Louis 
XIV reigns triumphantly over all previous ages and demonstrates marked advances in 
all fields of knowledge. To clearly stake out the supremacy of Louis’ century, they 
would denigrate the achievements of the past and assimilate all elements that would not 
quite fit into their cultural model of perfectibilité. Antoine Houdar de La Motte’s 
adjustment of the Iliad to French standards of form, style, taste, and behavior is an 
                                                
1 Throughout this text, the capitalized form ‘the Ancients’ is used to designate the opponents of ‘the 
Moderns’ during the quarrel over questions of cultural hegemony from the seventeenth- to the mid 
nineteenth-centuries. The ‘ancients’ (lower case) is used to refer to writers in classical antiquity and 
ancient Hebrew cultures. 
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example for how the Moderns would engage with the past, guided by rules of reason 
and common sense.2 
The Ancients, by contrast, assumed that cultural developments had reached an 
unsurpassable state of perfection in the past. Madame Dacier’s Iliad translation from 
1711 exemplifies how this position informed the Ancients’ treatment of sources. Dacier 
was well versed in Greek and Latin and known for her translations and editions of the 
classics. Unlike La Motte, her aim was not to alter and perfect ancient texts but to 
faithfully recuperate them, to reproduce their style and diction.3 
These two competing modes of fashioning the relation between modernity and 
the classical past resonate with a dispute much older even than the French quarrel or its 
English response at the turn of the seventeenth century, the Battle of the Books. Both 
the Moderns’ insistence on an ideal of perfectibility authorized by the progress of 
reason and the Ancients’ claim to a fixed state of perfection bound to the recuperation 
of a fixed set of ancient themes and compositional techniques have their foundation in 
what Joseph Levine terms “a clash of cultural ideas” permeating European history since 
                                                
2 La Motte cut Homer’s lengthy digressions, equipped the cast of characters with more favorable 
mannerisms and employed what he considered a more elegant and refined style of writing. What guided 
his endeavors to divest the text of its flaws was not scholarly acumen and knowledge of Greek but his 
common sense; that is, he applied the rule of reason. The grouping of materials in a dialogical structure in 
Charles Perrault’s Parallèle des anciens et des modernes (1688-1692) also shows the strategies Moderns 
would employ to demonstrate the superior status of their own age. To also accommodate the arts that 
resist an easy assimilation into his perfectibilié model, Perrault distinguishes between a beau universel 
(denoting artistic themes, styles and genres which have unfolded progressively since antiquity with one 
major interruption during the dark ages) and a beau relatif (all customs, manners and modes of expression 
that seem at odds with modern times, as historical aberrations from universal norms fall into the beau 
relatif category). 
3 See Levine, The Battle of the Books, 136. 
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antiquity.4 He shows that an early version of the argumentative pattern structuring the 
early modern dispute can be found in the rivalry of two schools of paideia in ancient 
Greece and Rome. One school concentrated on training the mind’s reasoning faculties 
to ascertain the workings of fixed laws operative in both natural and supernatural 
worlds, whereas the members of the other school focused on uncovering phenomena 
they regarded as being of immediate use for handling everyday concerns. The teachers’ 
primary interest lay in introducing effective strategies for students to train their 
eloquence rather than the faculty of reason.5 
 While this ancient controversy underwent a variety of renewals and 
transformations in late antiquity and the Middle Ages, it was only with Renaissance 
humanism in the fourteenth- to sixteenth-centuries that an comprehensive scholarly 
revival of antiquity was effected. Ancient Greek and especially Latin culture became 
the touchstone for moral behavior, cultural standards, and ideal linguistic forms. 
Rhetoric was advanced as the key element of every student’s education; in style, and 
genre, their foremost challenge was to revive and approximate the ancient models, to go 
                                                
4 Joseph M. Levine, “Ancients and moderns: cross-currents in early modern intellectual life,” in The 
Cambridge History of Libraries in Britain and Ireland, ed. E. S. Leedham-Green, Teresa Webber, and 
Giles Mandelbrote (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 9. 
5 Both, in The Battle of the Books: History and Literature in the Augustan Age (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1991) and in “Ancients and moderns: cross-currents in early modern intellectual life,” 
Levine provides the most comprehensive research on the complex historical backdrop against which the 
Ancient-Modern controversy in France and Britain formed. My cursory synopsis of the quarrel’s pre-
history draws primarily on his research. According to Levine, the two rival concepts of paideia are 
explicitly set against one another in Plato’s dialogues: “Plato, above all, had represented this argument in 
many of his dialogues, in which he exalted the culture of dialectic and set Socrates deliberately against 
the sophists and their rhetoric; while the sophists, led by Isocrates, retorted with their own educational 
schemes and schools, which were elaborated later for the Romans by Cicero and Quintilian among others. 
In this way, classical culture was transmitted to later times, not as one consistent whole, but rather in two 




ad fontes, directly to the ancient sources. Pedagogically, humanist educators directed 
students to recover the moral values of classical life through the imitation of the 
language and style of classical authors, uniting sapientia with eloquentia. Education had 
a moral but also utilitarian function; the man of letters learned the arts of rhetoric from 
ancient texts in order to meet his social and political obligations in the public sphere, in 
an active life of civic engagement.6 The other strand of classical paideia, the exercising 
of the logical arts, associated as it was with medieval scholasticism, thereby moved into 
the background because in the eyes of most humanists, the training of abstract reasoning 
could not be put to work. Humanists encouraged a publicly useful learning based on the 
ethics and style of pagan moralists such as Cicero who themselves embodied the kind of 
practical, engaged philosophy held up as the ideal for the Renaissance man of letters.7  
 This massive humanist recovery project aimed at educational reforms and the 
renewal of cultural life at large was later intertwined with a second major reform 
movement, the Protestant Reformation. The reformers’ main objective was also to 
                                                
6 The purpose of sixteenth-century rhetorical school manuals was “to equip the student to recognize the 
fundamental principles involved in the intelligent and persuasive expression of ideas in words, and to 
give him the wherewithal to produce spoken and written compositions of his own. That new works were 
best invented by imitating the old was a principle scarcely ever seriously disputed by the overridingly 
influential schoolroom orthodoxy of the sixteenth century,” Ann Moss, “Humanist Education,” in The 
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism: The Renaissance, vol. 3. ed. Glyn P. Norton (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 149. 
7 “…logic was either downplayed or reformed under the influence of rhetoric, while the rest of the 
philosophical curriculum, with the exception of moral philosophy, was pretty much ignored, except by 
those who continued to aim at a career in religion” (Levine, “Ancients and moderns: cross-currents in 
early modern intellectual life,” 12). In his recent study What Was History? The art of history in early 
modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), Anthony Grafton complicates the 
common account of early modern education as exclusively focused on the art of rhetoric. While a more 
nuanced appreciation of the historico-critical techniques of the early modern period would exceed the 
brief review of this chapter, Grafton’s latest research should nevertheless be noted. In unfolding the 
development of the genre of the Artes historicae, he recovers a number of hitherto occluded modes of 
history writing which, interestingly, adumbrate the new methods based on reason as well as the cultural 
historical methodologies developed in the eighteenth century by the Göttingen school. 
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return ad fontes, in this case to the primitive church described in the Scriptures. 
Dissatisfied with the leadership of the Catholic church and its (for Protestants, extra-
scriptural) claim that clerics alone were authorized to mediate between humanity and 
the divine, Protestant reformers demanded new mediating practices independent of the 
church authorities and based only on Biblical authority. Sola scriptura: by Scripture 
alone could one hope to decipher the divine will. As with the humanists, the reformers 
rejected what they regarded as the abstract logical hair-splitting of medieval theologians 
and demanded an active engagement by believers themselves with the text, in this case 
the Bible. The authority to mediate between God and the world is not a God-given 
privilege of a human leader based on dubious customs and traditions with no scriptural 
warrant but rather resides in the words of the Bible, waiting to be unlocked. 
 As with the thorough scholarly resurrection of pagan Greek and Roman texts 
performed by the humanists, the turn to the Scriptures of the Hebrews and early 
Christian culture set in motion a comprehensive recovery project. Since the key to the 
true meaning of the Bible as much as the true meaning of the Iliad lay in the 
formulations of these sources alone, it was the scholar’s task to uncover this information 
and to prove its authenticity and stability. Many Protestant reformers joined the 
humanists in detailed investigations of the linguistic peculiarities, religious beliefs, and 
cultural worlds of a wide range of texts from a world that now seemed 
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genuinely]ancient but also in need of recuperation for its ethical, stylistic, and 
theological importance to contemporaries.8 
 To produce more accurate versions of any ancient text, pagan or Judeo-
Christian, scholars needed instruments that would help them ascertain the histories of 
manuscripts and chronologies and assist them in recuperating the past texts within their 
respective cultural context. Groundbreaking research in this regard took place in the 
Enlightenment. It was during this period, as Jonathan Sheehan argues, that the wide 
distribution of scholarly instruments (literary, philological, and historical) and 
translations in Germany called forth the transformation of the century in the field of 
Biblical studies—that is, the birth of an Enlightenment Bible. He subsumes under the 
term “Enlightenment” the constellation of practices and institutions that opened the 
Bible to entirely new fields of inquiry and sites of reconstitution.9 Prior to its large-scale 
transformation and plural recuperation in the eighteenth-century, the Bible had been a 
“self-legitimzing” text in the sense that as a manifestation of God’s word its authority 
was always already affirmed. The legitimacy of the Enlightenment Bible, by contrast, 
was built on its place in the human world. The text’s authority no longer had its center 
in the field of theology but was distributed across a wide network of different media and 
disciplines. Sheehan delineates how the fields of history, philology, and pedagogy each 
                                                
8 On the intertwinements between the revival of the classics and the Protestant Reformation, see Jonathan 
Sheehan, “Scholarship, the New Testament, and the English Defense of the Bible,” in The Enlightenment 
Bible (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 31-53 and Levine, “Ancients and moderns: cross-
currents in early modern intellectual life,” 12. 
9 Jonathan Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), xi-xii. 
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reconstituted the Bible in their own way and formulated their own answers to questions 
regarding the Scriptures’ authority.10 
Ironically, while the driving force behind the deployment of new scholarly 
instruments throughout different disciplines was to consolidate the authority of the 
earliest religious documents and ancient arts, it was precisely in that very moment that 
their timeless exemplary function began to be called into doubt. Scholars began to 
perceive the strangeness of ancient worlds and to gain insights into ways of life and 
thinking that seemed utterly distinct from their current life world. J.G. Eichhorn, for 
instance, demonstrates in his Einleitung in das Alte Testament (1780-83) that the Bible 
consists of vastly different text collections, stemming from multiple origins. And F.A. 
Wolf, who transfers the methods of Biblical criticism to the field of classical studies in 
the Prolegomena ad Homerum, makes similar discoveries with regard to Homer’s 
poetry.11 
Such findings changed the perspective on history in major ways and called for a 
fundamental rethinking of the status of ancient texts. As Levine and Maike Oergel point 
out, the divide between Ancients and Moderns came to seem dated in light of the 
differences between present and past that historical critics and philologists brought to 
scholars’ attention. The dissemination of historical research revealed that the arguments 
on both sides actually share much in common because they are both premised on the 
same notion of historical development. Both Levine and Oergel show that the 
                                                
10 Sheehan, The Enlightenment Bible, xii-xiv. 
11 Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, Einleitung ins Alte Testament. 2nd edition (Reutlingen: J. Grözinger, 1790); 
F.A. Wolf, Prolegomena to Homer, 1795, ed. and transl. Anthony Grafton, Glenn W. Most, and James 
E.G. Zetzel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). 
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plausibility of the Modern claim that ancient cultural standards have been perfected 
over time depends as much as the Ancients’ insistence on the past’s unsurpassable state 
of perfection on a universalist concept of history. Madame Dacier’s preservative 
techniques and La Motte’s modernization efforts are based on a shared notion of 
sameness and comparability between ages, because neither one of their reworkings of 
the Iliad takes into consideration that perceptions of taste, artistic beauty, or literary 
style might have changed altogether. As Levine concludes, the question about the 
relationship of past cultures to modern life and the role of scholarship therein remained 
an open one even after many centuries of disputes across Europe.12 
 
Responses 
In dialogue with each other, the authors I discuss in this study each formulate 
their own answers to this question. Explicitly responding and contributing to the 
century-old classical and religious debates adumbrated above, they are all deeply 
                                                
12 Older studies, most importantly Hans Robert Jauss’ essay “Ästhetische Normen und geschichtliche 
Reflexionen in der Querelle“ which introduces his translation of  Perrault’s Parallèle argue that the end 
of the Querelle marks the origin of historical relativism: “Einsicht in die Relativität ist das wesentliche 
und letzte Ergebnis der Querelle, hiermit erübrigt sich eine weitere Auseinandersetzung über die 
Vorbildlichkeit der Alten” (Jauss, “Ästhetische Normen,” 62). Later research, however, agrees that the 
battles in France and England did not settle on the insight into the relativity of cultural values but left at 
least one legacy in the open question about the relationship betweeen ancient and modern cultures. 
Levine writes that “both sides in the quarrel shared more of their outlook than they had realized. Both 
sides implicitly accepted as timeless and universal very much the same set of literary and artistic 
standards that they were both sure had derived from antiquity. They disagreed only in how far they had in 
fact been restored or exceeded in the present—or how far they might yet be excelled in the future. It 
seems to have occurred to no one on either side to imagine that they might be altogether transformed” 
(Levine, The Battle of the Books, 28). Maike Oergel puts forth a similar claim in Culture and Identity: 
Historicity in German Literature and Thought 1770-1815 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2006). She writes that 
the historicism associated with the beau relatif is a limited one because “it does not impinge on the 
existence of a beau universel, a universally valid ideal. Such an ideal presupposes the existence of 
universally valid standards for assessing culture and constancy in the nature of human understanding. 
These two presuppositions negate a thoroughly historicist approach” (Oergel, Culture and Identity, 16). 
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invested in refashioning the relationship between ancient and modern cultures 
productively. What distinguishes them from their predecessors involved in quarrels over 
the role of the past is that that they seek to neither model modern projects on the norms 
and forms of antiquity nor to introduce the values of their own cultural advancements as 
improvements of ancient forms. Rather, their shared aim is to bring the different epochs 
into dialogue with one another by promoting and developing practices in the fields of 
reading, writing, and communication that help transform interesting aspects of the other, 
alien culture into vital ingredients of their own. 
Something quite similar happens to religious literature. The complex distribution 
of the Bible’s authority across media and disciplines that had been set off by the 
demands of Protestant reformers and resulted in major new findings about the human 
origin of the Scriptures inspires Staël, Herder, Emerson, and his fellow 
Transcendentalists to seek new forms for the reinvigoration of their own spiritual lives. 
Instead of adhering to religious rituals and symbols that had been invented and recorded 
by humans for other humans, they take the ancient records as sources of inspiration by 
reading, writing and speaking about them in creative ways. 
By bringing together intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic in the context 
of their involvements with these historical debates, this study presents a different 
perspective on terms such as individual autonomy or spiritual freedom that have come 
to be seen by the critical literature as paradigmatic for our understanding of the 
nineteenth-century relationship between German and American culture and its 
mediation by Staël. Unlike in the discourse of German idealism, Staël, Emerson and his 
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cohort do not associate these terms with abstract philosophical concepts but with 
specific practices. Ripley, for instance, emphasizes in his discussion of Marsh’s Herder 
translation how one can turn a text into a vehicle for spiritual freedom and revelation by 
combining historical examinations with philological techniques that resemble poetic 
ones, while Staël discusses how the learning of foreign languages and one’s historical 
engagement with them can be made productive for working towards individual 
autonomy. These figures respond with a variety of concrete activities to the new 
insights scholarship had disclosed and thereby introduce notions of cultural, spiritual, 
and individual independence that differ from those the critical literature on German-
American nineteenth-century relations has highlighted in discussions of Staël’s and the 
Transcendentalists’ reception of German idealism as well as historicism. 
Through a comparison of Staël’s earlier cultural study De la Littérature 
considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales, chapter one works out what 
De l’Allemagne introduces as the characteristics of the German contribution to the 
Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. She suggests that figures such as Herder and 
Winckelmann depart from the positions held by both Ancients and Moderns by arguing 
that the past is not to be imitated or improved. Rather, what she finds in the works by 
these critics and in modes of instruction at schools and universities are critical activities 
that help transform the encounter with classical sources into moments of self-cultivation 
and cultural invigoration. Staël similarly highlights how Herder employs the same 
philological techniques in his translations of religious works, thereby advancing a new 
sense of modern religious experience. 
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The second chapter explores how the textual practices De l’Allemagne identifies 
as paradigmatic for the rise of historicism in Germany are developed specifically in 
Herder’s works. Drawing on his essay on Winckelmann, on poetological writings 
concerned with the reconstruction of ancient genres such as fables, and on his 
theological works, I investigate his translations of secular and sacred texts as sites for 
the anthropological making of meaning and of what he terms the human imperative of 
“Selbstschöpfung“ or “self-shaping.” Through translations and collections, Herder 
makes foreign literatures accessible, I argue, and shows their role in the formation of the 
self as well as disciplines. My concentration on the anthropological interest of Herder’s 
philological efforts foregrounds facets of his work that have been sidelined by the 
critical literature’s focus on his critique of Enlightenment historicism. 
The relationship between historicism, philology and the rise of new models of 
education and religious experience that figure so prominently in both Staël’s and 
Herder’s works resonate powerfully in Transcendentalist texts. The third chapter 
examines how Transcendentalist critics like Marsh and Ripley discuss and adopt 
scholarly techniques of self-abandonment, empathy, and poetic-philology as modes 
through which Herder and Schleiermacher refashioned their practices of preaching and 
teaching. Religious integrity emerges thereby as something subjects acquire by 
carefully honing their skills of reading, writing, and social interaction. Classicists like 
Cornelius Conway Felton and Robert Patton promote similar skills as foundational to a 




The fourth chapter approaches Emerson – the thinker of transition who uses 
literatures of various provenience as sites for the continuous breaking and remaking of 
habits and traditions – against the backdrop of his colleagues’ engagement with German 
scholarship. I argue that his involvement with this discourse uncovers explanations for 
why he would promote such dynamic modes of thinking and engaging with literature in 
the first place. Like his colleagues, Emerson treats myths and the Bible not as 
authoritative and dogmatic texts but as sources providing us with insights into how 
ancient civilizations imparted meaning on their experiences and led spiritually and 
culturally rich lives. In that sense, he suggests that the way to relate to them 
productively is by using them as an inspiration for how to lead equally fulfilling lives. I 
demonstrate that Emerson’s development of the figure of the American scholar and his 
own activities as a freelance lyceum lecturer show how to do that. Taking his fellow 
Transcendentalists’ discussions of the value of scholarship further, he develops 
practices of abandonment, a language of love and friendship, and poetic philology into 






From Words to Worlds: De l’Allemagne and the Recasting of the Ancient Past 
 
Introduction 
It had taken Germaine de Staël years of hardship before she was at last able to 
publish a first London exile edition of De l’Allemagne in the fall of 1813. The author, 
who found herself exiled from her home country by Napoleon, had been en route to 
England through Russia to escape the emperor’s troops. In her baggage was one 
surviving book manuscript. Originally, the distribution of Mme Staël’s voluminous 
study of German history, religion, geography, politics, the arts, and philosophy had 
been scheduled for fall 1810:   
Le 23 septembre, je corrigeai la dernière épreuve de l’Allemagne: après six ans 
de travail, ce m’était une vraie joie de mettre le mot fin à mes trois volumes. Je 
fis la liste des cent personnes à qui je voulais les envoyer dans les différentes 
parties de la France et de l’Europe; j’attachais un grand prix à ce livre, que je 
croyais propre à faire connaître des idées nouvelles à la France. 
 
[On the 23rd of September I corrected the last proof of Germany; after six years’ 
labor, I felt the greatest delight in putting the word End to my three volumes. I 
made a list of one hundred persons to whom I wished to send copies, in different 
parts of France and Europe; I attached great importance to this book, which I 
thought well adapted to communicate new ideas in France.13] 
 
Napoleon, however, was determined to prevent at all costs that this woman and her 
“idées nouvelles” regain public attention in his empire. He made sure that she would not 
                                                
13 Anne Louise Germaine de Staël-Holstein, Dix Années d’Exil, ed. Paul Gautier (Paris: Plon, 1904), 165; 




have a forum to stir open debates over the themes De l’Allemagne markets as so full of 
potential for guiding French culture and politics in the new century. When the news 
reached him that 10,000 copies had been printed in Paris, he ordered that every copy be 
destroyed in front of the eyes of the gendarmerie that had encircled the publishing 
house, making sure that not a single copy would be taken out of the building. Staël 
received the order to hand over her master copy, desist from her adversary activities, 
and leave France within twenty-four hours. 
Bonaparte’s personal prevention of De l’Allemagne’s publication, however, 
backfired. By prohibiting the work he simultaneously set off a successful marketing 
campaign; the book was now even more eagerly awaited by the public and out of stock 
within three days of its publication in London. The first publication in France in May 
1814 right after the fall of Napoleon’s empire was equally profitable, selling about 
70,000 copies within a few weeks all over Europe.14 After having crossed the Rhine and 
the English Channel, Staël’s study of Germany traveled on without pause and crossed 
the Atlantic in 1814 with the publication of the first American edition in New York. 
 The international attention her study elicited and the controversies it sparked 
seem somewhat surprising at first, given that De l’Allemagne’s overall approach to 
identifying characteristics of a culture’s literary works by investigating its history, 
geography and socio-political customs are no novelty in the author’s oeuvre. Staël was 
an incredibly focused thinker; throughout all her works, her investigations are centered 
                                                
14 On De l’Allemagne’s publication history, see Monika Bosse’s “Nachwort” to the latest German 
translation in Germaine de Staël, Über Deutschland, ed. Monika Bosse, trans. Friedrich Buchholz and 




on the same themes and questions. The title of her earlier study from 1800 sums up the 
leitmotiv permeating her thought: De la Littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec 
les institutions sociales.  
Under the heading “littérature,” she subsumes “tout ce qui concerne enfin 
l’exercice de la pensée dans les écrits” [“everything that involves the exercise of 
thought in writing”15], with the exclusion of the sciences. Each of De la Littérature’s 
chapters is concerned with the impact these “exercise[s] of thought” have had on a 
culture’s governmental forms and religion throughout the cultural history of western 
civilization. And, conversely, Staël asks in what ways political institutions, religion, and 
the legal order of a community have been either conducive or detrimental to the thriving 
of the arts, philosophy, and the social sciences.  As Morroe Berger notes in the 
introduction to his translation of selections of Staël’s works, “she really never wrote 
about anything else; all her work was a brilliant elaboration of these themes.”16 In fact, 
many critics of De l’Allemagne read Staël’s chapter on Germany in De la Littérature 
(which she wrote before her first trip to Germany in winter 1803/04) as an early 
template for her later book. 
In both studies, she puts her research into the service of a common, overarching 
objective. All her cross-cultural inquiries are geared toward identifying, assembling and 
popularizing new strategies she felt had potential for bolstering France’s life world in 
                                                
15 Germaine de Staël, De la Littérature considérée dans ses rapports avec les institutions sociales, ed. 
Axel Blaeschke (Paris: InfoMédia Communication, 1998), 16; Germaine de Staël, Politics, Literature, 
and National Character, ed. and trans. Morroe Berger (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000), 
66. 




the post-Napoleonic era. “Oh, France! Terre de gloire et d’amour!”—framed by 
exclamation and quotation marks, this pathos-charged exclamation concluding De 
l’Allemagne leaves no doubt regarding the audience Staël sought to reach with her 
work. The motivating force guiding her comparative readings is nothing less than her 
pressing concern to usher in a new epoch in France. 
 Given these thematic and programmatic ties, why, then, was De l’Allemagne and 
not De la Littérature the work that provoked dismissals, accusations of betrayal of 
French cultural values, prohibition as well as enthusiastic approval among 
contemporaries in France, Europe, and beyond? Why was it De l’Allemagne that 
entered literary and cultural histories as one of the most important and controversial 
books of the nineteenth-century?17 What had happened since the publication of De la 
Littérature, during which Staël had paid two visits to Germany and Austria and 
sojourned Italy in August Wilhelm Schlegel’s company? What makes the assemblage of 
translation clips, memorized citations, and notes from lectures Staël had attended, 
materials from her conversations, personal anecdotes, subjective reflections and 
programmatic proclamations into a multi-volume study so compelling and contentious? 
There is, of course, no one answer to these complex questions. It is, however, 
interesting to see how confidently and surprisingly unanimously Staël’s critics have 
answered them. With minor variations, the critical literature has been telling the same 
                                                
17 On the reception of De l’Allemagne see Udo Schöning, “Mme Staël in der französischen Romantik,” in 
Germaine de Staël und ihr erstes deutsches Publikum: Literaturpolitik und Kulturtransfer um 1800, ed. 
Gerhard R. Kaiser and Olaf Müller (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2008); Edmond Eggli and 
Pierre Martino, Le débat romantique en France 1813-1830. Pamphlets. Manifests. Polémiques de Presse, 
vol. 2 (Paris: 1933); Germaine de Staël, Über Deutschland, ed. Monika Bosse, trans. Friedrich Buchholz 




narrative: De l’Allemagne is discussed as a work which has played an inestimable role 
in spreading a Romantic discourse centered on the autonomy of the subject. John 
Isbell’s and James Vigus’ studies exemplify this focus well: they both argue that the 
book’s main function lies in promoting Staël’s vision of national and individual 
independence in a propagandistic fashion. Germany serves her, so Isbell, as a suitable 
vehicle to develop a counter-model to French politics under Napoleon.18 Similarly 
Vigus, who demonstrates that while Staël had been exposed to a wide range of 
perspectives on Germany, conceptual distinctions were not her goal when she began 
shaping her notes into a narrative in 1808. Instead, her weaving together of German life, 
letters, and landscapes is directly geared toward the promotion of a simple, direct, and 
penetrating image of political and intellectual freedom embodied by “la patrie de la 
pensée.”19 De l’Allemagne’s propagation of the self as the sole foundation of true 
                                                
18 John Claiborne Isbell, The Birth of European Romanticism: Truth and Propaganda in Staël’s “De 
l’Allemagne” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 3-7: De l’Allemagne, he writes, “was 
Europe’s and America’s introduction to the German revolution.” Her “new Romanticism is 
propaganda…full of deliberate lies, and dangerously revolutionary” 3-7. Comparing earlier drafts with 
printed editions, Isbell demonstrates in each chapter Staël’s deliberate distortions and simplifications of 
historical facts. 
19 Germaine de Staël, De l’Allemagne, ed. Simone Balayé, vol. 1 (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1968), 47. 
James Vigus reads Staël’s drafts for her chapters on German philosophy in proximity to Henry Crabb 
Robinson’s notes to the private lectures he had given her on the philosophies of Schelling and Kant. 
Interestingly, these drafts reveal a complexity and nuance of thought wholly lacking from the final 
version. Here, she replaced her long elaborations by short pithy summaries and programmatic 
proclamations. His findings lead Vigus to conclude, like Isbell, that critics often overlook the book’s 
polemic intent, its purpose is to suggest a clear-cut, unambiguous set of proposals for political and literary 
reforms: “Warum hat de Staël auf die komplexen Ausführungen verzichtet? Man muss die polemische 
Absicht hier berücksichtigen. Quellentreue stand nicht im Vordergrund. Man betrachtete De l’Allemagne 
zu oft als bequeme Zusammenfassung der Werke der deutschen Literatur und Philosophie und bewertete 
es ausschließlich hinsichtlich seiner Genauigkeit in der Wiedergabe. Solche Urteile übersehen die 
Polemik, die hier an jeder Stelle auszumachen ist” (“Zwischen Kantianismus und Schellingianismus: 
Henry Crabb Robinsons Privatvorlesungen über Philosophie für Staël 1804 in Weimar,” in Germaine de 
Staël und ihr erstes deutsches Publikum: Literaturpolitik und Kulturtransfer um 1800, ed. Gerhard Kaiser 
[Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2007], 378). His essay is the latest approach which shows that 




knowledge, so the story always goes, crystallizes in the book’s idiosyncratic rendering 
of the Kantian critiques. The chapters on Kant and her introduction of idealist thought 
take center stage in most of the critical works seeking to present a detailed analysis of 
the new subject Staël envisions.20 With De l’Allemagne’s celebration of independent 
subjectivity and freedom of artistic expression, the author found a language with which 
she could distance herself from Napoleon’s dictatorial politics and from French neo-
classical aesthetics, the only art form that could thrive under his rule. By the same 
token, Kurt Mueller-Vollmer argues that her strategies of empowering the individual 
explain her popularity among New England intellectuals in the first half of the 
nineteenth-century. Staël’s way of intuitively understanding nations and cultures in their 
individuality and of approaching literature and the arts by employing her interpretation 
of Kant’s concept of “intuitive feeling” won her works a large American readership.21 
                                                
20 A variety of studies make it their main objective to work out the independence of her aesthetic 
judgments which she developed in conversations with the Schlegel brothers, Charles de Villers, and 
Benjamin Constant: Ernst Behler, “Kant vu par le Groupe de Coppet: la formation de l’image staëlienne 
de Kant,” Le Groupe de Coppet: Actres et documents du deuxieme Colloque de Coppet 10-13 juillet 
1974, ed. Simone Balaye (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1977), 135-67;, “Cross-Roads in Literary Theory and 
Criticism: Madame Staël and August Wilhelm Schlegel,” in Carrefour de Cultures: Mélanges offerts à 
Jacqueline Leiner, ed. Régis Antoine (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1993); Pauline Pange, Auguste-
Guillaume et Madame Staël (Paris: Edition Albert, 1938); Julia Rosen, Kulturtransfer als 
Diskurstransformation: Die Kantische Ästhetik in der Interpretation Mme Staëls (Heidelberg: Winter 
Verlag, 2004). 
21 Taking his cue from two articles by Sir James Mackintosh – a well known lawyer and cultural critic 
and opponent of Napoleon who became Staël’s close companion in London in 1813 – Kurt Mueller 
Vollmer argues that what marks the difference between Staël’s treatment of Germany in De la Littérature 
from De l’Allemagne is a “hermeneutic turn”: “In De la Littérature, Staël still attempted to comprehend 
the diversity of cultures by applying philosophical generalizations to the national particulars. In De 
l’Allemagne, an intuitive idea of the new object, the nation, lies at the heart of her 
deliberations….comparing the two reviews [Mackintosh’s reviews of De la Littérature in the February 
issue of the Edinburgh Review, (Feb. 1813) and De l’Allemagne right after the first exile edition had been 
published in London, Edinburgh Review, (Oct. 1813)], we can detect the watershed that separates the 
rationalist hermeneutics from the intuitively formed understanding of the Romantics” (“Setting the Stage 
in 1813: The Politics and Hermeneutics of ‘Germany,’” in British America and the United States, 1770s-




The attention critics have given to issues of individual independence and the role 
intuition plays therein has completely sidelined De l’Allemagne’s discussion of themes 
linked to the rise of historical criticism in Germany. This chapter focuses these thematic 
fields and argues that they enable us to see Staël’s concern with individual autonomy 
from a different point of view. Moreover, my concentration on how she evaluates the 
impact of German historical scholarship on various spheres of contemporary life opens 
up a new venue for tracing the impact her study had on American Transcendentalism – 
a central topic of chapter three. 
This chapter’s first part places De la Littérature’s cultural historical readings 
against the backdrop of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. In her attempt to 
demonstrate literature’s limitless capacity toward perfectibility on the one hand, and her 
concurrent pointing to the unparalleled perfection of classical art forms on the other, 
Staël reiterates the main argumentative patterns which had propelled the Ancient-
Modern battle. I have found that by utilizing these same interpretive techniques, Staël’s 
inquiries also evoke the same unresolved question which remained long after the battle 
had subsided: the question regarding the role historical, literary, and philological 
                                                                                                                                          
Transformation, ed. Armin Paul Frank and Kurt Mueller-Vollmer [Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2000], 
204). De l’Allemagne has fulfilled a variety of functions in an international context: it introduces a new 
interpretive strategy which allows one to grasp cultures in their individuality, a strategy “which served as 
the basis for her assessment of Germany and its culture” (Mueller-Vollmer, “The Politics and 
Hermeneutics of ‘Germany,’” 205). Moreover, her work performs how the same hermeneutic practice can 
be put to use for the cultivation of a new aesthetic experience. Staël popularizes the idea that “at the core 
of Kant’s philosophy lay an intuitive feeling (sentiment),” a feeling that obliterates all skepticism, and 
whose application “to art and literature alone would give birth to beauty, and this beauty was nothing but 
the ‘image realized of our soul’s representation” (Mueller-Vollmer, “The Politics and Hermeneutics of 
‘Germany,’” 216). In short, De l’Allemagne popularized a discourse congenial to the development of an 
idea of artistic and national autonomy on a transnational scale. 




research plays in countries that fashion their modern cultural self-understanding along 
debates of modes of adaptation of classical forms and styles. As the end of the quarrels 
had shown, the shared universalist historical understanding of the battle parties was 
unable to accommodate the findings of scholarship, suggesting fundamental differences 
between past and present.22 De la Littérature recalls the predicament and comments on 
it without resolving it.  
In De l’Allemagne Staël addresses the question concerning the function of 
historical scholarship for a modern culture’s relationship to the past again. Unlike in De 
la Littérature, however, she develops a number of new responses in dialogue with 
German critics. The chapter’s second and third part are focused on working out their 
characteristics in different thematic fields that illustrate Staël’s changed position 
particularly well. I examine her introduction to what she represents as new ways of 
language learning at German educational institutions, her investigation of 
Winckelmann’s engagement with classical art and its correspondence to the notion of 
art criticism she articulates in her novel Corinne ou l’Italie (1808), as well as her 
discussion of Herder’s translations and reworkings of Hebrew Scriptures.  
What distinguishes these involvements with the Bible and classical culture is a 
relationship to the past that renders the claims that had sustained the old Ancient-
                                                
22 As I discuss in the introduction, neither side was able to incorporate methodologically what the latest 
historical research suggested, namely the fundamental difference of past cultures: while the Modern battle 
party, with their insistence on the limitless potential of ancient works to be perfected, seemed to be on the 
progressive side, it turned out that their arguments were based on the same premises as the ones put forth 
by traditionalists. The arguments on both sides were universalist ones, because the Modern perfectibilié 





Modern quarrels obsolete. Parameters quite distinct from the idea of universally 
achieved perfection proclaimed by the Ancients and the concept of perfectibility 
adhered to by the Moderns come to dominate the discussion centered on the revival of 
ancient cultures. What moves to the fore in Staël’s discussion of Winckelmann and 
Herder or Corinne’s occupation with ancient civilizations are questions concerned with 
the contingency of linguistic expressions and cultural representations. According to 
Staël, the innovative potential of their approaches resides in the techniques they employ 
to compensate for the historical differences separating them from their objects of 
inquiry. They develop practices of engagement premised on techniques of immersion, 
empathy, and emotional and imaginary investment to reconstruct the past. And 
questions regarding the authority and contemporary relevance of ancient Greek and 
Hebrew works are linked to these modes of revival, to aesthetic pleasure, and to the 
contribution they make to the individual’s development. 
So in the context of her involvement with historical criticism, Staël’s vision of 
the independent subject appears as linked to engaging with the cultural worlds, works, 
and languages of others. In concluding the chapter, I will step back for a moment from 
those sections in De l’Allemagne that deal with specificities of historical criticism and 
turn to those in which she addresses her reform project for France more generally. 
Interestingly, her interest in idealism itself appears in a different light when looked at 
through a historico-critical lens. It is not philosophical questions regarding the 
plausibility of an idealist mind set that concern her but rather what it can do for the 




France to regain its strength, vigor, and cultural leadership. Staël is interested in idealist 
philosophy not as a possible road toward rendering the relationship between the world 
and metaphysics more comprehensible but as a practice of thinking that has an impact 
on the ways people lead their daily lives. 
 
 
Reverberations of a Great Divide: From De la Littérature to De l’Allemagne in 
Light of the Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes and the Vorzugsstreit 
 
“De la Littérature chez les Anciens et chez les Modernes” and “De l’état actuel 
des Lumières en France, et de leurs progrès futurs,” the two parts comprising De la 
Littérature, are unmistakably underwritten by a single overall motivation: 
En parcourant les révolutiones du monde et la succession des siècles, il est une 
idée première dont je ne détourne jamais mon attention; c’est la perfectibilité de 
l’espèce humaine…dans les périodes lumineuses, comme dans les siècles de 
ténèbres, la marche graduelle de l’esprit humain n’a point été interrompue. 
 
[As I survey the revolutions of the globe, and the succession of ages, one great 
idea is ever uppermost in my mind, from which I never allow my attention to be 
diverted; I mean that of the perfectibility of the human race…. [I]n the ages of 
light, as well as in those of darkness, the gradual advancement of the human 
spirit has never been interrupted].23 
 
Staël’s inquiries are faithful to the historicism advocated by the Moderns during the 
Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes. Even times of war and crisis which at first seem 
to have been the cause for major developmental setbacks have in Staël’s readings made 
                                                
23 De la Littérature, 40-41; translated as Germaine de Staël, A Treatise on Ancient and Modern 




important contributions to the advancement of humanity. Her discussion of literary 
themes, generic forms and philosophical reasoning within the historically specific 
matrix of different social life worlds is premised on the assumption that “Les 
siècles…sont héritiers des siècles; les générations partent du point où se sont arrêtées 
les générations précédentes…” [“…ages become the inheritors of ages: generations start 
from the point at which preceding generations had stopped…”24]; in an accumulative 
and mechanical fashion, each age has added to the overriding imperative of 
perfectibility.  
Staël exemplifies the enormous advances humans have made since antiquity 
with comparisons between Greek and modern dramatists. She holds the Greek 
dramatists’ lack of “la profonde connoissance des passions” [“a profound knowledge of 
the passions”25] responsible for the major shortcomings of these ancient works. Unlike 
their modern successors, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides have a barely developed 
sense of reflection which becomes manifest in psychologically shallow character 
representations.  
While the emotional depth distinguishing modern plays and the high degree of 
precision in rational philosophical thought seem to have no equal counterpart in the past 
age, the fine arts complicate Staël’s perfectibilié thesis, she claims that “Les beaux arts 
ne sont pas perfectibles à l’infini” [“The fine arts are not susceptible of infinite 
perfection”]. And as for modern poetic works, “les successeurs des Grecs sont restés 
bien au-dessous d’eux [the Greeks]” [“the successors and imitators of the Greeks have 
                                                
24 De la Littérature, 47-48; A Treatise, vol. 1, 71. 




fallen infinitely short of the perfection of their models”26]. Responsible for this 
limitation is the hybrid makeup of poetic compositions, consisting of both once 
perfected, always valid elements as well as of infinitely perfectible ones: 
La poésie moderne se compose d’images et de sentiments. Sous le premier 
rapport, elle appartient à l’imitation de la nature; sous le second, à l’éloquence 
des passions. 
 
[Modern Poetry consists in images and sentiments. When viewed as consisting 
of imageries, it ranks among the imitations of nature; when looked upon as 
composed of sentiments, it then results from the eloquence of the passions.27] 
 
While “la description du  printemps, de l’orage, de la nuit, de la beauté, des combats, 
peut se varier dans ses détails” [“the description of spring, of a storm, of night, of 
beauty, of a battle, may be susceptible of infinite variety in the details”28], modern poets 
are unable to surpass the original vivacity of the imagery energizing a Homeric verse. 
By training the sense of foresight and their ability to anticipate the experience of 
beautiful or sinister natural scenes, modern humans have lost their susceptibility for 
moments of surprise, wonder or shock. It was only by virtue of the ancient poet’s 
pristine faculties that nature could leave “la plus forte impression” [“the strongest 
impression”] on his mind, impressions he then worked into unique poetic images. 
As long as a modern poet seeks to evoke impressions of nature, he is limited to 
reproducing the animated images comprising ancient repertoires. If, however, he shifts 
his perspective and treats perhaps a similar set of images as sentimental expressions, 
they become infinitely perfectible. Modern poetry’s strength lies in scrutinizing and 
                                                
26 De la Littérature, 46; A Treatise, vol. 1, 67-68. 
27 De la Littérature, 46; A Treatise, vol. 1, 69, my emphasis. 




illuminating the complexity of human emotional states and in narrating these states into 
powerful verbal images. Staël’s discussion of poetry’s ambivalent position between 
classical nostalgia and modern progress in De la Littérature exemplifies a version of the 
discursive pattern structuring the Querelle.29  
So while De la Littérature’s large conglomeration of facts and fictions is 
organized around the idea that historical events and literary compositions of each age 
and within each geographical zone have contributed to humanity’s advancement, the 
author is at the same time careful not to antagonize the Ancients by retaining their 
claims.30 She places the different strategies of how the two camps imagined the 
relationship of past literatures and arts to modern life in proximity: the Ancient’s 
recuperative techniques focused on memorization and comprehensive reconstruction 
versus the Modern’s concentration on enhancing procedures geared toward 
improvement. 
And yet De la Littérature also steps beyond the inquiries of the Querelle; the 
study is commonly referred to as a threshold work. It is seen by critics as portending the 
revival of non-classical literatures during the Romantic age by virtue of its rehabilitation 
of the Middle Ages, and the geographical distinction between a literature of the South 
                                                
29 While Staël’s multi-layered intellectual alliances with such thinkers as Montesquieu, Rousseau, 
Diderot, d’Alembert, and Condorcet have been widely recognized, critics have only in recent years began 
to investigate the affinities between De la Littérature and the Querelle. As Berger notes in his 
“Introduction” to Germaine de Staël, “what is less often mentioned is that she drew upon earlier writers 
too, chiefly Charles Perrault and Bovier de Fontenelle” (47, 33). 
30 On Staël’s attempt to make concessions to the validity of arguments on both sides of the divide, see 
Elwood Hartmann, “Mme Staël, the Continuing Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns,  
and the Idea of Progress,” Research Studies 50 (1982), 35 and Axel Blaeschke, “Les ambiguïtés du 




originating with Homer and one of the North leading back to Ossian.31 Regardless of 
these chronological and geographical remappings, however, her survey is underwritten 
by the same methods practiced during the Querelle and by the French Lumiéres. And 
the same open question that stood at the end of it also looms large over De la 
Littérature: namely the question concerning the role of historical research in the context 
of Querelle methods that seek to reproduce and perfect forms of art and literature 
stemming from a culture wholly distinct from the present one. 
Staël addresses this question in “Des Ouvrages d’imagination,” one of the 
book’s closing chapters, and concludes that if one takes into consideration that the 
ancients produced their works under completely different circumstances one has to 
refrain from traditional Querelle practices: 
Si l’on vouloit se servir encore de la mythologie des anciens, ce seroit 
véritablement retomber dans l’enfance par la vieillesse…ces formes poétiques, 
empruntées du paganisme, ne sont pour nous que l’imitation de l’imitation; c’est 
peindre la nature à travers l’effet qu’elle a produit sur d’autres hommes. 
 
[To make use of the mythology of the ancients in these days, would be indeed to 
become childish through old age…. [T]hese poetical forms borrowed from 
Paganism, are to us only the imitation of an imitation, to use them is indeed to 
portray nature through the medium of the effect which it has produced upon 
other men.32] 
 
The passage suggests that it is pointless to draw on ancient mythology in an imitative 
                                                
31 See Elwood Hartmann, “Mme Staël, the Continuing Quarrel of the Ancients and Moderns,  
and the Idea of Progress,” Research Studies 50 (1982); L.R. Lind, “Madame Staël and the Battle of the 
Books,” Classical and Modern Literature 15 (1994); Axel Blaeschke, “Über Individual- und 
Nationalcharakter, Zeitgeist und Poesie. De l’influence des passions und De la Littérature im Urteil der 
Wilhelm von Humboldts und seiner Zeitgenossen,” in Germaine Staël und ihr erstes deutsches Publikum: 
Literaturpolitik und Kulturtransfer um 1800, ed. Gerhard Kaiser (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 
2007); Michel Brix, “Esthétique néo-classique et romantisme,” Nineteenth-Century French Studies 35, 
No. 1 (2006), 26-33. 




fashion because borrowing from and adapting their poetic forms means reworking 
materials that manifest expressions of the effects nature had on humans who lived 
during a different time and under different circumstances. Staël questions whether 
imitation is actually effective enough for France to attain literary success in the future 
and suggests tapping one’s imagination as a new resource in addition to the traditional 
ways of making past literatures productive for the present: 
Le public français accueille difficilement au théâtre les essays dans un genre 
nouveau; admirateur, avec raison, des chefs-d’œuvre qu’il possède, il pense 
qu’on veut faire rétrograder l’art, quand on s’écarte de la route que Racine a 
tracé. Je ne crois pas impossible cependant de réussir dans une route nouvelle… 
  
[A French audience is not generally willing to accept any innovation in the 
theatrical line, justly admiring the masterpieces already in its possession, any 
deviation from the path which Racine has pointed out appears to be prejudicial 
to the art. I do not, however, believe that it is impossible to succeed in a new 
track…33] 
 
She associates the “route nouvelle” powered by “des ouvrages d’imagination” with “le 
genre anglais ou le genre allemand.” Without giving offence to French neo-classical 
taste she proposes a gentle amplification of artistic boundaries by enriching the existing 
canon of masterpieces with “un genre intermédiaire.” Such an intermediate style would 
be distinguished by “l’art de donner de la dignité aux circonstances communes” [“the 
art of giving dignity to common circumstance”34] and appeal to the French audience by 
virtue of its immediate connection to their surroundings. Unlike the classically oriented 
pieces, such works would not be confined to reproducing experiences made by other 
humans. 
                                                
33 De la Littérature, 349-351; A Treatise, vol. 2, 181. 




Staël explores her careful gesturing at the potentials of a new method guiding 
artistic experience and productions to a full and theoretically sound extent in her 
engagement with the German contribution to the Ancient-Modern debate in De 
l’Allemagne. The study argues that “L’imitation des Anciens a pris chez les Allemands 
une direction tout autre que dans le reste de l’Europe” [“In their imitation of the 
ancients, the Germans have taken quite a different direction from the rest of Europe].35 
She does not explicitly name the German Vorzugsstreit when she elaborates on what 
she perceives as a new direction in the negotiation of the relationship between antiquity 
and German cultural life. But, with the exception of Schiller, she links the new 
approach to those intellectuals whom critics have identified as key figures in shaping 
the German contribution to the age-old dispute. For her, Herder, the Schlegel brothers 
and, above all, Winckelmann have reimagined the relationship to the past in ways 
without which the emergence of German culture as a culture of modernity would be 
unthinkable. 
According to Staël’s investigations, these individuals could gain such 
prominence in Germany because of the country’s system of education. The ways in 
which foreign languages, the history of languages, and philology are taught at schools 
and universities are the backdrop against which the resuscitation of classical culture 
could advance in new directions in Germany. By following up on the transformations 
Staël’s former adherence to the Querelle methods is undergoing in De l’Allemagne, my 
examinations provide a new interpretation of its significance. More specifically, I argue 
                                                




that the book makes a crucial contribution toward a reevaluation of the distinguishing 
characteristics of the Vorzugsstreit. 
Although the controversy coming from France and England fell on fertile 
ground in early eighteenth-century Germany,36 it was not until the second half of the 
century, with the publication of the words of Winckelmann, Herder, Schiller and the 
Schlegel brothers, that the debate underwent transformations that sparked the formation 
of a specifically German contribution to the discussion. Critics from Jauss to Oergel 
agree on the centrality of the debate for the formation of a historical consciousness in 
Germany and zero in on the connections between the debate and the emergence of 
historical thinking. Their respective assessments of the characteristics of mid- to late-
eighteenth century historical thought, however, differ significantly. In Jauss’ and 
Szondi’s earlier interpretations, historical thinking is rendered as a disposition that 
delimits the subject in its striving for freedom, posing a major impediment for modern 
culture’s aesthetic autonomy. As a result of their consent in historicism’s 
                                                
36 Compared to its English and French predecessors, the German Vorzugsstreit has received little critical 
attention. In his 1963 preface “Ästhetische Normen und geschichtliche Reflexionen” to Charles Perrault’s 
Parallèle des anciens et des modernes en ce qui regarde les arts et les sciences (1688-1697), Hans-
Robert Jauss wonders in a footnote to what extent the revival of antiquity by Winckelmann and German 
classicism can be seen as having been prefigured by the French Querelle (Jauss, “Ästhetische Normen,” 
9), suggesting that if one can speak at all of a German debate then it set in late with Winckelmann after 
the French Querelle had long been fought out. Later studies—e.g. Peter Kapitza, Ein bürgerlicher Krieg 
in der gelehrten Welt: zur Geschichte der Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes in Deutschland 
(München: Fink, 1981); Thomas Pago, Gottsched und die Rezeption der Querelle des Anciens et des 
Modernes in Deutschland: Untersuchungen zur Bedeutung des Vorzugsstreites für die Dichtungstheorie 
der Aufklärung (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989)—disprove the assumption that there was no 
German equivalent to the French Querelle and the English Battle of the Books. Pago and Kapitza 
assemble vast bodies of texts, showing that Germany took part in the debate even long before 
Winckelmann.  
Jauss himself corrects his earlier claim in Literaturgeschichte als Provokation (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1970) and contributes, together with Peter Szondi in “Antike und Moderne in der Ästhetik der 
Goethezeit,” in Poetik und Geschichtsphilosophie I, ed. Senta Metz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 




characteristics, these critics measure the critical value of these German disputants 
against the degree to which they can convincingly stake out a position that reaches 
beyond the confines of the historical vantage point.37  
What the scholarly literature shares in common, according to Oergel (who has 
contributed the most recent analysis of the debate), is a representation of the awareness 
of the historically mediated character of artistic value as posing an opposition to 
concepts of artistic norm. The interpretations, in other words, are underwritten by the 
assumption that the discovery of historicism in the late eighteenth-century introduced a 
sense of the relativity of cultural values that conflicted with the universality of classical 
standards.38 
                                                
37 Szondi and Jauss interpret Winckelmann’s and Herder’s contributions as caught up in an unsolvable 
predicament. Both writers vacillate between historical readings of classical culture on the one hand, and 
the search for an underlying order by which cultural history could be understood as a whole, by which 
one can conceive of an artistic representation as more than having an intrinsic value of its own derived 
from its origins (Szondi, “Antike und Moderne,” 27,55; Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, 72). 
In both discussions, Schlegel’s Studium-Aufsatz surpasses Herder and Winckelmann in its attempt to 
show a way out of the dilemma by locating the recuperation of a consummate ideal of beauty as it was 
once realized in the past in a utopian future. While Jauss gives Schlegel credit for his bold attempt to 
move beyond history, he interprets the essay as regressive, after all, and aligns Schlegel with the Ancients 
of the French Querelle (Jauss, Literaturgeschichte als Provokation, 87-88). In Szondi’s interpretation, 
Schlegel’s move beyond Winckelmann and Herder is highlighted as successful. According to him, the 
Studiums-Aufsatz delineates a trajectory toward an ideal of Bildung which brings together ancient and 
modern culture that points the way to an overall progressive aesthetic of modern poetry (Szondi, “Antike 
und Moderne,” 118-120). In Fuhrmann’s reading, Schlegel is also successful in his endeavor to 
recuperate the past and in mapping out the future of modern poetry. This model, however, is problematic 
because Schlegel delineates a uniquely German national character and is therefore a precursor to the 
development of a German Sonderweg. In all these studies, Schiller’s essay towers over all other 
contributions from the period. His solution resides in a dialectical model of history. See Manfred 
Fuhrmann, “Die ‘Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes,’ der Nationalismus und die deutsche Klassik,” 
in Deutschlands kulturelle Entfaltung. Die Neubestimmung des Menschen, ed. Bernhard Fabian 
(München: Kraus, 1980), 49-67. 
38 Maike Oergel’s Culture and Identity: Historicity in German Literature and Thought 1770-1815 
(Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2006) is the most recent book reviewing a vast body of critical works on German 
historicism and its prevalent theorizing as a mode of thought standing in opposition to what is conceived 
of as Enlightenment universalism. Oergel agrees with the majority of critics that the discovery of the 
temporality of cultural values and its theorizing found its first comprehensive expressions in Germany: 




By reconsidering the unresolved historical question which the French battle had 
raised and its recasting throughout the Vorzugsstreit, Oergel brings to bear a new 
perspective on the German debate. She argues that it has to be conceived of as 
intellectually coherent in its departure from the Querelle and its unanimous emphasis on 
rethinking universalist questions within the context of historicity. What stands out as the 
discussion’s distinct characteristic is a non-confrontational, integrative argumentative 
pattern. Schlegel, Herder or Schiller are all focused on developing theoretical models by 
means of which highly regarded attributes of classical culture can be transformed into 
vital ingredients of modern forms and concepts of art. 
I suggest that Staël’s representation of methods of learning and teaching at 
educational institutions and her appraisal of works by participants of the German 
Ancient-Modern debate substantiate this claim: De l’Allemagne shows that the 
intellectual climate in which these writers and critics worked was conducive to 
                                                                                                                                          
Culture and Identity, 2). See also George Iggers, Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft: eine Kritik der 
traditionellen Geschichtsauffassung von Herder bis zur Gegenwart (Wien: Böhlau, 1997), 15: “freilich ist 
es eine unbezweifelte Wahrheit, dass der Historismus in Deutschland seine entscheidende Ausformung 
erhalten hat.” While Oergel agrees with other critics that historical thinking originated in Germany, her 
study departs significantly from previous explanations in her approach to theorizing how we ought to 
understand the characteristics of eighteenth century historicism. What influential works—e.g. Friedrich 
Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus, ed. Carl Hinrichs (München: Oldenbourg Verlag 1959); 
Hermann August Korff, Geist der Goethezeit: Versuch einer ideellen Entwicklung der klassisch-
romantischen Literaturgeschichte (Leipzig: Koehler & Amelang, 1964); Hermann Nohl, Das historische 
Bewusstsein, ed. Erika Hoffmann (Göttingen: Muster-Schmidt, 1979)—have in common, according to 
Oergel, is the assumption that there always exists an “opposition between Enlightenment ideas and 
historicist perspectives. Invariably, their definitions centre on a rejection, or an overcoming, of the 
Enlightenment” (Oergel, Culture and Identity, 2). Another example of a dichotomous conceptualizing of 
historicism is the essay collection edited by Wilhelm Voßkamp, Klassik im Vergleich: Normativität und 
Historizität europäischer Klassiken, DFG-Symposium 1990 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993). The editor 
represents in his introduction to the volume the opposition between historicism and idealism in European 
classicism as the shared notion of the essays assembled in the volume: “Die stets widersprüchliche 
Einheit von Idealitätsanspruch und Geschichtlichkeit im Klassik-Begriff wird im Vergleich 





rethinking and reconstructing the idea of enduring classical models within the context of 
their historicity. In her discussions, the German critics lay emphasis on the 
reconstitution of the practical usefulness of classical culture. And it thereby becomes 
clear that the exacerbated construction of a binary opposition between historical and 
normative understandings of cultural values fails to take into account that the very idea 
of an authoritative cross-cultural norm itself undergoes a major transformation. 
 
 
Rethinking the Past through the Lens of Language Education, and Winckelmann 
 
Why and how would the recuperative project of ancient culture take a different 
direction in Germany? Staël’s explanations do not suggest that the recasting of the 
ancient-modern relation was a testament to any native skill but rather a function of 
educational reforms, in particular in the area of language study. By making the learning 
of languages the basis of all “établissements d’éducation,”39 universities trained the 
most capable men: “toute la gloire littéraire de l’Allemagne tient à ces institutions” 
[“the literary glory of Germany depends altogether upon these institutions”].40 Staël 
explains the success of “Des universités allemandes” with their placing of the study of 
languages at the core of a student’s curriculum. 
Her ways of assessing the educational value of learning a language in De 
l’Allemagne differs significantly from the vantage point she holds in De la Littérature. 
                                                
39De l’Allemagne, vol. 1, 141. 




Regardless of whether it is Greek, Latin or any other language, the objective of a 
student’s engagement with it is not the training of memory and the internalization of 
figures of speech. What moves into the foreground instead is the function of the study 
of languages as a student’s window into the complexities of human existence. Nothing, 
she writes, articulates “les problèmes de la vie” where none is simply “positif, aucun 
n'est absolu,” better than languages. To clearly demonstrate what she takes to be the 
benefits of exposing young people to different languages, she sets a language-based 
education up against a mathematical one: 
L'étude des langues, qui fait la base de l'instruction en Allemagne, est beaucoup 
plus favorable aux progrès des facultés dans l'enfance, que celle des 
mathématiques ou des sciences physiques... cette étude, dans le premier âge, 
n'exerce que le mécanisme de l'intelligence; les enfants que l'on occupe de si 
bonne heure à calculer perdent toute cette sève de l'imagination, alors si belle et 
si féconde, et n'acquièrent point à la place une justesse d'esprit transcendante: 
car l'arithmétique et l'algèbre se bornent à nous apprendre de mille manières des 
propositions toujours identiques. Les problèmes de la vie sont plus compliqués; 
aucun n'est positif, aucun n'est absolu: il faut deviner, il faut choisir, à l'aide 
d'aperçus et de suppositions qui n'ont aucun rapport avec la marche infaillible du 
calcul.  
 
[The study of languages, which forms the basis of instruction in Germany, is 
much more favorable to the progress of the faculties in infancy, than that of the 
mathematics or of the physical sciences...this study, in early life, exercises only 
the mechanism of the understanding; children, who are employed so early in 
calculating, lose all that seed of the imagination which is then so fine and so 
fertile, and do not acquire, in its room, any transcendent correctness of mind: for 
arithmetic and algebra are confined to making us acquainted, in a thousand 
different forms, with propositions which are always the same. The problems of 
life are more complicated; none are positive, none are absolute; we must guess, 
we must choose, by the help of perceptions and suppositions, which have no 
relation to the infallible progress of calculation].41 
 
                                                




In her eyes, the learning and the application of mathematical formulas cannot do as 
good a job in preparing students for life as their occupation with languages can. At basic 
levels, mathematical reasoning is not helpful because it does not push the learner to step 
beyond clearly distinguished categories of right and wrong. Languages, by contrast, 
foster the ability to approach problems and questions in a much more flexible and open 
fashion and challenge the student to draw on his imagination. This characteristic of 
languages becomes particularly obvious, Staël writes, when we examine their histories; 
depending on when, where, and how they were used, their meaning would change: “tout 
a passé par les mots et tout s'y retrouve quand on sait les examiner: les langues sont 
inépuisables pour l'enfant comme pour l'homme, et chacun en peut tirer tout ce dont il a 
besoin” [“every thing has passed by means of words, and every thing is again found in 
words when we know how to examine them: languages are inexhaustible for the child 
as well as for the man, and every one may draw from them whatever he stands in need 
of”].42 They exhibit an inexhaustible array of different modes of thinking and styles of 
existence. Words, Staël suggests, are windows into worlds, because their histories and 
different usages disclose to us narratives of the creation of meaning and truth.43 And 
they do something more, this quote suggests: they function as an archive open for all to 
employ them and put them into the service of their own purposes. 
                                                
42 De l’Allemagne, vol. 1, 142; Germany, vol. 1, 182. 
43 The phrase “from words to worlds” which I use in this chapter’s title and in variations throughout my 
text is borrowed from Caroline Winterer, The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in 
American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). Winterer – 
whose research is crucial for the argumentation of my third chapter – uses the expression to sum up the 
major argument of her study: that during the antebellum period “classical scholars and other educated 
Americans turned from a love of Rome and a focus on classical grammar to a new focus on ancient 




This discussion of the nature, function, and use of languages implies an 
understanding of foreign literatures and cultures, I claim, that differs fundamentally 
from the one she holds in De la Littérature. Her approach to words as expressions of 
different creations of meaning makes the one she promotes in her earlier study look 
dated: a student who has learned to engage with languages as living systems that are 
transforming continuously is unlikely to simply imitate literary forms and styles of 
Greek or any other culture but will process texts actively and productively. Staël 
suggests that teachers cannot begin early enough to direct their students’ attention to the 
multi-dimensionality of linguistic meaning. Especially during childhood when “cette 
sève de l'imagination” is prolific, human minds are open, malleable and receptive for 
instable connections between words and experiences of the world. The best way to 
make use of this sensitive period is to challenge them with the experience of learning 
more than one language: 
Le sens d'une phrase dans une langue étrangère est à la fois un problème 
grammatical et intellectuel; ce problème est tout-à-fait proportionné à 
l'intelligence de l'enfant: d'abord il n'entend que les mots, puis il s'élève jusqu'à 
la conception de la phrase, et bientôt après le charme de l'expression...se fait 
sentir par degrés à l'enfant qui traduit. Il s'essaie tout seul avec les difficultés que 
lui présentent deux langues à la fois, il s'introduit dans les idées successivement, 
compare et combine divers genres d'analogies et de vraisemblances; et l'activité 
spontanée de l'esprit...est vivement excitée par cette étude. Le nombre des 
facultés qu'elle fait mouvoir à la fois lui donne l'avantage sur tout autre travail, 
et l'on est trop heureux d'employer la mémoire flexible de l'enfant à retenir un 
genre de connoissances, sans lequel il seroit borné toute sa vie au cercle de sa 
propre  nation, cercle étroit comme tout ce qui est exclusif.  
 
[The sense of an expression in a foreign language is at once a grammatical and 
an intellectual problem; this problem is altogether proportioned to the 
understanding of a child: at first he understands only the words, then he ascends 




gradually perceived by the child while engaged in translating; he makes a trial of 
himself with the difficulties which are presented to him by two languages at a 
time;—he introduces himself to the several ideas in succession, compares and 
combines different sorts of analogies and probabilities; and the spontaneous 
activity of the mind...is in a lively manner excited by this study; the number of 
faculties which it awakens at the same time, gives it the advantage over every 
other species of labor; and we are too happy in being able to employ the flexible 
memory of a child, in retaining a sort of information, without which he would  be 
all his life confined to the circle of his own nation, a circle narrow like every thing which is 
exclusive].44 
 
What trains a child’s sense for the rich variability of a word’s meanings are translation 
exercises. Switching back and forth between different languages, it begins to associate 
meanings with whole sets of different and analogical word formations, compares ideas 
and explores a range of ways to articulate them. In Staël’s eyes, such encounters with a 
variety of expressions exercise a child’s flexible mind, animating its free and 
independent practice. And these exercises force the translator to step beyond the 
confines of a single nation and language. 
Staël’s preference of language learning over mathematics for the core education 
of students and children is by no means meant to devalue the sciences. Unlike in the 
field of language studies, however, it takes much longer and involves much more 
training before one reaches the point where mathematical reasoning challenges a 
student’s imagination and creative faculties. Only few people advance in their studies to 
that point while most become familiar with mathematics as a science in which “Une 
proposition en fait de chiffres est décidément fausse ou vraie” [“a proposition in figures 
is decidedly either false or true”]. According to Staël, 
                                                




Rien n'est moins applicable à la vie qu'un raisonnement mathématique...sous 
tous les autres rapports le vrai se mêle avec le faux... L'étude des 
mathématiques, habituant à la certitude, irrite contre toutes les opinions 
opposées à la nôtre; tandis que ce qu'il y a de plus important pour la conduite de 
ce monde, c'est d'apprendre les autres, c'est-à-dire de concevoir tout ce qui les 
porte à penser et à sentir autrement que nous. 
 
[Nothing is less applicable to the conduct of life than a mathematical 
reasoning...in all other relations, the true mixes itself with the false...the study of 
mathematics, accustoming us to certainty, irritates us aginst all opinions 
opposite to our own; while that which is most important for our conduct in this 
world is to understand our fellow creatures, that is to say, to comprehend all that 
induces them to think or feel differently from ourselves].45 
 
In its basic reductionist form, mathematics cultivates a practice of reasoning predicated 
on static, incontestable rules that guarantee specific results. Mental exercises geared 
toward a clearly circumscribed outcome, however, are of little practical value. 
Mathematical thinking is unsuitable for preparing the subject to acquire what Staël 
holds up as one of the most important skills in life—the ability to create a distance from 
one’s opinions. A student has to acquire the ability to think through a question from 
more than one angle and learn thereby why others think the way they do, and what it is 
that motivates others to think and feel differently than he does. According to Staël, 
someone who is used to thinking and expressing himself in a language not his own is 
more likely to feel himself into ways of thinking different from what he is used to. She 
regards this capacity “plus important pour la conduite de ce monde”: 
En apprenant la prosodie d'une langue, on entre plus intimement dans l'esprit de   
la nation qui la parle que par quelque genre d'étude que ce puisse être. De là 
vient qu'il est amusant de prononcer des mots étrangers: on écoute comme si 
c'étoit un autre qui parlât... 
 
                                                




[In learning the prosody of a language, we enter more intimately into the spirit 
of the nation by which it is spoken, than by any other possible manner of study. 
Thence it follows that it is amusing to pronounce foreign words: we listen to 
ourselves as if another were speaking...].46 
 
From its initial stages, the learning of languages makes empathetic transformations, the 
act in which one familiarizes oneself with the unfamiliar imperative. Therefore the 
student who, from early childhood on, has been accustomed to think himself into the 
spirit of cultures different from his own is better prepared, Staël’s discussion suggests, 
for handling the co-existence of different ways of thinking. He knows how to go beyond 
thinking and experiencing what lies within the immediate radius of his familiar zones. 
Furthermore, what makes languages so particularly apt for educational purposes 
is that they challenge both a student’s creative and cognitive faculties simultaneously: 
“La grammaire lie les idées l'une à l'autre, comme le calcul enchaîne les chiffres; la 
logique grammaticale est aussi précise que celle de l'algèbre” [“Grammar unites ideas, 
as calculation combines figures; grammatical logic is equally precise with that of 
algebra”]. The student has to acquire a fixed set of grammatical and syntactical rules 
and apply them correctly. In this regard the learning of languages, the memorization and 
internalization of linguistic patterns, resembles mathematical reasoning. At the same 
time, however, the grammatical logic “...s'applique à tout ce qu'il y a de vivant dans 
notre esprit: les mots sont en même temps des chiffres et des images; ils sont esclaves et 
libres” [“...applies itself to every thing that is alive in the mind: words are at the same 
                                                




time ciphers and images; they are both slaves and free”].47 While words are “slaves” in 
that their usage is regulated within a fixed web of grammatical rules, they are also 
illustrations of mental spontaneity. Viewed as free expressions of the mind, words 
exhibit seemingly boundless imaginary freedom. 
In “Des universités allemandes,” Staël introduces an educational concept 
focused on the cultivation of a culturally literate subject. The objective of learning 
languages is to train children’s and students’ awareness for the broad variety of human 
self-expression and self-fashioning in the medium of language. Moreover, her 
discussion suggests that the exposure to different forms of processing experience and 
expressing it has a stimulating effect on young people’s minds, animating them to work 
more feely and productively with language. 
According to Staël, this approach to education forms a crucial backdrop against 
which the resuscitation of classical culture could advance in new directions in Germany. 
The active cultivation of a historical consciousness and recognition of the alterity of 
other languages and literary works constitutes the baseline for fresh responses to the 
question of what role ancient culture plays in modern life. I interpret Staël’s 
explications about the teaching of ancient and modern languages, and her investigations 
of how critics and writers in Germany have related to and made use of the past as her 
development of a new response to the lingering question of the Ancient-Modern battle. 
She does not explicitly refer to the old debate but given her earlier involvement and the 
group of critics De l’Allemagne turns to, it is justified to draw a direct link between her 
                                                




explications of how the revival of classicism could move in “une direction tout autre 
que dans le reste de l’Europe” in Germany and the historical question raised in De la 
Littérature.  
She singles out Winckelmann as the one whose research demonstrates 
paradigmatically the direction that the revival of the past took in Germany: 
“Winckelmann a banni des beaux-arts, en Europe, le mélange du gout antique et du goût 
moderne” [“Winckelmann has banished from the fine arts in Europe the mixture of 
ancient and modern taste in Germany”].48 He was the first whose work clearly showed 
that artistic rules and classical modes of representation do not simply translate into 
modern frames of reference, and Staël adds that what he demonstrates for the fine arts 
holds true for all literary adaptations as well: “La littérature des anciens est chez les 
modernes une littérature transplantée...les circonstances politiques et religieuses…soient 
changées” [The literature of the ancients is, among the moderns, a transplanted 
literature...the circumstances both political and religious…are all entirely changed].49 
By emphasizing the difference between past and present so emphatically, Staël leaves 
no doubt about her departure from the position she held in De la Littérature. 
What makes Winckelmann’s approach so interesting, in her eyes, is the 
particular mode of critique with which he responds to insights into antiquity’s historical 
differences. She goes so far as to introduce that mode as a revolution in the manner of 
considering the arts and literature: “Toutefois l'homme qui fit une veritable révolution 
en Allemagne dans la manière de considérer les arts, et par les arts la littérature, c'est 
                                                
48De l’Allemagne, vol. 1, 187; Germany, vol. 1, 262. 




Winckelmann.” His writings, she points out, are not focused on improving or on 
preserving and imitating the past: 
Des poëtes, avant Winckelmann, avoient étudié les tragédies des grecs pour   
les adapter à nos théâtres... mais personne ne s'étoit fait pour ainsi dire un païen 
pour pénétrer l'antiquité. 
 
[Some poets before Winckelmann, had studied Greek tragedies, with the 
purpose of adapting them to our theatres...but no one had hitherto rendered 
himself a pagan in order to penetrate antiquity].50 
 
Rather, Winckelmann strips himself of the Christian belief and becomes a pagan. He 
can thereby approach the ancients at eye level and overcome hierarchical barriers. And 
more than that, he even treats them as loved friends: 
Nul avant lui n'avoit réuni des observations exactes et profondes à une 
admiration si pleine de vie; c'est ainsi seulement qu'on peut comprendre les 
beaux-arts. Il faut que l'attention qu'ils excitent vienne de l'amour, et qu'on 
découvre dans les chefs-d'oeuvre du talent, comme dans les traits d'un être chéri, 
mille charmes révélés par les sentiments qu'ils inspirent. 
 
[No one before him had united such exact and profound observation with 
admiration so animated; it is thus, only, that we can comprehend the fine arts. 
The attention they excite must be awakened by love, and we must discover in 
the chef-d’oeuvres of genius, as we do in the features of a beloved object, a 
thousand charms, which are revealed to us by the sentiments they inspire].51 
 
Staël concludes from her reading of Winckelmann that his particular way of combining 
a very personal and emotion-driven approach with detailed critical examinations of his 
objects needs to underlie all investigations of the fine arts. What we can learn from him 
is that the emotions we direct toward an object help to animate them, and become 
personal, alive, and unique. Because of the transformations that artworks undergo with 
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this practice, Staël regards it as authentic and resistant to common nostalgic neo-
classical revival methods: 
L'imagination et l'érudition prêtoient également à Winckelmann leurs   
différentes lumières; on étoit persuadé jusqu'à lui qu'elles s'excluoient 
mutuellement. Il a fait voir que, pour deviner les anciens, l'une étoit aussi 
nécessaire que l'autre. On ne peut donner de la vie aux objets de l'art que par la 
connoissance intime du pays et de l'époque dans laquelle ils ont existé… C'est 
ainsi qu'il faut prendre l'érudition pour guide à travers l'antiquité; les vestiges 
qu'on aperçoit sont interrompus, effacés, difficiles à saisir: mais, en s'aidant à la 
fois de l'imagination et de l'étude, on recompose le temps, et l'on refait la vie. 
 
[Imagination and erudition equally lent their different lights to Winckelmann; 
before him it was thought that they mutually excluded each other. He has shown 
us that to understand the ancients, one was as necessary as the other. We can 
give life to objects of art only by an intimate acquaintance with the country and 
with the epoch in which they existed….It is thus, that through antiquity we must 
take learning for our guide: the vestiges which we perceive are interrupted, 
effaced, difficult to lay hold of; but by making use at once of imagination and 
study, we bring back time, and renew existence.]52 
 
Not only our emotions but also our imagination, she claims, are an indispensible guide 
through the ruins of the past. By following Winckelmann’s lead and feeling ourselves 
imaginatively into the culture of antiquity, we are able to compensate for its lacking 
accessibility and blurred traces. In her eyes, imaginary reconstructions of incomplete 
objects as well as an emotional involvement with them needs to form an essential 
component of any erudite investigation. 
In her novel Corinne ou l’Italie, Staël elaborates in more detail on how a critical 
approach that actively works with emotions and the imagination transforms the 
historical sites of Rome into venues full of life, connected to personal feelings and 
memories. As Nanette Le Coat points out in “Places of Memory: History Writing in 
                                                




Staël’s Corinne,” the novel’s heroine is not only a muse, an improviser, and a poet but 
also an erudite historian and art critic.53 Corinne confronts French neoclassicism – 
represented in the novel by the French aristocrat Count d’Erfeuil – with a new 
perspective on artistic originality that corresponds with Staël’s interpretation of 
Winckelmann’s art criticism in De l’Allemagne.  
The historical tours that Corinne gives her English companion Lord Nelvil (aka 
Oswald) throughout Italy are regularly interrupted by the narrator’s voice which 
complements and explicates Corinne’s accounts. The narrator explains to the reader, for 
instance, that Corinne manages to captivate her listener’s attention by drawing on both 
her intellectual memories – “Les souvenirs de l'esprit” – and the memories of her 
imagination – “Les souvenirs de l'imagination”: 
 
Les souvenirs de l'esprit sont acquis par l'étude. Les souvenirs de l'imagination 
naissent d'une impression plus immédiate et plus intime qui donne de la vie à la 
pensée, et nous rend, pour ainsi dire, témoins de ce que nous avons appris. 
 
[Intellectual memories are acquired by study. Memories of the imagination stem 
from a more immediate, more profound impression, which gives life to our 
thoughts and makes us, as it were, witnesses of what we have learned.]54 
 
Later on in the novel, a longer commentary explains in more detail why Corinne’s 
approach should be considered much more productive, interesting, and pleasurable than 
one that relies simply on historical facts: 
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Les érudits qui s'occupent seulement à recueillir une collection de noms qu'ils 
appellent l'histoire sont sûrement dépourvus de toute imagination. Mais pénétrer 
dans le passé, interroger le coeur humain à travers les siècles, saisir un fait par 
un mot, et le caractère et les moeurs d'une nation par un fait, enfin remonter 
jusques aux temps les plus reculés, pour tâcher de se figurer comment la terre, 
dans sa première jeunesse, apparaissait aux regards des hommes, et de quelle 
manière ils supportaient alors ce don de la vie que la civilisation a tant 
compliqué maintenant ; c'est un effort continuel de l'imagination, qui devine et 
découvre les plus beaux secrets que la réflexion et l'étude puissent nous révéler. 
Ce genre d'intérêt et d'occupation attirait singulièrement Oswald…. 
 
[The scholars who are concerned only to gather a collection of names which 
they call history are undoubtedly devoid of any imagination. But to delve into 
the past, to question the human heart across centuries, to grasp a fact through 
one word, and the character and customs of a nation from one deed, in short to 
go back to the most far-off times, to try to imagine how the world, in its first 
youth, appeared to the eyes of men, and how at that time they bore the gift of 
life which civilization has made so complicated today, that requires a sustained 
effort of the imagination, which penetrates and discovers the finest secrets that 
meditation and study can reveal to us. Oswald was particularly attracted to that 
kind of interest and occupation….]55 
 
What makes Corinne’s stories attractive, in the narrator’s opinion, is that she does not 
burden her companion’s attention with studious historical details but picks out selected 
aspects that appear significant to her. Drawing on her empathetic and imaginative 
faculties, she uses those aspects as a springboard to draw out larger historical 
connections and weaves her observations thereby into bigger narratives. The 
connections between Corinne’s practices and those of Staël’s Winckelmann are quite 
obvious. Both revive the ruins of antiquity for their contemporary audience by 
advancing techniques of reconstruction that include an active incorporation of personal 
emotions, empathy, and the imagination. 
                                                




With the promotion of such models of revival, she clearly distances herself from 
those practiced during the Querelle. Regardless of whether we turn to Winckelmann, 
Corinne, or to what Staël introduces as new modes of language instruction at German 
educational institutions, the transformation that her historical understanding undergoes 
cannot be overlooked. She views languages, literatures, and the fine arts as culturally 
and historically unique expressions that give those able to interpret them insights into 
foreign worlds and people’s experiences thereof. Her discussions suggest that the way 
to render them contemporary in a productive fashion is to employ techniques such as 
those practiced by Winckelmann or Corinne. For her they have an exemplary function 
because  of how they succeed in making their listeners’ and readers’ encounter with the 
past informative, pleasurable, personal, and aesthetically engaging.56 
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Staël’s Herder, Religious Revival, and the Project of France’s Cultural Recovery 
 
De l’Allemagne, as I have illustrated, explores the historical question which 
Ancient and Modern interpretative practices had brought to the fore from a new vantage 
point. Staël observes that in Germany the growing awareness of the historical 
embeddedness of languages and literatures facilitates the dissemination of altogether 
new approaches to reconstituting the past, approaches that actively work with capacities 
of imagination, empathy, and emotion. Not only the legacies of the pagan Greeks, 
however, become touchstones for a modern cultural self-understanding in Germany. Of 
equal significance are, according to Staël, new methods of resuscitating the Bible. De 
l’Allemagne introduces Herder as an important figure who – similar to Winckelmann, as 
far as basic methodological aspects are concerned – combines empathy and imagination 
with scholarly acumen for the purpose of bringing religious writings to life: 
 
Herder s'attachoit à pénétrer le génie des temps les plus reculés, peut-être que la 
qualité qu'il possédoit au suprême degree, l'imagination, servoit mieux que toute 
autre à les faire connoître... il semble qu'on se promène au milieu de l'ancien 
monde avec un poëte historien qui touche les ruines de sa baguette et reconstruit 
à nos yeux les édifices abattus.... et celui de tous ses ouvrages où l'on reconnoît 
le plus jusqu'à quel point il portoit le tact des nations étrangères, c'est son essai 
sur la poésie hébraïque. Jamais on n'a mieux exprimé le genie de ce peuple 
prophète, pour qui l'inspiration poétique étoit un rapport intime avec la divinité. 
 
[...as Herder’s object was to penetrate the genius of the earliest periods of time, 
perhaps the quality he most eminently possessed, which was imagination, 
proved more serviceable to him in that pursuit than any other would have 
done…it seems as if we were walking in the midst of the old world with an 
historical poet, who touches the ruins with his wand, and erects anew before our 




most readily discovers how far he could adopt the spirit of foreign nations. The 
genius of a prophetic people, for whom poetical inspiration consisted of its 
intimate connection to divinity, was never better expressed].57 
 
In Staël’s eyes, Herder’s ability to immerse himself in distant centuries can best be 
studied in his major theological work Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie. This 
unfinished study brings together historical narratives, translations of poetry from the 
Old Testament as well as from Oriental literatures, and what makes it so appealing, she 
suggests, is how Herder arranges and comments on his sources. Vom Geist is not just a 
work by a historian but by “un poëte historien”; what distinguishes the historical poet is 
that he uses his imagination to remake missing links and connections between the 
themes and sources he investigates. (Years later, this observation will become central 
for Transcendentalist evaluations of the value of Herder’s collections of Hebrew poetry, 
on which see chapter three, part one.) The imaginative mode helps to transport the 
reader back in time and make it appear in vivid images before his inner eye. And 
Herder’s poetic reworkings do more than that: he brings his sources into a form 
conducive to the reader’s active engagement with them: “On a dit que ses écrits 
ressembloient à une conversation animée: il est vrai qu'il n'a pas dans ses ouvrages la 
forme méthodique qu'on est convenu de donner aux livres” [“It has been said, that his 
writings resemble an animated conversation: it is true that he has not made use of that 
methodical form in his works, which is given to books in general”]. Herder maintains 
the open and lively conversational style he found in his transcripts. Unlike modern book 
prints that arrange and present their themes within some sort of organizational 
                                                




framework, Herder’s translations, she writes, are held in the provisional style of 
“entretiens écrits” [“written down conversations”].58 
 By refraining from corseting the Hebrew poems into a form in accord with 
modern understandings of logic, Herder can sustain the dynamic of the ancient verses 
and retain an open format that facilitates an equally open engagement by the reader with 
his texts. It is the way in which his “théologie poétique” inspires readers to express their 
religious feelings in poetic imagery that Staël regards as the most productive and 
forward-looking aspect of his collections: 
Herder le premier fit renaître la foi par la poésie: profondément instruit dans les 
langues orientales, il avoit pour la bible un genre d'admiration semblable à celui 
qu'un Homère sanctifié pourroit inspirer. 
 
[Herder was the first to regenerate faith by poetry: deeply instructed in the 
eastern languages, he felt a kind of admiration for the Bible like that which a 
sanctified Homer would inspire].59 
   
By means of the form and style of his reworkings, he finds ways to contribute to the 
revival of people’s spiritual lives through poetry, and he thereby pushes the Bible into 
the realm of aesthetics and national literature. Based on this appraisal of the function of 
Herder’s works on the Old Testament, I suggest that De l’Allemagne introduces its 
readers to what Jonathan Sheehan refers to as the invention of the cultural Bible in 
Germany. A cultural Bible is a text “whose legitimacy and authority [is] embedded no 
longer in theology, but in that complex of literature, teaching, scholarship, and history 
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that came to be called culture.”60 According to Sheehan, a cultural interpretation of the 
Bible is no longer premised on the assumption that the Holy Scriptures, if thoroughly 
scrutinized, disclose the truth of God’s words. Rather, for a cultural reader, their 
authority resides in the changing functions the texts have had throughout different times 
and within different cultural contexts. In Sheehan’s account of the production of the 
cultural Bible in late eighteenth-century Germany, Herder’s theological writings occupy 
a key position.61 
More specifically, he argues that the important role of Herder’s investigation of 
the relationship between the Old Testament and the national self-understanding of 
ancient Hebrew culture lies in the conclusions Herder draws from this link for the 
Bible’s place in German culture: “if the literature of the Hebrews was a national one, 
then translation would be the secret to resurrecting the Bible as a specifically German 
literary text.”62 These observations are relevant for Staël’s introduction of Herder in De 
l’Allemagne, because she also emphasizes that Herder makes the engagement with the 
Scriptures not only an occasion for a revival of faith by poetry but also for contributing 
to the national bonding amongst the members of a German speaking cultural 
community. 
She points out connections between those writers she groups together as “Les 
écrivains religieux de L’Allemagne actuelle” [“The current religious writers of 
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Germany”] and the formation of a literary canon. She suggests that Bible translations 
have gone beyond contributing to an appreciation of the aesthetic beauty of Hebrew 
poetry. Crucially, the “sentiments religieux” which works like Vom Geist have 
facilitated are of a specific kind: “le caractère national en est empreint, et le génie des 
arts et de la littérature y puise toute son inspiration” [“...the national character is 
impressed with them (religious sentiments), and it is from them that the genius of the 
arts and of literature draws all its inspiration”].63 The poetic expressions which 
translators like Herder would employ to recuperate the character of the Hebrew verses 
inspired other modes of forging the Scriptures in German idioms and within modern 
literary forms.  
On her travels through Germany’s northern Protestant areas, Staël observes a 
strong confidence and faith among the inhabitants in the truth of their religious feelings, 
of their enthusiasm: “l’enthousiasme signifie Dieu en nous” [“enthusiasm signifies God 
in us”].64 Northern Germany, she writes is the region in which, unlike in the Catholic 
south, theological questions have been scrutinized in depth. And it is “la réunion d’une 
foi vive avec l’esprit d’examen” [“the union of a lively faith with the spirit of 
inquiry”]65 which paved the way for religion’s revival, inspiring the composition of 
poetry and creating feelings of belonging.66 
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At this point, the shared practices and functions of the revival of the classics and 
the Bible throughout De l’Allemagne become evident. Herder’s poetic reworkings of 
Hebrew poetry and Winckelmann’s reconstructions of Greek art are underwritten by the 
same techniques: both seek to fully immerse themselves in the other culture and turn 
that moment of empathetic immersion into an occasion for a creative reconstitution. 
Staël emphasizes that these processes can transform the subject’s mode of perception 
and enable it to experience the world and express itself anew spiritually or in other 
ways. She proposes that this ability inhabits a central function for Germany’s cultural 
development. Her discussions, in other words, suggest that the interlinking of the 
reconstitution of ancient texts and objects with processes of displacement and 
immersion elicited a reconceptualizing of categories of artistic and religious truth that 
contributed in major ways to Germany’s cultural unfolding. 
In “De la Poésie Allemande” she turns to Goethe and comments on the 
naturalness of his poetic language which, she writes, developed out of his talent “pour 
se transporter dans les siècles, dans les pays, dans les caractères” [“to transport 
(himself) into ages, countries, and characters”]: 
 
Goethe... est naturel au suprême degree... quand il se transporte dans des pays, 
des moeurs et des situations toutes nouvelles, sa poésie prend facilement la 
couleur des contrées étrangères: il saisit avec un talent unique ce qui plaît dans 
les  chansons nationales de chaque peuple; il devient, quand il le veut, un grec, 
un indien, un morlaque. 
 
[Goethe is to the highest degree natural...when he transports himself to new 




countries; he seizes, with a talent perfectly unique, all that pleases in the national 
songs of each nation; he becomes, when he chooses it, a Greek, an Indian, or a 
Morlachian].67 
 
Goethe applies techniques of empathy and immersion to access and revive the Greeks 
as well as popular literatures belonging to other ages. Through his protean skills, the 
encounter has a transformative effect on his writing, bestowing it with what Staël refers 
to as its non-artificial, natural characteristic. It resonates with the lives of common 
people – “Des poëmes de Goethe et de Bürger sont mis en musique, et vous les 
entendez répéter des bords du Rhin jusqu'à la Baltique” [“The poems by Goethe and 
Bürger are set to music, and repeated from the banks of the Rhine to the shores of the 
Baltic”] – and differs thereby significantly from modern French compositions that “sont 
tout-à-fait inconnues aux gens du peuple et aux bourgeois même des villes” [“are quite 
unknown to the common people, and even to the class of citizens in our towns”].68 
Against this backdrop of Staël’s interest in the role of history for Germany’s 
cultural self-understanding, her notion of individual autonomy appears in a new light. 
Her engagement with modes of instruction and scholarship in the fields of religion, 
classical studies, and language education does not impart the vision of the subject as an 
elite being who exists removed from and untroubled by the currents of historical change 
and institutions. Quite the contrary: her assessment of language teaching at German 
schools and universities suggests that independence of thinking, and the impulse to 
work freely and creatively with words is acquired by students’ exposure to and active 
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work with a broad variety of modes of human self-expression and self-fashioning. For 
the scholars and writers she discusses, the road toward cultural and spiritual 
independence is also paved with a variety of exercises: Corinne and Winckelmann 
establish themselves as art critics and historians by applying special reconstructive 
techniques to the objects under investigation. Similarly, religious critics like Herder 
inspire people’s enthusiasm by means of their writings’ form and style, and by injecting 
a spirit of inquiry into the histories of the Scriptures. 
In conclusion to this chapter, I want to ask in what way this notion of autonomy 
that – to speak with Foucault – takes the self as a work to be accomplished could be 
made productive for our understanding of Staël’s objective to contribute with De 
l’Allemagne to the cultural recovery of post-Napoleonic France. Foucault’s “self-
technology” is a useful umbrella term to subsume the different exercises and techniques 
I have discussed so far and to ask how they might modify our perspective on the nature 
of Staël’s vision of individual independence for France as she articulates it in her 
discussions of German idealist philosophy. 
Foucault develops the concept of self-technology in his late works. In distinction 
to his earlier works concerned with technologies of power and domination, by 1980 he 
had become interested in how “a human being turns him- or herself into a subject.”69 He 
turns away from sweeping historical and epistemological claims regarding discursive 
techniques of power and domination. The question taking center stage in his last works 
is how “one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one 
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sees.”70 How can the individual impact and change the pervasive influence current ways 
of thinking exercise over his life? 
In the Vermont lectures, he examines techniques of self-formation from the 
early Greek to the Christian age and defines them as activities that 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state 
of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.71 
 
He examines the self-activities, the work that people have performed on themselves to 
reach a state different from their current one, throughout different historical periods. In 
his account, classical culture figures as the golden age congenial to the flourishing of a 
variety of lifestyles; the subject was free to form his own independent mode of 
existence.72 In the age of Christianity, by contrast, self-techniques were highly regulated 
and controlled. Christian moral codes subjected the self to the performance of practices 
under the surveillance of pastoral authorities.73 While Foucault’s specific appraisals of 
the distinguishing characteristics of the history of the subject in antiquity and 
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Christianity have sparked much critique, the overall approach itself has proved 
productive for critical investigations focused on exploring changing forms of human 
self-conception over the course of history.74 
His approach also provides a useful framework for interpreting De l’Allemagne 
because in each domain of her historico-critical inquiries, Staël examines “to what 
extent the effort to think one’s own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, 
and so enable it to think differently.”75 Regardless of whether she talks about how to 
revive antiquity, the spirit of religious writings, or the need to broaden one’s horizon by 
comparing different languages, she suggests throughout that the function of feeling 
oneself into other cultures lies in “free[ing] thought from what it silently thinks.” By 
employing a number of self-technologies (in my discussions I refer to them as practices, 
exercises, or techniques), the subject frees itself from commonly held assumptions 
about the authoritative nature of religious dogmas or artistic norms and begins to think 
differently. It achieves thereby a new state of freedom and independence. 
I suggest approaching her concern with the autonomy of the self in the context 
of her interpretation of German idealist thinking in a similar way. She is clearly not 
interested in this tradition as a means to bring the individual closer to the true meaning 
of things but rather in the effect the direction of idealist thinking can have on those 
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engaging it. She is interested in it, I want to propose, as a self-technology that has the 
power to lead France into new directions of thinking. For a variety of complex reasons, 
she is deeply concerned with the philosophical beliefs that have informed the character 
of the French zeitgeist since the beginning of the Napoleonic era.76 A major target for 
her attacks is the pervasive dominance of “la philosophie des sensations,” a highly 
reductive version of sensationist philosophy that had gained immense popularity among 
the French. 
The list of the many ills in current French society for which Staël locates the 
cause in the prevalent assumption that the mind is formed exclusively by what comes 
through the senses is long and dense. Whether she turns to social issues, literary themes 
or political topics, what emerges as the overriding characteristic of sensationist thinking 
is the proliferation of a lethargic, enervated, and uninspired outlook on the world. 
People assume 
...qu'on ne peut rien à rien, ils répètent, avec l'ermite de Prague dans Shakespear, 
que ce qui est, est, et que les theories n'ont point d'influence sur le monde. Ces 
hommes finissent par rendre vrai ce qu'ils disent; car avec une telle manière de 
penser on ne sauroit agir sur les autres... 
 
[...that nothing can be done with nothing; they repeat, with the Hermit of Prague, 
in Shakespeare, that what is, is, and that theories have no influence on the world. 
Such men leave off with making what they say true, for with such a mode of 
thinking they cannot act upon others...].77 
 
                                                
76 Claudia Moscovici, “Between Two Worlds: Germaine Staël’s De l’Allemagne,” in Romanticism and 
Postromanticism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 27-37 details Staël’s critique and investigates 
the relation of the author’s objections to the leading currents of philosophical thinking in France. 




An empirically grounded self-understanding withdraws the subject’s capacities from 
itself and disqualifies any practices of self-care and theories proclaiming that such 
practices can actually affect something. In light of the subject’s lacking confidence in 
the strength and transformative impact of its abilities, Staël seeks to introduce a new 
mode of thinking that she considers as having the potential to turn the present French 
mind-set: 
Si l'on admettoit au contraire que l'âme agit par elle-même, qu'il faut puiser en 
soi pour y trouver la vérité, et que cette vérité ne peut être saisie qu'à l'aide d'une 
méditation profonde, puisqu'elle n'est pas dans le cercle des expériences 
terrestres, la direction entière des esprits seroit changée. 
 
[If it was admitted, on the contrary, that the soul acts by itself, and that we must 
draw up information out of ourselves to find the truth, and that this truth cannot 
be seized upon, except by the aid of profound meditation, because it is not 
within the range of terrestrial experience; the whole course of men’s mind would 
be changed].78 
 
Her use of the subjunctive here indicates that her interest in a philosophy of life 
premised on the idea of preexistent forms of knowledge is not concerned with questions 
of the truth or falsehood of such an assumption. As she writes, “Il n'est pas probable que 
nous puissions jamais connoître les vérités éternelles qui expliquent l'existence de ce 
monde” [“It is not likely that we should ever be able to know the eternal truths which 
explain the existence of this world”].79 She does not, as has often been argued, stake out 
a position focused on establishing epistemological security.80 Rather, she envisions the 
                                                
78 De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 114; Germany, vol. 3, 49, my emphasis. 
79 De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 90; Germany, vol. 3, 3. 
80 See, for instance, Udo Schöning: “Mme Staël in der französischen Romantik,” in Germaine Staël und 
ihr erstes deutsches Publikum: Literaturpolitik und Kulturtransfer um 1800, ed. Gerhard R. Kaiser and 




promotion of what she takes to be Germany’s idealist mode of thinking as a healing 
formula for her own society, which she diagnoses as suffering from moral decline and 
literary stagnation.81 In the social sphere, the sensationist mind-set has produced 
hedonistic lifestyles and corrupted moral values: “Si tout ce qui compose notre volonté 
nous vient  des objets extérieurs, chacun peut en appeler à des relations particulières 
pour motiver toute sa conduite” [“If all that composes our will comes to us from 
external objects, every one may appeal to his own particular relations for the motives of 
his whole conduct...”].82 And in the realm of literature, the sensationist conception of 
reality has stunted the thriving of works that abound with imaginary imagery.  
Staël’s recipe for a way out of the aridity of France’s cultural landscape lies in 
the active cultivation of an enthusiastic disposition. Throughout De l’Allemagne, she 
proposes that idealist thinking manifests itself in people’s enthusiasm and confident use 
of their imagination (she uses the two terms interchangeably to characterize Germany); 
                                                                                                                                          
perspective sidesteps the confines of materialism and historical relativism: “…in De l’Allemagne [handelt 
es sich um das Projekt] einer politischen, sozialen, moralischen und ästhetischen Erneuerung des Landes 
auf idealistischer Grundlage, ein Gedanke, der in dem ethisch-religiösen und ästhetisch gefassten 
Enthusiasmusbegriff kulminiert. Auf diese Weise entgeht Staël sowohl den Zwängen des Materialismus 
als auch denen des historischen Relativismus….Durch die idealistische Komponente wird es möglich, die 
durch die Anerkennung der historischen Bedingtheit aller kulturellen Phänomene theoretisch bedrohten 
Freiheit und Autonomie des Individuums zu postulieren, insbesondere die des Künstlers als Genie,” 28. 
81 Staël proposes that the philosophical assumptions which prevail in a society define the zeitgeist, the 
general mind-set shaping the feeling and thinking of people in a specific period: “Le système 
philosophique adopté dans un pays exerce une grande influence sur la tendance des esprits: c'est le moule 
universel dans lequel se jettent toutes les pensées; ceux même qui n'ont point étudié ce système se 
conforment sans le savoir à la disposition générale qu'il inspire” [The philosophical system, adopted in 
any country, exerts a great influence over the direction of mind; it is the universal model after which all 
thought is cast; those persons even, who have not studied the system, conform, unknowingly, to the 
general disposition which it inspires], De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 113; Germany, vol. 3, 46. 
82 De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 100; Germany, vol. 3, 25. According to Staël, a society which turns in the first 
place to external circumstances when trying to explain human behavioral patterns fosters an attitude of 
moral indifference. People do not seek the cause of certain predicaments in themselves but hold the 




they designate “la qualité vraiment distinctive de la langue allemande” [“the quality 
which really distinguishes the German nation”].83 Depending on the context of her 
discussion, the terms are religiously connoted (as I mentioned, she notes that 
Protestantism was a major force behind people’s trust in their own spiritual perceptions: 
“l’enthousiasme signifie Dieu en nous”) or designate, more generally, a productive 
approach of dealing with texts and objects and of processing experiences.84 
In her eyes, that is exactly what France needs, and she appeals to artists and 
writers to focus their eloquence and expressive skills on strengthening people’s 
confidence in their “imagination enthousiaste”: 
Les travaux de l'esprit ne semblent à beaucoup d'écrivains qu'une occupation 
presque mécanique... mais de tels hommes ont-ils l'idée du sublime bonheur de 
la pensée quand l'enthousiasme l'anime? Savent-ils de quel espoir l'on se sent 
pénétré quand on croit manifester par le don de l'éloquence une vérité profonde, 
une vérité qui forme un généreux lien entre nous et toutes les âmes en sympathie 
avec la nôtre? 
 
[The labours of the understanding are considered by many writers as an 
occupation almost merely mechanical...but have such men even an idea of the 
sublime happiness of thought when it is animated by enthusiasm? Do they know 
the hope which penetrates the soul, when there arises in it the confident belief, 
that by the gift of eloquence we are about to demonstrate and declare some 
profound truth, some truth which will be a generous bond of union between us 
and every soul that sympathizes with ours?]85 
 
                                                
83 De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 305; Germany, vol. 3, 395. 
84 In her Kant interpretation, the Kantian categories are rendered a reliable basis for moral and aesthetic 
truth which enthusiasm generates. Enthusiasm, she writes, “c'est une disposition innée...et nous 
reconnoissons la beauté quand nous la voyons, parce qu'elle est l'image extérieure de l'idéal, dont le type 
est dans notre intelligence [“is an innate disposition...and we discover beauty when we see it, because it is 
the outward image of that ideal beauty, the type of which exists in our mind”], De l’Allemagne, vol. 2, 
137; Germany, vol. 3, 90. 




Techniques such as eloquence are crucial for effecting an experience of uplift. They put 
people in a position where they feel they act as agents in a process of uncovering truth. 
Writings and artworks that have such an effect, she claims in “Influence de 
l’enthousiasme sur le Bonheur,” set new energies free and contribute significantly to 
people’s happiness. The popularization of this notion of the role of literature and the 




De l’Allemagne’s intense and wide-ranging occupation with modes of language 
learning, theology, religion, and classical studies brought to bear a different perspective 
on the book’s significance. Staël’s discussions of German critical investigations of 
ancient civilizations foregrounds questions of the historical integration of languages and 
literatures, and her interest is focused on bringing into view methods of language 
instruction and reconstituting ancient texts and objects that draw attention to historical 
differences while also developing techniques aimed at integrating the other culture 
productively. In light of the techniques of immersion, empathy, and emotional and 
imaginary animation that Staël introduces as vehicles for the revival of texts and 
objects, her vision of individual autonomy appears as complexly integrated into the 
cultural worlds, works, and languages of others. 
These aspects of De l’Allemagne are usually occluded by the critical literature 




accuracy Staël processed the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, or the Schlegel brothers and 
contributed to their cross-cultural popularity. An interpretation focused on the 
transformations of her historical understanding from De la Littérature to De 
l’Allemagne, by contrast, draws attention to a different facet and to different qualities of 
her project to introduce the French to an alternative perspective on the capacities of the 
subject. In a rather cursory fashion that needs more attention, I asked in the chapter’s 
concluding paragraphs how a notion of independence premised on the subject’s intense 
engagement with foreign cultures and their histories as a language learner, critic or artist 
changes our perspective on the objective of her reception of idealist philosophy. Against 
the backdrop of her historical thinking, the reproduction of argumentative accuracy 
never seemed to be her goal but rather the effect such thinking has on a culture and its 
people. Staël, I argued, is interested in idealist thinking not as a philosophy for or 
against which one can argue but as a healthy mind-set, as a mode of thinking that 






Der Mensch siehet nur, wie ein Mensch siehet: Modern Functions of Ancient Greek 
and Hebrew Literature in Light of Herder’s Anthropological Thinking 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the restructuring of the relation between ancient and 
modern cultures in selected writings by Herder on ancient Greek and Hebrew literature. 
As in the preceding analysis of Staël’s assessment of German historical scholarship, the 
objective is two-fold: First, I tease out the characteristics of the hermeneutic practice 
Herder employs to fashion this relation, and I then investigate his thoughts on how 
people’s occupation with works from the past are of use to their self-development and 
the invigoration of modern cultural life. Second, I ask in what ways Herder’s mode of 
constructing the relation serves the reform objectives he pursued in his professional life 
as a theologian. 
Throughout this examination, I pay particular attention to how Herder’s 
historical revival efforts in the field of Greek and Hebrew literature and its use for 
contemporary purposes are underwritten by his anthropological thinking. His lifelong 
study of the science of man helps to highlight a dimension of his thinking which 
scholars focused on the historicist impetus of Herder’s writings on and translations of 




Herder’s work has been sidelined by critics’ main interest: Herder’s relationship to 
Enlightenment thought.  
The Herder we know best today is the one who attacks Enlightenment 
historiographers’ assumption that the values of their own age are universal, and that 
other cultures could therefore be understood only in terms of Enlightenment standards 
and ideals. We know Herder as someone who like no other thinker of his time urges his 
contemporaries to make an effort and strive to understand human actions, events, and 
works of art internally; who appeals to people to interpret other civilizations within their 
time and place, rather than imposing their own notions. 
 
Some critics have gone so far as to link Herder’s concern with the contingency 
of cultural values with a relativist outlook on historical developments. The most 
important aim of Herder’s investigations into the literatures and cultures of the past, 
they claim, resides in his spreading of a consciousness of difference.86 Other recent 
studies in the field agree that Herder’s primary objective lies in advancing an awareness 
                                                
86 In the field of Anglo-American criticism, this relativistic interpretation of Herder’s historical thinking 
points back to Isaiah Berlin’s way leading scholarship. In his works on Herder and the Enlightenment, he 
sets up Herder as a radical proponent of cultural pluralism; aligning himself with what he takes to be a 
Herderian conception of pluralism, Berlin defines it as “[den] Glauben…an die Unvergleichbarkeit der 
Werte verschiedener Kulturen und…an die Unvereinbarkeit von Idealen, die gleichermaßen gültig sind.” 
See Robert E. Norton, “Die anglo-amerikanische Herder-Rezeption: ‘Gegenaufklärung’ und ihre 
Befürworter,” in Vom Selbstdenken: Aufklärung und Aufklärungskritik in Herders “Ideen zur Philosophie 
der Geschichte der Menschheit,” ed. Regine Otto und John H. Zammito (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2001), 
216-217. The representation of Herder as a counter-Enlightenment figure is equally widespread in the 
field of Germanistik. Reverting to works by Friedrich Meinecke, Hermann August Korff or Herman 
Nohl, Oergel sums up this strand of Herder studies in her discussion of the development of late eighteenth 
century German historicism in Culture and Identity: Historicity in German Literature and Thought 1770-
1815 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 2-13. See also Wilhelm Voßkamp’s introduction to the essay collection 
Klassik im Vergleich: Normativität und Historizität europäischer Klassiken, DFG Symposium 1990 
(Stuttgart: Metzler, 1993): “Die stets widersprüchliche Einheit von Idealitätsanspruch und 




for the plurality of forms of life but they part company with relativist interpretations in 
that they insist on the integrative character of Herder’s historicism. Leventhal to a 
certain extent and especially Morton, Muthu or Oergel are all deeply invested in 
demonstrating that Herder’s responses to Enlightenment historiography is underwritten 
by an integrative impulse: All four critics demonstrate that Herder’s efforts to illuminate 
the lifeworlds and works of ancient civilizations are prompted by his impulse to 
productively correlate and not to oppose the present and past age. Each critic explores 
in different ways the twin gestures of Herder’s integrative approach: his historical 
inquiry into how different cultures shaped their respective moral and aesthetic values, 
and his concurrent concern with their translatability, with the question to what extent 
the cultural resources of bygone eras can function as a source of inspiration for the 
present.  
Morton claims that the way in which Herder puts the languages and art forms of 
the past and present into a dialogue is underwritten by a dialectical structure of thinking 
that later resonates in Hegel and Adorno, among others.87 He interprets Herder’s “Über 
den Fleiß in mehreren gelehrten Sprachen“ as a paradigmatic text of his oeuvre that 
unfolds in the pattern of thesis, antithesis, synthesis and overcomes thereby the split 
between particularism and cosmopolitanism.88 
                                                
87 Michael Morton, Herder and the Poetics of Thought: Unity and Diversity in “On Diligence in Several 
Learned Languages” (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 38-39. 
88 Herder’s method of “Einfühlung” figures thereby as a nodal point where the characteristics of how 
exactly he overcomes the split crystallizes. To understand foreign languages we need to perform two 
movements, which occur simultaneously but in opposite directions: “we must bring them to us, in the 
sense of grasping them from, and in the terms of, the perspective of our own language. At the same time, 
we must go to them, in the sense of achieving a perspective corresponding to theirs.” This process of 




Oergel develops her argument regarding Herder’s effort to relate antiquity and 
modernity against the background of his response to the Querelle; notably in his 
renowned essay on “Shakespeare” (1773), she suggests, he forges a vantage point that 
departs from the positions which had propelled the battle in France and England (see 
chapter I). She argues that Herder formulates his response to the Querelle along 
reconciliatory lines. While the age of the past looks different through Herder’s empathic 
mode of analysis, his essay famously also refers to Sophocles and Shakespeare as 
equals, calling them brothers even. What they share in common is that they are both 
truly representative of their respective cultures, both “are different but equally 
admirable because both of them produced drama that was relevant to their time and 
audience, ‘natural’ in Herder’s terminology, because it had grown from and represented 
their respective cultures.” Shakespeare’s “historical drama” and “ancient Greek 
tragedy” are equals not based on their content but because of their structural 
equivalence: both writers “occupy the same position structurally in their respective 
cultural histories.” By suggesting that Shakespeare’s and Sophocles’ common ground is 
                                                                                                                                          
and culture yields a new perspective; a perspective that is different in that neither the original native nor 
the foreign language remain unaltered. When the two opposing poles come together, they express an 
activity of productive synthesis, a state of fusion in which both native and foreign elements remain in 
force while also transforming and transcending one another. Furthermore, Morton observes that this 
activity of mutual transformation which underlies the confrontation of native and foreign language is also 
the driving force behind Herder’s vision of “the possibility of a distinctive German national literature.” 
The key toward a genuine native tradition lies in taking the literatures of the past as models of inspiration 
and to carve out “a position analogues to theirs, to be to our own time what they were to their eras.” This 
process of self- and culture building by means of crossing linguistic and mental frontiers, fosters the 
contact and communication across national, geographic and temporal boundaries. It contributes 
considerably to the advancement of Herder’s “Humanitätsideal,“ to his vision of “humanity as a unity-in-




the cultural community they each represent and engage, Herder is able to integrate the 
concept of the norm in the historical process.89  
Both Oergel’s and Morton’s investigations uncover argumentative structures in 
Herder’s writing which suggest a productive and enriching relation to the past. Their 
respective claims center on the relation between Herder’s efforts to draw people’s 
attention to cultural diversity and his concurrent concern to further the development of a 
German national literature and the advancement of humanity. Leventhal’s study, by 
contrast, foregrounds the instability and problematic nature of cross-cultural 
communication. The purpose of his examination is to demonstrate that Herder’s 
interpretive method marks a radical departure from the semiotic Enlightenment 
discourse of interpretation as well as from the “Romantic hermeneutics” practiced 
prominently by critics like Dilthey and Gadamer.90 Herder’s divinatory theory of 
                                                
89 According to Oergel’s analysis, Herder links ideas regarding the representation of truth and value in art 
to public recognition and approval: “perfection in art” that is “the state when the artwork perfectly 
expresses and represents the culture it originates from, when culture is first crystallized into art, creating 
identity, and eventually tradition.” While the art work’s normative value is contingent upon its 
recognition within a specific time and culture, its structural value is universal; it remains “as a 
representative ideal of that culture” and survives the currents of historical change.  With his distinction 
between an art work’s structural and cultural specific value, with his claim that the culture of antiquity 
retains its status as an ideal by virtue of its organic qualities, Herder escapes a limited notion of 
historicism and reintegrates normative thinking in his organic understanding of historical processes 
(Oergel, Culture and Identity, 4, 21-26).  
Karl Menges also makes a strong case against the assumption that Herder remains caught in the relativist 
rhetoric of the Querelle, formulating a counter-Enlightenment position. According to Menges, Herder 
rejects both sides of the battle and considers progress as a continuous sequence of “Kulturentelechien.” 
The different ages of cultural development are related to one another by periods in which civilizations 
fully realize their inherent productive potentials. Compare Karl Menges, “Herder und die ‘Querelle des 
Anciens et des Modernes’: Eine wirkungsgeschichtliche Replik,” in Ethische contra ästhetische 
Legitimation von Literatur. Traditionalismus und Modernismus. Kontroversen um den Avantgardismus, 
ed. Walter Haug and Wilfried Barner (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986), 156-159. 
90 Leventhal argues that what Herder shares in common with Lessing and the early Romantics is a 
fundamental doubt in the plausibility of the semiotic Enlightenment discourse on interpretation figuring 
prominently in writings from Christian Wulff, Johann Martin Chladenius and Georg Friedrich Meier to 




reading, the act of feeling one’s way into the spirit of the past has an estranging effect 
upon the subject, facing it with its “limits and boundaries.” According to Leventhal, this 
is not to say that the divinatorial practice rules out the subject’s ability to span the vast 
gulf between different cultures but that Herder imagines the hermeneutic process as a 
conflicting and highly instable one.91 
                                                                                                                                          
in the assumption that the interpreter discloses “the intrinsic value, comprehensibility, authenticity, 
rationality and truth of discourse” (Leventhal, Disciplines of Interpretation,18, comp. also 7); Herder and 
a number of likeminded critics, by contrast, undercut these “underlying ‘rules’ of Enlightenment 
discourse – a discourse of transparency, ideality and immediacy” by advancing a new understanding of 
hermeneutics. The key characteristic of this different understanding is that it “engage[s] in an 
interpretation of the interpretive process itself;” Leventhal observes a “”folding back’ of interpretation 
upon itself” in writings by Herder or Friedrich Schlegel and analyses how they thereby set themselves off 
from the Enlightenment discourse of interpretation (Leventhal, Disciplines of Interpretation, 7). 
Moreover, Leventhal set Herder off from what he calls a “naïve sense of divinatorial reading” by critics 
like Dilthey or Gadamer (Leventhal, Disciplines of Interpretation, 196-198). According to Leventhals’s 
analysis of their “Romantic hermeneutics,” the empathic practice fosters the continuation of “Geist,” of a 
“universal historical spirit that underlies all human expression;” they see in “hermeneutics the task of 
arriving at that spirit through textual interpretation” (Leventhal, Disciplines of Interpretation, 13). 
Through his divinatorial understanding, the interpreter’s task is to fully reconstitute the text’s underlying 
meaning and to enter into a reconciliatory relationship with it. Such a hermeneutic concept foregoes what 
Leventhal underscores as “intellectually revolutionary moments in Herder’s writing,” that is his 
demonstration that while “cultures can be interpreted in principle because they are linguistically 
constituted,” processes of interpretation always posit conflicts between discursive systems and are a 
highly fluctuating undertaking (Leventhal, Disciplines of Interpretation, 203-204). 
For a “Romantic hermeneutic” appraisals of Herder’s work which both follows the tradition of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey while also modifying it, see Hans-Dietrich Irmscher, “Grundzüge der 
Hermeneutik Herders,” in Bückeburger Gespräche über Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. Johann Gottfried 
Maltusch (Bückeburg: Grimme, 1973), 17-57. In his essay, Herder’s divinatorial method, his concept of 
“Einfühlung,” figures as the nodal point where the two gestures of Herder’s reconstructive efforts 
crystallize. The purpose of his research on Herder’s hermeneutics is to demonstrate that his method goes 
far beyond the objective to establish an emotional situation whereby the modern individual can identify 
with the object of his engagement. Herder’s works, he argues, do not suggest that the task of 
hermeneutics lies only in the reconstruction and identification with some original meaning in 
Schleiermacher’s or Dilthey’s sense; but, following the debates sparked by Gadamer’s Wahrheit und 
Methode, Irmscher claims that the purpose of Herder’s method of interpretation is to mark out multiple 
ways in which the past can be of use for the present and future (Irmscher, “Grundzüge der Hermeneutik 
Herders,” 53-55). 
91 The imaginary encounter is always transformative in a two-fold way for “neither the interpretive 
subject nor the aesthetic ‘object’ are extant in their historical individuality, already constituted, as it were, 
prior to any confrontation with the Other.” He regards these dynamic, process-oriented characteristics of 
the divinatorial practice as “intellectually revolutionary moments in Herder’s writing”; that is his 
demonstration that while “cultures can be interpreted in principle because they are linguistically 
constituted,” processes of interpretation always posit conflicts between discursive systems and are a 




 In Leventhal’s analysis, Herder’s fashioning of the ancient-modern relation 
portends a deconstructivist hermeneutics; Oergel takes him to be modeling the relation 
on what she calls a structural level, and Morton views in Herder a precursor of 
dialectical thinking. What their arguments all share in common is that they take Herder 
to be deeply suspicious of any moments in which the reading subject loses sight of the 
limits of comprehending the lives and works of others. In fact, the argumentative 
models they each uncover in their respective analyses of Herder’s texts suggest that his 
thinking is underwritten by a built-in structure of “checks and balances,” disrupting any 
moments which imply the illusion of closure and intimacy. 
 To be sure, in sophisticated and compelling ways these critical studies cast into 
relief Herder’s subtle negotiations between the anxiety of synthesis permeating all his 
writings and his simultaneous exploration of the translatability of cultural values. There 
is, however, another unexplored dimension in his thinking which these existing critical 
frameworks do not accommodate and which comes clearly into view when we take into 
consideration the extent to which the makeup and the direction of his historical 
investigations is shaped by his anthropological beliefs. In light of Herder’s deep probing 
into how humans operate and what it takes to become human, these historical questions 
often fade into the background; when Herder lays out how modern subjects ought to 
form an empathic and affective relationship to distant objects, he does not judge the 
value and plausibility of the relation by the extent to which the subject exhibits its 
distance and difference from the poetic text or art work it revives. What takes center 




poetic genres and the Hebrew Bible can facilitate the human imperative of self-
formation through processes of imaginary world-building. The origin and development 
of self-formation in and of itself without any specified objectives lies at the heart of his 
anthropological thinking. 
 When Herder addresses the objective of humanity and explains what he means 
by “Humanität,“ then the core objective resides in the process of unfolding, training, 
and specialization itself. What lies at the center of Herder’s “Humanitätsidee“ is the 
imperative of self-formation itself; the direction and end of it, however, is not specified. 
Drawing on the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Muthu makes 
this point very clear. Humanity, in Muthu’s analysis of Herder’s anthropological 
thinking, does not stand for a definable objective or quality but for “the sum total, and 
ever changing uses, of our active powers in different ages and places.”92  
If we regard Herder’s negotiation of the ancient-modern relation from this angle 
of a philosophical anthropology, then questions concerning historical accuracy, or the 
limited accessibility of cultural, temporal, and spatial remoteness become less pressing. 
Herder’s attention shifts to the question of what the engagement, of what such 
reconstructive efforts do for the subject, how he makes use of the past. The chapter’s 
first part demonstrates this interest through the lens of Herder’s interpretation of 
Winckelmann. Herder argues that Winckelmann’s contribution to the field of classical 
scholarship lies in his personal and personifying practice. It allows him to unfold and to 
ground the coordinates of his own existence vis-à-vis the invention of a circle of 
                                                
92 Sankar Muthu, “Pluralism, Humanity, and Empire in Herder’s Political Thought,” in Enlightenment 




imaginary Greek friends. In fact, Herder suggests that individual life stories like 
Winckelmann’s constitute a formative element of the emerging discipline of classical 
scholarship. 
Herder takes Winckelmann’s practice as his own point of orientation and 
promotes it in his writings on Greek literature as a valuable strategy. Why does Herder 
ascribe such significance to the use of literary texts as sites for the cultivation of 
personhood? In the second part of this chapter, I argue that his poetological writings on 
the origin of poetry provide an answer. I suggest that Herder pays so much attention to 
Winckelmann’s practice because it echoes what he introduces in his discussion of the 
development of ancient poetic forms as the oldest elements of the human creation of 
meaning. Setting himself off from Enlightenment conceptions of how humans acquire 
knowledge, Herder develops his “Menschenbild” of humans as creatures whose ideas 
all originate in sensation and experience. We perceive the world in analogy to our 
sensuous, embodied existence, and ancient poetic genres like the Aesopian fable exhibit 
this process vividly: with its personifications of acting objects and animals, the genre 
provides a window into the affective and empathic mode humans employ to find 
meaning and orientation in the world. 
With his step-by-step narrative of the fable’s sensuous development, Herder 
draws attention to how our perception of the world is structured by the organ filtering it 
and the medium in which it gets expressed. Through these explications, Herder does 
something more than to familiarize his readership with early manifestations of human 




springboards for their own imaginary mappings. By pointing out that narratives about 
the origin of poetry appear in a different light, depending on the culture we turn to and 
the literary genre or medium of art – be it painting, poetry, or music – we take into 
view, he suggests explicitly that origin questions are a highly contested matter. 
This element of contest determines Herder’s examinations nowhere more than in 
his major theological work Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie. The chapter’s third part 
concentrates on how Herder recapitulates the same anthro-poetological considerations 
governing his discussion of the constitution and function of Greek poetry in his analysis 
of Hebrew literature. I work out how he sets up the narrative of poetic development in 
the context of the Oriental tradition. Much more so than in discussions of non-
theological writings, he works through questions of the origin of poetry by drawing 
attention to a polyphony of narratives competing with one another. Of particular interest 
is thereby how he switches back and forth between settling and unsettling the question. 
Herder and his fictive speaker Eutyphron, I argue, enter the contest and actively 
construct narratives in which the origin of poetry is sometimes located in the structure 
of the Hebrew language and sometimes somewhere else. 
 
 
Herder’s Winckelmann, Classical Scholarship, and the Use of History 
 
Like many of his contemporaries, Herder sets forth Winckelmann’s works on 




undertakings in the field in major ways. The point of my analysis of Herder’s 
engagement with Winckelmann is not for Winckelmann’s sake; rather, I consider 
“Denkmal Johann Winkelmanns” (1777) a suitable entryway into how Herder sets up 
his anthropological position. Within the context of current scholarly debates over how 
to evaluate Winckelmann’s contribution to the emerging field of classical scholarship, 
Herder stakes out what he considers Winckelmann’s main accomplishments in the field. 
And in delineating these characteristics, Herder hones his own humanist approach. 
The essay is Herder’s response to a “Preisausschreiben,” an open contest which 
Landgraf Friedrich II von Hessen had advertised. Upon his return from Italy, he had 
founded the “Fürstliche Hessische Gesellschaft der Altertümer” in Kassel in 1777; a 
principal objective of the society’s members was to evaluate and determine 
Winckelmann’s contributions to the discipline of classical scholarship and support 
further research in the field. For that purpose, they were looking for a “Lobrede auf 
Herrn Winckelmann, worin ausgeführt werden soll, auf welchem Punkt er die 
Altertumswissenschaft vorgefunden und auf welchem er sie zurückgelassen hat.“93 The 
eulogy was supposed to be written in the rhetorical style of the French éloge and 
address the state of the field as Winckelmann had found it as well as the state in which 
he had left it to future next generations of classical scholars. 
 Readers, however, who expect a response that lines up conveniently with the 
society’s criteria for content and style will be disappointed by Herder’s essay. He opens 
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French original and the German translation see Arthur Schulz, Die Kasseler Lobschriften auf 




with a biting critique of the restrictive stylistic and linguistic guidelines, arguing that it 
is impossible to compose an appropriate appraisal of Winckelmann’s life and work 
within the strict corset of these instructions. In fact, Herder goes so far as to reformulate 
the topic of the essay contest itself throughout his text so that it would fit what he 
introduces as a more adequate representation of Winckelmann’s merits; instead of 
taking the state of the field of “Altertumswissenschaften” as his starting point, Herder 
organizes his essay around a quest for the relationship between Winckelmann’s research 
and vital moments and turning points in his personal life. He takes the society’s 
formulation “auf welchem Punkt er die Altertumswissenschaft vorgefunden und auf 
welchem er sie zurückgelassen hat” and replaces the disciplinary angle with a 
biographical one: “Wo Winkelmann anfing und wo er auförte?,“ “von welchem Punkt 
er von jeher ausging und wohin er strebte?” or “der Punkt, wo er ausging und auf den er 
immer zurückkam“ (FA 2:631-635).94  
 Through these reformulations of the same question which Herder foregrounds 
by putting them in quotation marks, the memorial essay sets a clear focus: Herder 
assumes that the emergence of the “Altertumswissenschaften” as a discipline cannot be 
severed from the biographies of those who narrate it. I argue that Herder pursues two 
interrelated objectives by bringing together the issue of self-formation with the 
formation of a discipline: he seeks to uncover the ways in which Winckelmann’s 
development of an exclusive set of assumptions about antiquity determined the 
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formation of his personality and patterned his way of life. Moreover, his aim is to 
suggest that the connection between the individual and the field, as he finds it in 
Winckelmann’s work, not only impacts the history of the individual but also the history 
of the field. Herder works out how Winckelmann’s practice of engaging with the past 
generates a unique scholarly discourse, making the study of the ancients an attractive 
and popular field of study on a transnational scale. 
 For a clearer understanding of the essay’s two focal points, I treat them one after 
the other, beginning with Herder’s concentration on Winckelmann’s biography: 
 
“von welchem Punkt er von jeher ausging und wohin er strebte?“ In seiner 
verschämtesten Armut und Niedrigkeit, ohne einige bestimmte Aussicht, wohin 
er je kommen? und wozu ihn das Glück brauchen würde? strebt er schon mit 
dem edlen Stolze, mit dem unbefriedigten aber auch unauslöschlichen Gefühl 
für Freiheit, Freundschaft, Einfalt und Sinn der Alten... – Er dürstet nach dem 
gesunden Menschenverstande und simpeln Sinne der Alten, nach ihrer einfachen 
Art des Lebens zu genießen und dasselbe rühmlich, zu einem edeln Zwecke, 
doch etwas in der Welt ausgerichtet zu haben und nachzulassen ein Denkmal 
seiner! so sein Leben zu gebrauchen. Lasset es sein, dass dies ein Traum, dass es 
Romantische Ideen waren; gnug, sie waren auch in den folgenden Zeiten der 
Geist und die Wurzel seines Lebens; ohne sie wäre nie ein Winkelmann worden. 
(FA 2:634) 
 
With the aid of his imaginary reconstructions of an ideal ancient life world, 
Winckelmann is able to counterbalance and compensate for the toils and hardships of 
his own poverty-ridden existence. The parallel world he builds for himself – “Er 
betrachtete sich als einen Alten, der wie sie schreiben, leben und denken sollte” (FA 
2:635) – provides him with a spiritual home, and gives him the feeling of belonging he 




eyes, Winckelmann’s imaginary act of displacement, his invention of a home in a 
bygone life world make up the roots of his existence; without the ancients’ 
companionship “wäre nie ein Winkelmann worden.” He experiences his life through the 
eyes of an imaginary other and can thereby carve out his own place and craft himself a 
lasting “Denkmal” with his writings. 
 Herder measures the value of Winckelmann’s work by the extent to which it has 
helped him take on the unfolding and cultivation of his selfhood as a lifelong project; 
his primary interest lies in illuminating how Winckelmann uses his immersion into a 
bygone era as a vehicle and solid point of orientation for his own self-realization: 
“Dieser Sinn und Geist für die Alten, auch im Gebrauch der Gelehrsamkeit und in der 
Anwendung seines Lebens, war Winkelmanns Wurzel“ (FA 2:635). Interestingly, in 
light of the determination and success with which he makes use of the ancients, it is no 
pressing concern for Herder that these reconstructions are imaginary ones: “Lasset es 
sein, dass dies ein Traum, dass es Romantische Ideen waren, sie waren auch in den 
folgenden Zeiten der Geist und die Wurzel seines Lebens.” 
 What justifies the idealist character of Winckelmann’s renewal strategy lies not 
only in Herder’s observation that it gives his life a foundation and direction; he also 
values Winckelmann’s approach from a historical point of view, arguing that in light of 
the cultural relicts’ material state, his selective and imaginary mode appears historically 
adequate: 
Und wie fing ers denn an? Er schrieb statt Geschichte, die nicht geschrieben 
werden kann, ein historisches Lehrgebäude….Unvollständig mag das allerdings 




dem großen Mangel von Namen, Nachrichten und würklicher Geschichte, das 
einzige Mittel zu einem Ganzen, das den Nutzen oder vielleicht mehr als den 
Nutzen erreicht, den uns die dürftige Geschichte gäbe. So wie schon Aristoteles 
gesagt hat, daß die Poesie Philosophischer sei, als die Geschichte; so ist ein 
solches Idealgebäude, wenns nur für sich selbst auf guten Gründen beruhet, 
lehrreicher, als Namen und Jahrzahlen sein würden. (FA 2:656-657) 
 
In this passage, Herder brings together both anthropological and historical observations 
so as to make a strong case for the incomplete and idealist nature of Winckelmann’s 
“historisches Lehrgebäude.” In his function as a historian, Herder applauds 
Winckelmann’s departure from the kind of historiography practiced by antiquarians. 
Their method of marshaling a broad range of evidence and of adhering to a systematic 
and unselective study is an impossible undertaking in light of the boundless abundance 
and the blurred, fragmentary state of ancient artifacts. More pressing than his historical 
objections, however, are his humanist ones: an assembly of names and dates can hardly 
serve a productive purpose. As at other points throughout his works, Herder recalls the 
authority of Aristotle when he argues that an “Idealgebäude,” that is a well reasoned 
imaginary construction as that of Winckelmann, does a better service to the individual 
than historical data collections. 
 My focus on Herder’s interest in the role of the past for the cultivation of 
selfhood is certainly not intended to gloss over passages in which he problematizes 
Winckelmann’s work and calls attention to areas of his scholarship which call for 
further investigation and revision.95 Rather, I want to highlight those unexplored facets 
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of his thinking in which he puts historical considerations into the service of his 
humanist project of self-formation. It is remarkable how he directs his readers’ attention 
to the value of Winckelmann’s “Idealgebäude“ even when he takes a critical view of 
Winckelmann’s thinking; this dynamic figures most prominently in his discussion of 
Winckelmann’s idealization of the Greeks as the inventors of art. On the one hand, 
Herder critiques his disregard for the Greeks’ indebtedness to other cultures, 
particularly the Egyptians: “Der große Verehrer der Griechen nimmt an: ‘sie…haben 
sich ihre Kunst selbst erfunden, sie sein einem fremden Volke nichts schuldig.” (FA 
2:658) Winckelmann’s invention of a birthplace for art is premised on the exclusion of 
other historical relations: 
 “…aus ihrem Boden waren die Griechen doch nicht gewachsen, sie winken 
selbst, insonderheit in ihrer Kultur, auf Asien und Ägypten. Diese hatten 
Abgötterei, Kunst und Baukunst, da Griechenland noch in Barbarei lag….Die 
ersten Kunstwerke der Griechen waren aus Asien oder Asien nahe....Die 
Ähnlichkeit, die sich zwischen dem alten Griechischen und Aegyptischen Styl 
findet, ist offenbar und niemand kann sie leugnen.” (FA 2:660-661)  
 
No one can deny the affinities between Greek and Egyptian culture. Interestingly, 
however, Winckelmann’s ignorance of these connections does not detract from the 
value of his work, because Herder’s analysis suggests on the other hand that his 
invention of the origin of art in Greece is “idealisch wahr”; it is true because 
Winckelmann in a way does nothing else than what the oldest cultures did themselves: 
they invented an order and an origin, a set of roots from the messiness of historical 
                                                                                                                                          
Winckelmann’s “selbstgemachte[r] idealische[r] Ordnung;“ although one is easily led into thinking that 
Herder is supportive of Winckelmann’s approach to the past, it is a misleading assumption. The reason 





material to orient themselves in the world and to create an indigenous tradition, and that 
is good because the quest for the origin is a bottomless and mind-numbing one.96 
 At this point, we can see the different angles from which Herder supports and 
authorizes Winckelmann’s idealizing reconstructions, which serve his orientation and 
self-formation: the material condition of the cultural relicts legitimizes his practice. 
Moreover, his imaginary practice reiterates in modern times and on an individual scale 
processes of global cultural identity formation (which I will return to in the next section 
of this chapter).  
The most pressing question that arises for now is where and how, in Herder’s 
eyes, Winckelmann’s mode of putting his scholarship into the service of his self-
fashioning impacts the history of the discipline. Gathering from the response Herder’s 
essay received from the “Gesellschaft der Altertümer,” one gains the impression that his 
exploration of the connection between Winckelmann’s life and the ways his 
reinventions of the past formed classical scholarship did not meet a receptive audience. 
Herder lost the contest against the Göttingen philologist Christian Gottlob Heyne; in a 
secret vote, the members of the society voted unanimously for Heyne’s “Lobschrift auf 
Winckelmann.” Unlike Herder’s eulogy, Heyne’s “Lobschrift” focuses on the question 
and follows the instructions. Heyne highlights shortcomings in Winckelmann’s works 
and suggests that the imaginary reconstructions are his way of compensating for his 
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Schwierigkeiten erschweren und vermehren, wie Ein Volk aus andre haben würken, etwas von Einem 
Volk aufs andre habe kommen können? sonst macht man sich gegen die lichteste Sache Zweifel und 




lack of knowledge and familiarity with the most up to date scientific literature.97 From 
Heyne’s essay and from the society’s refusal to engage with Herder’s argument, one is 
led to assume that what he holds to be Winckelmann’s most valuable contribution to the 
field did not resonate with contemporary learned audiences. To draw this conclusion, 
however, would be wrong. Herder was certainly not alone in suggesting that a personal 
and idealizing practice like Winckelmann’s deserves to be taken seriously because it 
constitutes a significant element in the shaping of the self-understanding of the 
emerging discipline. 
In “The Potter’s Daughter’s Sons: German Classical Scholarship and the 
Language of Love Circa 1800,” Güthenke observes that from the beginning “the life 
stories of individual scholars and institutions form a guiding paradigm” in the 
consolidation of classical scholarship as a discipline; “the biographical and personal 
have played a significant part in how the discipline looks at itself.”98 She investigates 
this link between the personal and the emergence of the field of classics in texts by 
Winckelmann, Herder, Schlegel, Humboldt, Wolf, Boeckh, and Schleiermacher; while 
some of these figures determined the course and program of the field’s 
professionalization directly by means of their institutional affiliations, others were not 
classical scholars in the professional sense. Both, however, had an equally significant 
impact on the consolidation and progress of the Altertumswissenschaften as a discipline 
whose historiography needs to be considered in terms of the individuals who shape it. 
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More specifically, what the works by these figures share in common is “the 
conception of the ancient past as a quasi-human figure vis-à-vis its observer”; in their 
accounts of antiquity, these scholars employ strategies of personification and express 
their reconstitutions in a contemporary language of interpersonal affection, attraction, 
and intimacy.99 Against the backdrop of her observation, Güthenke develops her central 
claim that this language of love and the imagery of affect has shaped individuals as 
much as the scholarly discourse that was establishing itself.  
Since at least the outbreak of the Querelle, Güthenke states, it is clear that the 
state of classical scholarship has had an enormous impact on the self-understanding of 
modern societies. What is distinct about the field’s consolidation in Germany, however, 
is a turn toward individual experience; with the rise of the idea of Bildung the focus lies 
on how the engagement with classical antiquity can facilitate individual self-formation. 
While it is no news that classicism has significantly informed the conception of 
Bildung, critics have not considered how “Bildung and its cultivation of particular 
attachments also informed classical scholarship’s model of itself.”100 Güthenke 
demonstrates how reconstructions of the past structured around imaginary intimate 
interpersonal encounters have shaped the discipline and its practitioners. The discourse 
of love links the scholar and the object of his study through a “rhetoric of exclusivity,” 
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individual and self-reflexivity, that encouraged strategies of personifying especially Greek antiquity, and 
that in turn also inflected the self-understanding of the discipline and its practitioners, suggesting a model 
of individual development as the default approach to interpreting the past and the pursuit of classical 
scholarship alike. In other words, not only did classical antiquity inform the conception of sentimental 
Bildung, but sentimental Bildung and its cultivation of particular attachments also informed classical 




and affirms thereby the singularity of the individual and the autonomy of the 
discipline.101 
Güthenke does not discuss Herder’s Winckelmann essay, but “Denkmal Johann 
Winkelmanns” addresses exactly the mutually transformative relationship Güthenke 
observes between self-formation and the emerging scholarly discourse. In Herder’s 
analysis, Winckelmann’s mode of establishing a relation to the past is the vehicle 
through which he constitutes not only himself in a distinctive way but also the field of 
classical studies; and it is this dynamic which he wants to bring to the attention of the 
members of the society for “Altertumswissenschaften.” 
Right in his essay’s opening paragraph, Herder highlights Winckelmann’s 
unique “Schreibart” in which he invents antiquity: “Er ist in der Zahl der Wenigen, die 
den Deutschen Namen auch Gegenden schätzbar gemacht, wo man ihn sonst unter dem 
Namen der Goten zu begreifen gewohnt ist…Die Schreibart seiner Schriften wird 
bleiben, so lange die deutsche Sprache dauert; ein großer Teil ihres Inhalts und ihr Geist 
wird sie überleben.” (FA 2:630) Herder predicts a long survival of Winckelmann’s 
style, of his innovative mode of crafting language; he writes that Winckelmann has 
expressed his skill nowhere else in his works more beautifully and captivatingly than in 
his famous debut study on the theme of imitation in Greek works of art. His Gedanken 
über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke (1755) has a programmatic function: 
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Herder designates it as both the “Keim” of Winckelmann’s own life as well as the key 
work for future scholarly studies in the field in Germany and abroad.102 
Herder points out precisely how Winckelmann’s work formed the scholarly 
discourse in pioneering ways, making the study of antiquity an attractive and widely 
popular field: 
Da zaubertest Du dich liebevoll ins alte Griechenland, in schöne aber verlebte 
Zeiten, liehest dem toten Marmor, der sich in Deiner Brust beseelte, Deine Ideen 
von Heldenruhm, Schönheit und Liebe, und pflücktest von ihrem erstarrten 
Busen die Blume des Ruhms und des Genusses im Leben. Du strecktest Deinen 
Arm in die Ferne, um Freundschaft zu finden, Griechische Freundschaft, die Du 
Dir wünschtest. (FA 2:671) 
 
The relation Winckelmann builds is a personal one; feeling himself into the foreign 
cultural world, he treats its objects of art like individuals, and invests them with feelings 
of love. He revives the dead marble figures by imparting them with his ideas of beauty, 
love, and friendship and transforms the experience of his imaginary friendships into an 
unparalleled personal style, into what Herder calls his “Schreibart.” 
 According to Herder, it is this language of affect and friendship which had a 
vital impact on how he himself and future generations would experience and revive the 
past. To read about antiquity in a language so personal and filled with youthful love and 
ardor conveys the impression, Herder notes, that the Gedanken are addressed personally 
to oneself; he compares his reading experience to the reception of a bride’s letter: “Ich 
las sie [Winckelmann’s Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke] mit 
der jugendlichen Empfindung eines heitern Morgens, wie den Brief einer Braut von 
                                                




fernher, aus einer verlebten glücklichen Zeit, aus einem glücklichen Himmelsstriche” 
(FA 2:632-633). A language filled with the emotion of love bestows Winckelmann’s 
representations with an aura of beginning and exclusivity; Herder compiles metaphors 
evoking images of beginning such as “Duftvolle Jugendblüte,” “Keim,” “Knospe,” 
“Morgen,” or “Quelle” to describe the impression Winckelmann’s work left him with. 
Engaging with antiquity through the lens of Winckelmann’s language of 
friendship and pristine freshness leads one into thinking that nobody has imagined the 
works of the past in the ways oneself does here and now. The strategies of personalizing 
and personifying antiquity give modern individuals a stage on which to invent 
themselves in conversation with an imaginary other. Moreover, by forging an original 
perspective on classical culture and by working it into an equally original language, 
critics like Winckelmann have contributed to the recognition, consolidation and 
spreading of classical scholarship in major ways. Herder concludes his essay by 
announcing that he will follow in Winckelmann’s footsteps: “so erlaubt mir die 
Bescheidenheit nur, auf Winkelmanns Spur zu bleiben” (FA 2:653). Indeed, as I will 
demonstrate, both the issue of self-fashioning through personal investigations of past 
cultures in a language of love and the question of how such investigations shape a 








Personified Beginnings: Arguing Animals, Grumpy Trees, and the Birth of Poetry 
 
Unlike his Weimar Classics colleagues Schiller, Goethe and Wieland, Herder 
did not gain recognition by writing canon-forming works of fiction. Instead, he 
concentrated his energies on collecting, translating, and reworking the literary legacies 
of cultures from around the globe, beginning with the earliest ones. The main body of 
his capacious output consists of mythical stories, folk songs, and poetry of various 
origin. What makes these collections fascinating resources in the first place are the ways 
in which Herder introduces and interprets them. Applying tools of historical and 
philological criticism, he treats these materials as media that tell us how humanity’s 
earliest cultures experienced the world, how they found orientation and constructed 
meaning. Ancient poetry, he suggests, is a captivating window into the diversity of the 
oldest expressions of human world-building. 
A widely popular genre in the Enlightenment which, according to Herder, stages 
and performs these processes particularly lucidly is the fable; he designates it as a 
“Migniaturstück der großen Dichtkunst“ (FA 4:1320), a composition which in the most 
condensed fashion introduces its readers to basic characteristics of how humans create 
and engage with the world they inhabit. Herder collected fables from the Greek and 
Oriental tradition and uses them throughout many of his writings as springboards for 
extensive theoretical reflections about the origin, nature and function of poetry and 
other art forms in ancient and modern times. In his crucial essay Über Bild, Dichtung 




poetry and art can function as a vehicle, fostering individual development and a vibrant 
modern cultural life. 
Because of the paradigmatic status which the fable inhabits in Herder’s work, it 
lends itself as a hook to exploring questions the “Denkmal” essay on Winckelmann 
raised: why does Herder put such high value on strategies of personifying antiquity, of 
projecting feelings of love and friendship onto inanimate objects for the purpose of their 
imaginary revival? Why is he supportive of Winckelmann’s idealized accounts of the 
Greeks as the inventors of beauty in art, representing his “Idealgebäude” as a nodal 
point for Winckelmann’s development and crucial for the consolidation and spreading 
of classical scholarship? I argue that answers to these questions are bound up with 
Herder’s idea of man and his theory of how humans obtain knowledge. I begin by 
putting into focus the premises and characteristics of Herder’s concept of the evolution 
of knowledge; in a second step, I concentrate on Herder’s establishment of parallels 
between what he takes to be the basic practices humans employ to create meaning on 
the one hand and the content and compositional structure of the fable on the other. This 
context, I suggest, illuminates why Herder values Winckelmann’s modes of reviving 
antiquity. 
Ultimately, the objective of my analysis is to show that for Herder the primary 
modern function of ancient genres like the fable lies in honing the individual’s capacity 
of analogical thinking. Throughout Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel, he designates with 
“Analogie” processes of how humans continuously shape, reshape and enhance their 




the age of myth, Herder highlights how the senses operate and how they mediate and 
structure experience. He points out that from the outset, questions regarding the origin 
of the arts dovetailed with the ability of individuals and different cultures to represent 
their ideas and perceptions in different media of art. With these examinations, I argue, 
Herder seeks to raise awareness of the inexhaustibility of modes of experience and 
representation and inspire an active cultivation of the different senses. Finally, his aim 
is to prompt his contemporaries to intervene in the battle of rival narratives about the 
origin of the arts in which the different cultures he examines invented themselves. 
Drawing on many of his earlier works – most importantly, the pioneering 
Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (1772) – Herder premises his multi-step 
examination of humanity’s beginnings in Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel on the idea 
that humans found themselves put into a situation in which they had to invent for 
themselves poetry in order to compensate for a basic lack: “Der Mensch erfindet nur aus 
Armut, weil er nicht hat: er wähnt und dichtet, weil er nicht weiß” (FA 4:645). In 
Herder’s eyes, man is a “Mängelwesen,” as a wanting creature; in his treatise on the 
origin of language he argues that what distinguishes humans from animals is that the 
former are deficient creatures who are born with unfocused instincts and unspecialized 
skills. To different degrees, animal senses are all programmed toward particular 
activities and the execution of a specific set of skills. In contrast to animals, with their 
goal oriented sensory organization, humans find themselves equipped with unfocused 
senses and lack of specific talents. A bird is born with the ability to assemble nests and 




webs; humans, however, have no developed talents whatsoever when they are born. The 
human child with its impoverished instincts and undefined senses appears to be nature’s 
most helpless and orphaned being.103 
This situation of lack, however, also has an upside: their underdeveloped senses 
free humans from being confined to one particular realm in nature and from performing 
a predetermined number of activities: “Wenn der Mensch Vorstellungskräfte hat, die 
nicht auf den Bau einer Honigzelle…bezirkt sind…so bekommen sie eben damit, 
weitere Aussicht” (FA 1:716). The lack of attachment of our senses to one particular 
sphere enables freedom of choice; it is up to us to decide toward which ends we develop 
our capacities. We are forced to build our world, create meaning and develop our own 
coordinates of orientation. 
Building and elaborating on his explications in the language essay, Herder 
details in the opening paragraphs of Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel exactly how he 
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idea of humans as “Mängelwesen,” the following passages are crucial: “Und wenn endlich Sinne und 
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Töne, wie doch jedes Tier in seiner Art; bloß unter Tiere gestellet, ists also das verwaisetste Kind der 
Natur. Nackt und bloß, schwach und dürftig, schüchtern und unbewaffnet…Mit einer so zerstreuten 
geschwächten Sinnlichkeit, mit so unbestimmten, schlafenden Fähigkeiten, mit so geteilten und 
ermatteten Trieben geboren…so verwaiset und verlassen, dass es selbst nicht mit einer Sprache begabt 
ist, seine Mängel zu äußern” (715). For a comprehensive analysis of the function of Herder’s idea of man 
as “Mängelwesen” for his theory about the origin of language see Ulrich Gaier, Herders 
Sprachphilosophie und Erkenntniskritik (Stuttgart: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1988), 75-156; Georg W. 
Bertram, “Herders antireduktionistische Sprachphilosophie,” in Herder im Spiegel der Zeiten. 
Verwerfungen der Rezeptionsgeschichte und Chancen einer Relektüre, ed. Tilman Borsche (München: 




imagines such constantly active processes of human knowledge production and world 
designing. The senses, he suggests, are our fundamental mode of access to the world 
and humans recover their knowledge about things within the complex web of 
experience: “Der Mensch ist ein so zusammengesetztes, künstliches Wesen, dass, Trotz 
aller Anstrengung, in ihm nie ein ganz einfacher Zustand möglich ist (FA 4:633). As in 
earlier works, notably in the fourth volume of his Kritische Wäldchen (1769) and in 
Plastik (1778), his thinking about sensory knowledge is a broadening and deepening of 
the line of argumentation set out by Baumgarten in the Aesthetica.104 Herder departs 
from the idea that the capacity of reason can be regarded as separate from sensible 
experience; he drastically revises the place of logic by arguing that we develop our 
cognitive skills not in abstraction from the senses but, as with other skills, mediated 
through the senses. We obtain all our ideas as embodied, sensuous beings. 
More precisely, Herder connects all acts of producing knowledge with moments 
in which we bring the continuous stream of impressions filtering through our senses – 
“Der Mensch…schwimmt in einem Meer von Eindrücken der Gegenstände” (FA 4:633) 
– to a temporary halt: 
                                                
104 On Herder’s intervention in discussions over the status of the emerging discipline of aesthetics, see 
Jason Gaiger’s introduction to his translation of Herder’s “Plastik”: Sculpture: Some Observations on 
Shape and Form from Pygmalion’s Creative Dream (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002): 
“Whereas Baumgarten sought to incorporate aesthetics as a second domain of inquiry alongside logic, 
Herder recognizes that this new science has important consequences for logic itself. Rather than 
functioning as an ancillary discipline, the study of aesthetics ultimatively subverts the attempt to keep the 
two domains apart. For Herder, a theory of ideas conceived in abstraction from the operations of the 
senses must necessarily be deficient.” Sensible knowledge cannot be grasped as an “analogy of reason,” 
nor can the categories through which it is analyzed be taken from traditional logic. Instead, we need to 
effect a reversal approach, replacing the “nominal” definitions of logic with a philosophy that traces our 
ideas back to their origin in sensation and experience (8-9). See also John Zammito, Kant, Herder, and 
the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 318-330 and Hans Adler, Die 
Prägnanz des Dunklen: Gnoseologie, Ästhetik, Geschichtsphilosophie bei Johann Gottfried Herder 




Alle Gegenstände unsrer Sinne nämlich werden nur dadurch unser, dass wir sie 
gewahr werden, d.i. sie mit dem Gepräge unsres Bewusstseins, mehr oder 
minder hell und lebhaft bezeichnen. In dem Walde sinnlicher Gegenstände, der 
mich umgibt, finde ich mich nur dadurch zurecht und werde über das Chaos der 
auf mich zudringenden Empfindungen Herr und Meister, dass ich Gegenstände 
von anderen trenne, dass ich ihnen Umriss, Maß und Gestalt gebe, mithin im 
Mannigfaltigen mir Einheit schaffe und sie mit dem Gepräge meines inneren 
Sinnes, als ob dieser ein Stempel der Wahrheit wäre, lebhaft und zuversichtlich 
bezeichne. (FA 4:635) 
 
The creation of knowledge is bound up with acts of recognition, isolation and 
appropriation. This opening scene of Herder’s essay on the development of the fable 
recalls the scenario from the language treatise in which he imagines that man acquires 
the capacity to speak and develop a sense of logic during an encounter with a sheep.105 
Like the moment of “Besonnenheit” and “aufmerken” in which the figure in the treatise 
takes notice of the sheep (FA 1:719-726), “gewahr werden” in this passage designates 
the instance when one brings the interactive, continuously productive relationship 
between the senses and external stimuli to a momentary standstill. We get to know 
objects by isolating, categorizing and designating specific characteristics from the 
overwhelming flood of impressions we take in through our perceptive organs, and by 
giving a selected number of objects “Umriss, Maß und Gestalt”; Herder describes these 
acts of appropriation with verbs like “metaschematisieren,” “übersetzen,” 
“anempfinden,” and, most importantly, “prägen.”  
 Throughout his works, Herder favors the term “prägen,” to coin, when he 
explores the particular ways in which humans experience their surroundings, isolate a 
                                                
105 See Gaier, Herders Sprachphilosophie und Erkenntniskritik for a comprehensive analysis of the sheep 
scene and of the characteristics of Herder’s narrative of the origin of language in relation his discussion of 




number of specificities and form ideas and concepts about them. In the passage above, 
he suggests that it is the “Gepräge meines inneren Sinnes,” the unique structure and 
composition of man’s senses, which determines how he isolates the perceptions 
streaming in on him. Crucially, “Der Mensch siehet nur, wie der Mensch siehet” – the 
ways in which we process perceptions and coin them are underwritten by what Herder 
calls the law of analogy, meaning that we make sense of the world and organize it in 
proportion to how we experience it through the lens of our embodied, sensuous 
existence. 
He distinguishes major elements – “Hauptstücke des Habitus unserer 
Empfindungsweise“ – which direct the human mode of perception. First, what mediates 
our perspective on the world is the category of personhood, of subjectivity: 
Alles was da ist, sehen wir wirken; und schließen mit Recht, dass der Wirkung 
eine wirkende Kraft, mithin ein Subjekt zum Grunde liegt; und da wir Personen 
sind, so dichten wir uns an allem Wirkenden der Naturkräfte persönliche Wesen. 
Daher nun jene Belebung der ganzen Natur, jene Gespräche mit allen Dingen 
um uns her...jene Prosopopöien und Personifikationen bei allen Völkern der 
Erde...sobald unser Geist in andern Organen die Natur sähe, würde er notwendig 
anders klassifizieren. Der sinnliche Mensch kann nun nicht anders, als sinnlich 
ordnen; und indem er in alles Wirkende seine eigene Wirkungskraft 
hinüberträgt, so erscheinen ihm Götter in allen Elementen. (FA 4:643) 
 
Assuming that how we experience the world holds equally true for others, we imagine 
the relation between ourselves and the animate and inanimate beings surrounding us as 
a relation of correspondence. We personify nature, communicate with it and imagine 
that the creatures inhabiting it and the life forces permeating it interact in modes that are 




light of who we are; if our sensuous organs were furnished differently, we would 
perceive and organize it differently.106 This argument regarding the perspectivism of 
human perception constitutes a core element of Herder’s idea of man; in his eyes, man’s 
productive fashioning of the living world around him is not a sign of ignorance and 
primitivism. Rather, ancient myths in which stars, winds, clouds and the sun speak to 
each other, and mountains and rivers are infused with a soul and colonized by spirits, 
are a vivid window into how humans took on the challenge and compensated for their 
wanting existence; these stories exhibit ur-scenarios of human world-creating.107  
 Herder draws attention to how these modes of personifying nature and of 
populating it with spirits and gods are organized along the human gender division and 
conceptualized in a language of affect: “So natürlich es dem Menschen scheinet, dass 
alles Wirkende Person sei: so kann er sich auch keine andre Art der Wirkung als die in 
seiner Natur liegt, Tätigkeit und Leiden, Empfangen und Geben, Liebe und Haß, am 
Ende nichts als die beiden Geschlechter denken, in welche die Natur ihre belebtesten 
Wesen geteilt hat…Und so ward der Himmel mit Göttern und Göttinnen, so wurden die 
Elemente mit Wesen erfüllt, die sich einander fliehen oder anziehen, einander fördern 
                                                
106 Herder stresses throughout his essay that if humans were equipped with different perceptive organs, 
the entire network of relations in which we organize the world would look different; for a creature 
without feeling, for instance, the world would be nothing but a dead mass and for a chaotic mind a 
lawless, colorful chaos, see FA 4:641. 
107 On the mode and functions of personifications, see particularly FA 4:649, 653-655. See also Jürgen 
Brummack, “Herders Theorie der Fabel,” in Johann Gottfried Herder, 1744-1803, ed. Gerhard Sauder 
(Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1987): “Das mythische Zeitalter…ist [bei Herder] nicht mehr nur eine Stufe in der 
Geschichte des Geistes und fortwirkende Grundlage der späteren Kulturentwicklung, sondern zugleich 
Modell menschlicher Erkenntnis überhaupt, das letztlich immer gültig bleibt. Denn alle 
Gegenstandswahrnehmung kann, weil nach Maßgabe der beteiligten Sinne und nach der Regel des im 
Mannigfaltigen Einheit stiftenden inneren Sinnes erfolgt, ein Dichten, ein Bilderschaffen genannt 
werden…In allem Wirklichen setzen wir ‘eine wirkende Kraft’ voraus und tragen unvermeidlich ‘unsere 
Empfindungs- und Denkart’ analogisch ‘in die Gegenstände hinüber,’ die für den Mythos typische 




oder zerstören,“ (FA 4:644). In these mythological narratives, humans assign gender 
categories and posit emotions of love, suffering, joy, and hatred as a central motor to 
establish contact with what is other than the self. Another instance where we can 
witness such basic analogical patterning of human bonding with their surroundings 
every day is among children; in their play they imagine objects as living figures and 
direct emotions toward them.108 
 According to Herder, in the poetic genre of the fable, this structure of analogy 
manifests itself in the simplest, most straightforward fashion; “Analogie,” he states, is 
the fable’s mother (compare FA 4:673). I suggest that he chose the genre to exemplify 
his point because it both vividly performs the principle of analogy and at same time it 
also facilitates the reader’s “analogische Erfindungskraft” by virtue of its polyfunctional 
structure. Moreover, he picked the fable over other poetic forms because it resonated 
with his audience: “Jeder kennt dieselbe [die Aesopische Fabel] aus gemeinen Begriffen 
und Beispielen” (FA 4:648). The animated animals stage what Herder singles out as the 
crucial elements of man’s orientation in the world, that is to say the representation of 
animals, nature’s living elements and inanimate objects as having the qualities and 
thoughts of a human being: “Tiere handeln in der Fabel, weil dem sinnlichen Menschen 
alles Wirkende in der Natur zu handeln scheinet…der Araber spricht mit seinem Roß, 
der Hirte mit seinem Schaf…er glaubt, sie zu verstehen und wähnt, dass sie ihn 
verstehen” (FA 4:649). Subjects assign gender identities to what is other than the self 
                                                
108 Compare for example FA 4:643: “In der Kindheit sehen wir lange Jahre die Welt so an und in 




and imagine that the interactions among other beings and the conflicts and joys they 
share correspond to their own ways of feeling and experiencing. 
 For the reader, however, the relation between the scenario with which the fable 
opens and the conclusions drawn from it is discontinuous. The stories and their 
interpretations evolved in concrete life situations of Aesop’s time and the reader cannot 
really reproduce and relate to them (see FA 4:657). The relation between the two parts 
of the story is polyfunctional but it is precisely this ambiguity between the two parts 
which Herder regards as the genre’s most productive feature; it challenges the reader to 
practice his most important capacity, his “analogische Erfindungskraft.”109 The reading 
subject trains his mind’s plasticity by transforming and applying what he has read to 
similar situations: “Ich kenne keine nützlichere Bildung menschlicher Seelenkräfte, als 
die Übung der Analogie, ähnliche Fälle zu erdenken und in ihnen das Ähnliche auf 
treffende Art genau zu bezeichnen” (FA 4:661). The lack of cohesion between story and 
the interpretation of the staged scene sharpens the reader’s thinking within networks and 
structures of affinity. 
 By promulgating such a notion of Bildung, Herder suggests a modern use of the 
fable that works with and not against a conception of human perception and cognition 
as emphatically active, productive processes. In advancing his position, he departs from 
the didactic purpose which Lessing, among other prominent Enlightenment figures, had 
                                                
109 “er gewöhnte sich in der Fabel selbst das Wesentliche vom Unnötigen zu unterscheiden, die ganze 
Situation derselben praktisch anzusehen und die brauchbarste seiner Seelenkräfte, die analogische 




assigned to the genre.110 In both “Aesop und Lessing” (1768) and in Über Bild, 
Dichtung und Fabel, Herder infers from Lessing’s “Abhandlungen über die Fabel” 
(1759) that he determines the purpose of the stories to be the communication of a 
normative moral statement which the story stages so clearly and unambiguously that it 
does not leave the reader in any doubt over how to understand its point of instruction. In 
Herder’s eyes, the objective of Lessing’s Abhandlungen relies on the kind of 
understanding of how humans learn which he himself rejects; Lessing’s concept is 
premised on the division between rational reflection and sensory knowledge which 
Herder discards by claiming that humans learn everything through their senses. Lessing 
assumes that learning can be separated from experience when he suggest that the point 
of the genre is to communicate a normative moral statement; his didactic objective 
relies on the idea that man’s cognitive capacities can be conceived in abstraction from 
our senses and disengaged from real life experience.111 
Herder’s deconstruction of this normative didactic purpose of the fable gives 
rise to a reconstructive practice which makes the unfolding of one’s capacities the 
primary objective, enabling him to put the ancient genre into the service of his 
“Humanitätsprojekt.” In “Pluralism, Humanity, and Empire in Herder’s Political 
Thought,” Muthu provides an analysis of Herder’s notion of “Humanität” which helps 
to sharpen the point I want to make here. Drawing on Herder’s theory of humans as 
“Mängelwesen” and on his observation that what all humans have in common is a set of 
                                                
110 On the history and reception of the fable, see Peter Hasubek, Die Fabel: Theorie, Geschichte und 
Rezeption einer Gattung (Berlin: E. Schmidt, 1982). 
111 On Herder’s discussion of Lessing’s “Abhandlungen,” see “Aesop und Lessing,” FA 4:1311-1322 and 




open-ended capacities, Muthu argues that the imperative of unfolding, training, and 
specializing one’s capacities constitutes the core objective of Herder’s 
“Humanitätsidee.” Zeroing in on Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menschheit, Muthu brings into view Herder’s survey of how across temporal and 
geographical zones, people have cultivated and exercised their potentials in manifold 
ways and used them toward vastly different ends: “all peoples…strive to find meaning 
in their lives and exercise artful and creative capacities, through their languages, 
customs, intimate relationships, spiritual pursuits, all of which take an almost infinite 
variety.” Humanity, in Muthu’s analysis of Herder’s anthropological thinking, does not 
stand for a definable objective or quality but for “the sum total, and ever changing uses, 
of our active powers in different ages and places.”112 Herder’s concept does not provide 
any instruction for how humans ought to make use of their capacities. The only 
imperative is development itself because of man’s unspecialized physical and mental 
constitution. 
According to Muthu, these anthropological investigations into the diverse ways 
in which humans have exercised their role as cultural agents constitute the backdrop 
against which Herder sets up his conception of humanity as a moral ideal. “The grand 
law of nature,” writes Muthu upon quoting from book XV of the Ideen, is to “let man be 
man,” to “let him mould his condition according to what he himself shall view best.”113 
                                                
112 Sankar Muthu, “Pluralism, Humanity, and Empire in Herder’s Political Thought,” in Enlightenment 
against Empire (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2003), 235. 
113 Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Mankind, trans. T. Churchill (London: J. Johnson, 
1800), 440, quoted in Muthu, “Pluralism, Humanity, and Empire in Herder’s Political Thought,” 247. 




The higher law is to respect and protect plural forms of life, to give individuals and 
cultures the opportunity to unfold and cultivate themselves according to their own 
standards. 
I suggest that with his poetological writings and ancient text collections, Herder 
seeks to contribute to the creation of an environment which supports individuals in their 
efforts to develop plural forms of life. The practice of analogical thinking which he sees 
so vividly performed in the literatures of the past figures thereby as a key technique. 
Herder represents it as a cognitive tool that fosters progress in all fields of knowledge 
and as an exercise for humans to act out their role as cultural agents: 
Eigentlich und absolut kann der Mensch weder dichten, noch erfinden; er würde 
damit der Schöpfer einer neuen Welt. Was er tun kann, ist, Bilder und Gedanken 
paaren, sie mit dem Stempel der Analogie, insonderheit aus sich selbst 
bezeichnen. (FA 4:645) 
 
Der Geist dichtet: der bemerkende innere Sinn schafft Bilder. Er schafft sich 
neue Bilder, wenn die Gegenstände auch tausendmal angeschaut und besungen 
                                                                                                                                          
Gesellschaften hat der Mensch durchaus nichts anders im Sinn haben, nichts anders anbauen können, als 
Humanität, wie er sich dieselbe auch dachte. Ihr zu gut sind die Anordnungen unserer Geschlechter und 
Lebensalter von der Natur gemacht, dass unsre Kindheit länger daure und nur mit Hülfe der Erziehung 
eine Art Humanität lerne. Ihr zu gut sind auf der weiten Erde alle Lebensarten der Menschen eingerichtet, 
alle Gattungen der Gesellschaft eingeführt worden. Jäger oder Fischer, Hirt oder Ackermann und Bürger; 
in jedem Zustande lernte der Mensch Nahrungsmittel unterscheiden, Wohnungen für sich und die 
Seinigen errichten: er lernte für seine beiden Geschlechter Kleidungen zum Schmuck erhöhen und sein 
Hauswesen ordnen. Er erfand mancherlei Gesetzte und Regierungsformen, die alle zum Zweck haben 
wollten, dass jeder, unbefehdet vom andern, seine Kräfte üben und einen schönern, freieren Genuss des 
Lebens erweben könnte...Lasset uns auf den Erdstrich zurückblicken, den wir bisher durchwandert haben; 
in allen Einrichtungen der Völker von Sina bis Rom, in allen Mannigfaltigkeiten ihrer Verfassung, so wie 
in jeder ihrer Erfindungen des Krieges und Friedens, selbst bei allen Greueln und Fehlern der Nationen 
blieb das Hauptgesetz der Natur kenntlich: „der Mensch sei Mensch! Er bilde sich seinen Zustand nach 
dem, was er für das Beste erkennet.“ Hiezu bemächtigten sich die Völker ihres Landes und richteten sich 
ein, wie sie konnten. Aus dem Weibe und dem Staat, aus Sklaven, Kleidern und Häusern, aus 
Ergötzungen und Speisen, aus Wissenschaft und Kunst ist hie und da auf der Erde alles gemacht worden, 
was man zu seinem oder des Ganzen Besten daraus machen zu können glaubte. Überall also finden wir 
die Menschheit im Besitz und Gebrauch des Rechtes, sich zu einer Art von Humanität zu bilden, 




wären: denn er schaut sie mit seinen Augen an, und je treuer er sich selbst bleibt, 
desto eigentümlicher wird er zusammensetzen und schildern. (FA 4:640) 
 
Der Ursprung aller menschlichen Dichtung [ist] jener wirksame Trieb in uns, 
Analogien zu schaffen, mit innerem Vergnügen sie anzuerkennen und jedes Mal 
dadurch [unsere] Begriffe zu erweitern, zu üben, zu stärken. (FA 4:673) 
 
As these passages illustrate, Herder designates invention as a process of isolating, 
assembling, combining, recombining and refining thoughts and experiences. The 
originality of a representation hinges on the cultivation of the individual’s senses, on his 
ability to make use of them in their diversity. Each sense structures one’s perceptions in 
a unique way depending on such factors as one’s point of view, cultural environment, 
and the medium of representation: “Alle diese Dinge…bestimmen sich zuletzt…nach 
dem Standpunkt in welchem man siehet, nach dem Organ oder Ton der Empfindung, 
mit welchem man es zeichnet oder bemerket“ (FA 4:641), and, according to Herder, 
humans should take advantage of this interactive, perpetually moving and changing 
relationship between the senses and their life world. It enables them to cast a unique 
light even on objects which others have already taken into view and represented 
multiple times. He encourages his readers to explore how each sense structures one’s 
perceptions differently, depending on the medium through which it operates: “Jedes 
Sylbenmaß sogar, jeder Ton des Liedes schattiert die Bilder der Phantasie auf eigene 
Weise“ (FA 4:639). The subject, for instance, will find that the same inner image will 
appear in a fundamentally different light depending on whether it is translated in the 
medium of music or poetry. Herder urges his readers to investigate this dynamic 




their thinking and life experience confidently and determinately with images and 
themes from the past and to observe how their senses mediate them without worrying 
that others have already explored them in detail: “Wenn Deine Rede oder Dichtkunst 
dieser Bilder [Herder refers to Homeric descriptions] bedarf: so schildere sie nach 
Deiner Art, wie Du solche wahrnahmest, wie der Geist Deiner Poesie sie fordert” (FA 
4:639). 
 This larger context of Herder’s efforts to raise his reader’s awareness of how the 
subject can productively shape reality by actively engaging and honing his senses 
renders his interest in Winckelmann comprehensible. What makes Winckelmann’s 
revival of classical culture so appealing in Herder’s eyes is the affective, personal 
manner in which he imagines the encounter with objects of art: “Du…liehest dem toten 
Marmor, der sich in Deiner Brust beseelte, Deine Ideen von Heldenruhm, Schönheit 
und Liebe” (FA 2:671). For Herder, I suggest, Winckelmann’s work encapsulates core 
elements of the project he wants to promote with his own work. Winckelmann revives 
in a modern fashion the characteristics Herder singles out as worthy of study and 
imitation in his examinations of fables and myths: He cultivates an animated mode of 
perception and confidently works his inner images – “die Bilder seiner Phantasie,” to 
phrase it in Herderian terms – into a sensuous and highly original style of writing. 
Through the medium of his “Schreibart,” familiar objects come into sight in hitherto 
unknown ways. 
 My argument is thus that Herder severs the modern function of ancient 




the sole purpose of his project to engage people with literatures of the past lies in 
familiarizing them with basic principles of human world-creating and in motivating 
them to train their own sensuous faculties. By framing the objective of his focus on the 
past in such broad, non-restrictive ways, the Greco-Roman tradition appears as one 
among multiple ancient cultural traditions. With his concentration on illuminating 
models of human world orientation, knowledge generation and reality construction, 
Herder opens up the field of examination – clearly, the engagement with any literary 
tradition and culture can potentially serve him as a springboard to bring his topics of 
interest into view and facilitate his project. 
 More specifically, by not setting any limits to the field of inquiry and by not 
providing rules or instructions for how people ought to use any of the themes and 
images he uncovers, Herder advocates that the authority to do so lies in each individual: 
“der Mensch sei Mensch! Er bilde sich seinen Zustand nach dem, was er für das Beste 
erkennet” (FA 6:633). Man himself has to decide on the appropriate way of doing 
things. Once again, the Winckelmann essay, I propose, provides a concrete example for 
Herder’s stance on this point: Herder highlights Winckelmann’s invention of the Greeks 
as the originators of truth and beauty in art and problematizes that this model is 
premised on bracketing off the formative impact of other cultures, of the Egyptians for 
that matter. At the same time, however, he demonstrates that the specific way in which 
Winckelmann fashions this origin narrative is authoritative by virtue of its impact and 
the functions it fulfills: it serves his and other people’s individual development, and it 




the authority and popularity of classical scholarship far beyond Winckelmann’s life 
time and the borders of his culture. 
 Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel proposes that the negotiation of such questions 
over which cultural tradition or medium of art was the one to articulate ideas and 
aesthetic values first and in the best ways has always been a matter of authority: 
 
Von Kind zu Kind ging die Sage fort…bis sie Kunst ward und diese Kunst hieß 
Dichtkunst. Das rohe Gold ward gepräget…Jeder Erzähler nämlich will gut 
erzählen und da er als Unterrichter der Weisere ist, so will er auch seinen 
Unterricht angenehm, lebhaft, kurz und auf die vollkommenste Weise einprägen. 
Hiermit war die Dichtkunst erfunden. Dieser Erzähler nämlich erfand seinen 
ererbten oder erworbenen Gedanken neue, stärkere, lebhafte, liebliche Bilder 
und Worte; jener den Worten abgemessene Sylbenmaße, liebliche Töne. Die 
Gebärdensprache brachte den Akzent, die Modulation des Tanzes ausgesuchte 
Metra in die Rede und so war, ohne dass man beinah wußte durch wen? die 
Dichtkunst da. Jede Nation, die sie nicht aus der Eltern Hause mitbrachte, erfand 
die Ihrige und mit jeder neuen Form nahm Bild, Sage und Dichtung auch eine 
neue schönere Gestalt an. (FA 4:646) 
 
The subject who masters “Prägekunst,” the art of coining, of crafting his narrative in the 
most vivid and compelling fashion has the authority of telling where and through which 
medium humans first invented art for themselves. From the beginning, such narrators 
found themselves in highly competitive company where everyone seeks recognition and 
approval for his individual way of telling: “Jeder Erzähler nämlich will gut erzählen” 
[emphasis added]. “einprägen”—that is to employ the best possible method for literally 
impressing one’s story on the audience’s mind in a memorable fashion – is everyone’s  
objective. In pursuit of this goal, the narrator selects a medium – be it sound, image, 




the body of inherited stories into a new narrative. His motivation is to assemble and 
represent “seine ererbten oder erworbenen Gedanken” in ways that are more beautiful, 
stronger, and more inspiring than previous ones. “Und so war, ohne dass man beinah 
wusste durch wen? die Dichtkunst da” – there is no single origin; multiple origin 
narratives compete with one another, and the battle is carried out between modes of 
representation, between individuals, institutions, and between cultures. 
 As long as Herder remains in a descriptive mode, acquainting his readership 
with practices of human sense making and plural narratives within which cultural 
traditions invented themselves, the origin question remains a matter he leaves to the 
authority of others. Things, however, become immensely more complex when he takes 
up the same discussion over the roles and functions of poetry in the context of his 
writings on and translations of Hebrew literature. Given his own professional 
background, no other literary tradition was more important to Herder; the contemporary 
revival and future survival of these ancient Hebrew writings was Herder’s most pressing 
concern. In the next section, I first concentrate on how Herder imagines that one should 
read the Old Testament and work out the characteristics of his treatment of sacred 
literature. In a second step, I focus on the characteristics his position regarding the 
question of poetic beginnings undergoes in his most distinguished theological work 







Origin as Contest and Creation in Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie 
 
Herder’s prolific literary output covers multiple fields, ranging from aesthetics, 
comparative literature, and linguistics to philosophy, history, and politics. What 
occuppied his thinking and determined his life more than any of these fields, however, 
was theology and the study and practice of religion. From his early years, Herder’s 
primary calling was the ministry. After graduating in theology from the university of 
Königsberg, he accepted a position in Riga at a “Domschule” where he served as a 
teacher and preacher from 1764 to 1769. Following his “Reisejahre” through France, he 
held a post as court preacher and general superintendent in Bückeburg, the capital town 
of a rural principality in Lower Saxony ruled by Graf Wilhelm zu Schaumburg-Lippe. 
In 1776, Goethe arranged for him to come to Weimar where he accepted a multifaceted 
position as senior pastor to the court, general superintendent, councilor of churches, and 
Ephorus (professor and supervisor) of all Gymnasien and schools in the region.114 All 
his life, Herder saw himself as a theologian, and he spent his entire professional career 
in active church service; theology was to him “[das] Geschäft seines Lebens.“115 
 His daily on-the-job challenges and experiences informed the manner in which 
he would pursue his ideas on education and Humanität in his writings. And, conversely, 
the extensive scholarly research and his philosophical-anthropological reflections on 
these themes inspired the measures he undertook to effect practical change in the areas 
                                                
114 Steven D. Martinson, “Herder’s Life and Works,” in A Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried 
Herder, ed. Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 29. 




of his professional activity.116 Herder held multiple offices in schools and churches, and 
his endeavor to use these affiliations to push through and implement his agendas was an 
immensely laborious and often frustrating experience.117 He worked hard to reform the 
Prussian Gymnasium and the Gymnasium in Riga, and used the sea voyage from Riga 
to France to detail the specific contents and principles of his ideas in the Journal meiner 
Reise im Jahr 1769. He developed and put into practice new student curricula and 
founded a teacher seminar aimed at preparing a new generation of teachers who would 
base their teachings on the contents and pedagogical practices he envisioned.118  
                                                
116 See Harro Müller-Michaels, “Herder in Office: His Duties as Superintendent of Schools,” in A 
Companion to the Works of Johann Gottfried Herder, ed. Hans Adler and Wulf Koepke (Rochester, NY: 
Camden House, 2009), 373-390; Martin Kessler, “Herder’s Theology” in the same Companion to the 
Works of Johann Gottfried Herder: “[Herder] aimed to turn his ideals for the formation and education of 
humankind into practical impulses for reform” (262); and Martin Kessler, Johann Gottfried Herder: Der 
Theologe unter den Klassikern: das Amt des Generalsuperintendenten von Sachsen-Weimar, 2 vols. 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 2007). The most comprehensive biography which explores Herder’s professional 
career in light of his works is Rudolf Haym’s Herder nach seinem Leben und seinen Werken, 2 vols. 
(Berlin: Rudolph Gaertner, 1877-1885; numerous reprints and editions). Michael Zaremba’s biography 
Johann Gottfried Herder: Prediger der Humanität. Eine Biographie (Köln: Böhlau, 2002) makes a 
particular effort to bring into view Herder’s theological studies as the nodal point for his practical reform 
projects. 
117 Translating and summarizing from Karoline Herder’s Erinnerungen aus dem leben Joh. Gottfrieds von 
Herder, ed. Johann Georg Mueller (Tübingen: Cotta, 1820), Müller-Michaels provides a cogent overview 
of Herder’s tasks in “Herder in Office: His Duties as Superintendent of Schools,”: “As a minister he held 
sermons, accompanied the members of the parish from baptism to the grave, performed and dissolved 
marriages, supervised the Weimar schools in his capacity of superintendent, appointed directors and 
instructors, jumped in as substitute teacher when necessary, administered teacher certification and exams, 
proctored the students’ exams, gave speeches at the end of each school year, administered salaries and 
oversaw the continuing education of teachers (especially those in rural areas), drafted textbooks, syllabi, 
and new forms of instruction, prepared (beginning in 1789) the sessions of the consistory, which he led 
from that point on, kept track of all the expenses in his diocese, held his colleagues accountable for their 
actions, listened to complaints, oversaw the budget for agricultural operations, and doled out professional 
advice. He accomplished all of this in a reliable manner and with great success, as confirmed by his 
contemporaries. But Herder himself was dissatisfied: his suggestions for the reorganization of church, 
school and state were being implemented too slowly, half-heartedly, or not at all…Thus he complained 
just two years after his arrival in Weimar about the exhausting daily duties, imagining himself stretched 
‘auf die hölzerne Folterbank’ (on the wooden torture track) wallowing ‘unter dem alten sächsischen 
Dreck’ (under the old Saxon mess)” (373). 
118 On the details of Herder’s curriculum for a new type of secondary school, see Müller-Michaels, 





One of his core concerns was to strip school syllabi of sections centered on 
expanding students’ knowledge by means of memorization and the recitation of sources. 
Instead, he demanded that the learning goals in all fields of study should concentrate on 
developing the students’ self-learning capabilities.119 The school address “Von Schulen 
als Übungsplätzen der Fähigkeiten der Seele” which Herder gave in 1799 records this 
objective succinctly: “Unser ganzes Leben ist für uns Gymnasium; was aus uns werden 
soll, muss in uns durch Übung werden...alle unsre Kenntnisse, Gewohnheiten und 
Fertigkeiten, sind Resultate unserer Übung“ (FA 9/2:783-784). In his eyes, a school’s 
primary mission should consist in developing a curriculum and in exercising teaching 
methods directed at equipping its pupils with a variety of tools useful for their self-
learning and “Selbstschöpfung,” their self-creation (FA 9/2:785). The Pädagogische 
Schriften clearly reveal Herder’s efforts to model his educational reform project on the 
insights which undergird his concept of how humans create meaning, of how they need 
to identify and work out their sphere of activity and impact in the cultures they live in. 
The  “Entwurf der Anwendung dreier Akademischer Jahre für Theologen” (FA 9/2:418, 
1782) suggests that the phase in which students learn how to learn and in which their 
minds are stimulated by a variety of different subjects should be extend beyond the 
school years. Herder envisioned the first years at the university to be centered on 
continuing, deepening, and expanding the fields of study and modes of learning familiar 
                                                
119 See Müller-Michaels, “Herder in Office: His Duties as Superintendent of Schools”: “The teacher 
should stimulate the students’ self-learning by, first, getting the students’ attention; second, by having 
them translate literary works; third, by stimulating them through reading to engage in free-writing and to 
each collect their work in a kind of notebook or literary anthology; and fourth, by encouraging them to 
engage in debates about topics and texts, generally in their free time, in order to prepare themselves for 




to students from their Gymnasium education. Today, the liberal arts college education 
in the United States resonates perhaps closest with Herder’s model for the first years of 
university education.120  
In the context of these reform activities, Herder found it a particular challenge to 
gain support for establishing the study of the Bible as the main vehicle for public 
education. He witnessed with sadness and disappointment that friends as well as 
example-setting figures of rank and distinction like Goethe and Duke Carl August von 
Sachsen-Weimar rarely visited the church.121 At the university level, he found the 
academic status of theology to be declining and pushed into the background, especially 
by philosophy. He was highly concerned about the field’s rising popularity and 
observed with unease that people preferred to read Kant instead of the Bible.122 He 
feared that theology would degenerate to becoming a “Wissenschaft,” a mere academic 
subject, removed from society and without practical impact on people’s ways of life and 
thinking.123 To improve and strengthen the role of theology, Herder tried to foster 
communication between schools, the church, and the university in Weimar; he 
envisioned “more church supervision of the university and schools.” With this impulse 
to expand the church’s sphere of influence and to prepare young people for their 
                                                
120 See Müller-Michaels, 386-387. 
121 Zaremba, Johann Gottfried Herder: Prediger der Humanität, 164. On Herder’s impression that his 
ministerial job did not receive the kind of public support and recognition it deserved, see also Martin 
Kessler, Johann Gottfried Herder-der Theologe unter den Klassikern. Das Amt des 
Generalsuperintedenten von Sachsen-Weimar, vol. 2, 979-990. 
122 “Spätestens seit den achtziger Jahren spürte [Herder], dass sein Fachgebiet, die Theologie, zunehmend 
zu einem bloßen Anhängsel der Philosophie verkam, dass die Kandiaten lieber Kant lasen als die Bibel” 
(Zaremba, Johann Gottfried Herder: Prediger der Humanität, 214). 
123 Regarding Herder’s concern about a purely scientific and critical Bible interpretation at the university, 
see esp. the 1st and 13th letter of the Briefe. And regarding his critique of dogmatic Bible interpretations in 




services in churches and schools, he designed a seminary for preachers in the early 
1780s whose mission and vision is laid out in the Briefe, das Studium der Theologie 
betreffend (1780/81). The Briefe are Herder’s attempt to determine a central and 
sustainable place for the Bible in a competitive environment where its authority was 
prone to becoming increasingly marginalized. The project was to have the faculty of 
theology and, ideally, also the members of the department of philosophy collaborate and 
set up a seminary focused on training students’ practical expertise of doing ministerial 
work in public institutions.124  
 While these specific plans remained unrealized, the works growing out of 
Herder’s project to draw people into a fresh engagement with the Bible were successful. 
Both his unfinished study Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie as well as its preparatory 
work the Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend  became guides to reading the 
Bible for ministers and students of theology as well as for a wider educated public. As 
Wulf Köpke has pointed out, it is hard to classify Vom Geist because it is neither an 
exegesis in the traditional sense nor a scholarly examination with footnotes and a 
bibliography.125 The title varies Robert Lowth’ Oxford lectures De Sacra Poesi 
Hebraeorum Praelectiones by replacing “sacred” with “Geist,” and suggests thereby 
that Hebrew poetry belongs in the realm of human thinking. The subtitle makes the 
human connection even more explicit by announcing that what follows is Eine 
                                                
124 Kessler, “Herder’s Theology,” 264. On this project see also SWS 30:488-501 and Kessler, Johann 
Gottfried Herder-der Theologe unter den Klassikern. Das Amt des Generalsuperintedenten von Sachsen-
Weimar, vol 2, 994-1000. 
125 See Wulf Koepke, “Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie: Biblisch-orientalische Poesie als alternatives 




Anleitung für die Liebhaber derselben und der ältesten Geschichte des menschlichen 
Geistes [emphasis added]. The text is an introduction and a guide to the writings of the 
Bible for people who love these texts, and who are interested in exploring the history of 
human spirituality through the lens of humanity’s oldest documents.  
 Vom Geist brings together historical narratives and translations of poetry from 
the Old Testament as well as from other Oriental literatures like the Persian and Arabic 
tradition, and it encourages its readers to study these documents as varied expressions of 
human experiences of the divine: “Studiere man also das Alte Testament, auch nur als 
ein menschliches Buch voll alter Poesien, mit Lust und Liebe” (FA 5:670).126 Rejecting 
any orthodox interpretation of the Scriptures, Herder makes a strong case against the 
assumption that they articulate a system of divinely revealed truths. As Goethe notes in 
Dichtung und Wahrheit, the most prominent feature of Herder’s treatment of the 
Scriptures is that he understands them as “Dichtkunst” and “Welt- und Völkergabe.”127 
The Briefe and Vom Geist suggest that the language of the Bible is a human language; it 
is historically explicable and within reach of humans. It conveys in myriad ways how 
people have felt and expressed the existence of God through their senses. 
 As in the Briefe, Herder arranges his materials in Vom Geist in an open form and 
chooses an equally open and undogmatic style of writing to ease his readers’ way into 
                                                
126 The introduction to Vom Geist recalls the first letter of the Briefe: “Menschlich muss man die Bibel 
lesen: denn sie ist ein Buch durch Menschen für Menschen geschrieben: menschlich ist die Sprache, 
menschlich die äußern Hülfsmittel, mit denen sie geschrieben und aufbehalten ist” (FA 9/1:145). 
127 “Die hebräische Dichtkunst, welche er [Herder] nach seinem Vorgänger Lowth geistreich behandelte, 
die Volkspoesie, deren Überlieferung im Elsaß aufzusuchen e runs antrieb, die ältesten Urkunden als 
Poesie gaben das Zeugnis, daß die Dichtkunst überhaupt eine Welt- und Völkergabe sei, nicht ein 
Privatteil einiger feinen, gebildeten Menschen,” Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Dichtung und Wahrheit, 3 




the world of the ancient Hebrews.128 The first part consists of ten lively and free 
thinking conversations between two friends, Alciphron and Eutyphron, which Herder 
invites his readers to join in. In a way, Eutyphron acts out Herder’s ideal of a modern 
teacher and preacher: he avoids the “Kanzelton,” “[den] Ton der Lehre” (FA 5:668-
669), that is a top-down model of religious instruction. Rather, he assists his friend to 
overcome prejudices and resentments against what Alciphron regards as the primitivism 
and barbarism of the Hebrew language. It is not Eutyphron’s objective to tell his friend 
how he ought to understand certain images, poems, parables or hymns, but rather to 
help him appreciate their linguistic and aesthetic peculiarities as unique manifestations 
of what the world looked like to the members of Hebrew culture: “Alte Sprachen…sind 
die Form, in der sich menschliche Gedanken, gut oder schlecht, gebildet haben: sie 
geben die unterscheidensten Züge vom Charakter und der Sehart einzelner Völker” (FA 
5:673). Eutyphron enables Alicphron to see the parallel structure of ancient Hebrew, its 
lack of rigid divisions between tenses, its overflow of verbs, synonyms and 
personifications not as shortcomings but as expressions of a lively, sensuous and 
continuously active and changing experience of the world. 
 By helping Alciphron to appreciate Hebrew culture in its own right and by 
encouraging him to engage with it in an empathic and sensuous manner (see FA 5:674), 
Eutyphron ultimately enables his friend to read the Bible and experience religion in new 
and unexpected ways. He begins to rediscover the texts as sources from which he can 
                                                
128 The form of the Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend is modeled on the Briefe, die neueste 
Litteratur betreffend, which Lessing, Mendelssohn, Nicolai und Abbt published between 1759 and 1765 




learn that the revelation of God is not a privilege of past generations but that every 
individual, every generation, and every culture can discover him anew and in multiple 
ways.129 For their second conversation, the two friends meet in the early morning hours 
on a mountain top to witness the birth of a new day in light of their understanding of 
revelation as a matter of the present.130 
 This brief introduction to Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie should suffice to 
demonstrate the close proximity between how Herder treats and determines the function 
of profane and religious literatures. He severs the texts from the idea that they represent 
any sort of fixed moral, didactic or aesthetic function which the modern subject ought to 
recover and follow. In light of his wide-ranging anthropological reflections, cultural 
historical investigations and empathic engagements with these ancient traditions, he 
proposes that the active practice of the subject’s self-learning capacities and his self-
creation should always be the main focus when one interprets and teaches these 
literatures. He never grew tired of communicating this objective through his written 
                                                
129 Eutyphron tells his friend that while one can certainly no longer write poetry like the Hebrews, their 
animated mode of perception is worthy of study and imitation: “Niemand solls [imitate the Hebrews]: 
denn jede Sprache, jede Nation, jedes Klima hat ein eignes Maß und eigne Quellen seiner 
Lieblingsdichtung. Es  zeigte elende Armut an, wenn man von so entlegnen Völkern borgen wollte; aber 
denselben Weg gehen, müssen wir! und aus eben den Quellen schöpfen. Vor wessen Auge und 
Empfindung sich die Natur nicht belebt, zu wem sie nicht spricht, wem sie nicht handelt; der ist nicht zu 
ihrem Dichter geboren” (FA 5-748-749). 
130 See FA 5:695. To exemplify his point that an animated, personified mode of seeing is not a sign of 
primitivism but the way in which humans process experience, Eutyphron tells Alciphron about Jonathan 
Carver’s spiritual encounter in Travels through the interior parts of North-America (1778): “Haben Sie in 
einer der neuern Reisen die Geschichte jenes Amerikaners gelesen, der den großen Wasserfall zu sehen 
reiste? Von fern schon, da er das erhabene Geräusch hörte, sprach er mit dem großen Geist: als er näher 
hinzu kam, fiel er nieder und betete an. Nicht aus knechtischer Furcht oder dummer Stupidität, sondern 
im Gefühl, dass in einem so wunderbaren, großen Werk der große Geist ihm gleichsam näher sei...Sein 
Gefühl ist die Geschichte aller alten Völker, Sprachen, Hymnen, Namen Gottes und 
Religionsgebräuchen, wo aus Trümmern der Urwelt Ihnen eine Schar von Denkmalen und Beweisen 




work as much as through his teaching and preaching—famously, he states in the 40th 
letter of the Briefe that the exegesis of the Bible is the best sermon: “[die] Auslegung 
der Bibel halte ich also für die vornehmste, beste Predigt” (FA 9/1:507).131 Today we do 
not have too many of Herder’s sermons because he was reluctant to publish them, 
fearing that the flowing language of time and life would loose its immediacy and 
liveliness if written down. The reminiscence of a congregation member who attended 
one of his early sermons in Riga, however,  suggests that Herder lived up to his own 
principles: the audience member recalls Herder as an inspiring preacher, highlights his 
ability to fill religious forms with new life and describes the effect his preaching had on 
him as uplifting, animating you to make your contribution to the greater good of human 
welfare: “Mit Geist, Herz und wahrer Religiosität belebte er…die alte Form, 
aufmunternd zur Ausübung jeder menschlichen Tugend….”132 
 Herder’s liberal mode of preaching, the publications on how to teach the Bible, 
and the translations from the Old Testament which highlight that human beings stand at 
the origin of the Bible – these are all different components of his overall project to 
secure the Bible’s place in the public sphere.133 And to be sure, these interpretations 
                                                
131 For Herder’s detailed instructions on how to preach, see FA 9/1:508-511. 
132 Cited in Michael Zaremba, Johann Gottfried Herder: Prediger der Humanität, 60. On the 
transmission of Herder’s sermons, his congregation, and his self-understanding as a preacher, see also 
Kessler, “Herder’s Theology,” 262 and especially the following two book volumes by Kessler: Johann 
Gottfried Herder-der Theologe unter den Klassikern and Das Amt des Generalsuperintedenten von 
Sachsen-Weimar; Herders Kirchenamt in Sachsen-Weimar in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmbarkeit von 
Stadt- und Hofkirche. 
133 See Koepke, “Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie: Biblisch-orientalische Poesie als alternatives 
Vorbild,“ (95) for another interesting observation of how Herder communicates to his readers that 
humans stand at the origin of the Bible in the second part of Vom Geist der Ebäischen Poesie. Koepke 
notes that Herder focuses on individual narratives like Moses’ stories, King David’s psalms, the prophets, 




attracted his audience and facilitated fresh ways of engaging with religious texts. 
Herder’s research brought to bear an undogmatic understanding on the heavily debated 
question of divine revelation, and his writings and modes of public address opened up a 
whole new range of perspectives on questions of revelation and religious experience. At 
the same time, however, these same interpretations through which he sought to 
reconstitute and stabilize the role of the Bible also contributed significantly to the 
destabilization of its authority. The close ties between Herder’s understanding of 
religious texts and non-religious literary works clearly draw attention to this 
dehierarchization of the Bible’s superior status: both sorts of texts function as nodal 
points for training the subject’s self-learning and self-creating capacities in Herder’s 
discussions. Against the backdrop of Herder’s exegesis, it is not clear why one should 
turn to the Bible and not to other texts; it is not obvious what the Bible can do for the 
reader that other texts cannot. In fact, the proximity between Herder’s treatment of 
religious and profane writings has led a variety of critics to the assumption that his 
primary concern lies in aestheticizing the Hebrew texts, turning them – just like other 
ancient literatures – into a vital sources for Bildung, and putting them forth as models 
for eighteenth century literary innovation.134 
                                                                                                                                          
common is they are bound to time and place; and when God speaks to them their individual responses 
suggest that revelation is a human affair, expressed in ways that correspond to the specificities of their 
respective life situations. 
134 Gerhard Sauder, “Altes Testament – neue Literatur der siebziger Jahre,” in Johann Gottfried Herder 
Aspekte seines Lebenswerkes, ed. Martin Kessler (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 29-45; Grit Schorch, “Das 
Erhabene und die Dichtkunst der Hebräer. Transformationen eines ästhetischen Konzepts bei Lowth, 
Mendelssohn und Herder,” in Hebräische Poesie und jüdischer Volksgeist. Die Wirkungsgeschichte von 
Johann Gottfried Herder im Judentum Mittel- und Osteuropas, ed. Christoph Schulte (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 2003), 68-92; Marcia Bunge, “Herder’s Historical View of Religion and the Study of 




 Other critics, by contrast, have claimed that the relationship between the Bible 
and other literatures in Herder’s theological writings exhibits fundamental tensions 
which by no means resolve themselves in a straightforward “poetry instead of theology” 
formula—they argue against the idea that a secularization of the Bible gives rise to the 
sacralization of poetry.135 Both Bultmann and Weidner show that Herder does not 
simply reimagine religious ideas aesthetically within a secular framework of thinking. 
Rather, they propose that Herder sought to reconstitute the elevated and special role of 
the Bible by imagining its origin as a contemporaneously human and divine affair. 
Bultmann’s book-length study details how Herder develops a model of the Bible’s 
origin that is premised on a “Gleichursprünglichkeit von Offenbarung und natürlicher 
Religion.”136 By the same token, Weidner suggests that the vexed dynamic of Herder’s 
origin discussion in Vom Geist hinges upon his unfolding of a human-divine 
“Doppelursprung.” Moreover, he brings into view how Herder unfolds this human-
                                                                                                                                          
the Pursuit of Knowledge, ed. Wulf Koepke (Camden House 1996), 132-244. Sauder explores the 
significance of Herder’s revaluation of the aesthetic quality of the language and poetry of the Old 
Testament for the development of late eighteenth century literature. Schorch claims that by reading the 
Bible as literature, Herder was able to secure a place for it; without such an appreciation of its aesthetic 
qualities, the Bible would have disappeared from modern secularized discourses. Bunge argues that 
Herder’s approach to the past can best be characterized through the notion of Bildung. 
135 “Im Verhältnis der Literatur zu Bibel hat man um 1800 eine Art Umkehrung feststellen wollen, indem 
zunächst das Religiöse zum Erlebnis werde, dann das ästhetische Erleben das religiöse ersetze und 
schließlich die Ästhetik zu einer Heilung der Poesie hypostasiert werde: ‘einer Säkularisierung der Bibel 
entspricht dann die Sakralisierung der Poesie’” (Daniel Weidner, “Einleitung” to Urpoesie und 
Morgendland: Johann Gottfried Herder: Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie, ed. Daniel Weidner [Berlin: 
Kadmos, 2008], 12). 
136 Drawing on the Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts (1774/76), Briefe, das Studium der 
Theologie betreffend (1780/81) and Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie (1782/83), Bultmann concludes: 
“Das ideale Modell, das [Herder] zu etablieren strebt, ist das einer Koinzidenz von natürlicher und 
offenbarter Religion; es soll erlauben, Offenbarung ‘menschlich’ zu verstehen und gleichzeitig eine 
natürliche Erkenntnis Gottes in einer Offenbarung zu verankern. Das theologische Ziel ist also einerseits 
die anthropologische Entschränkung der Offenbarungstradition, andererseits die 
offenbarungstheologische natürlichen Religion” (Christoph Bultmann, Die biblische Urgeschichte in der 
Aufklärung: Johann Gottfried Herders Interpretation der Genesis als Antwort auf die Religionskritik 




divine double origin simultaneously in different media, genres, and modes of 
representation (Bildspruch, Personifikation, Fabel, Sage, Musik). Ultimately, Weidner 
demonstrates how Herder concentrates these ramified and widely distributed human-
divine double origins in one focal point, in what he calls משל (m š l), the maschal: “Im 
maschal wird der Ursprung der Poesie ausgedrückt.”137 Herder argues that the 
complexly interwoven origins of poetry all share a common ancestor in the Hebrew 
stem word משל. 
 Building and expanding on Weidner’s research, Andrea Polaschegg has worked 
out the problematic status of Herder’s discussion in Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie 
of the peculiarities of ancient Hebrew, claiming that his core argument remains jarringly 
contradictory. Polaschegg claims that he grounds his idea of a universal origin of poetry 
in the specific linguistic structures of the Hebrew language. By assigning it a 
distinguished, exceptional status, Herder sets the language apart from other languages, 
ancient Egyptian in particular, and subverts thereby the universal gesture of his claim.138 
Herder sets up ancient Hebrew as the “Urspungssprache” not just with reference to the 
                                                
137 Daniel Weidner, “Ursprung und Wesen der ebräischen Poesie. Zu Figuren und Schreibweisen des 
Ursprünglichen bei Herder,” in Urpoesie und Morgendland: Johann Gottfried Herder: Vom Geist der 
Ebräischen Poesie, ed. Daniel Weidner (Berlin: Kadmos, 2008), 113-151; for Weidner’s analysis of the 
maschal, see 127-131. 
138 “Einerseits entwirft Herder nämlich die orientalische Poesie der Hebräer tatsächlich als 
Ausgangspunkt und Nucleus einer menschheitsgeschichtlichen Gesamtentwicklung und 
‘entschränkt’…diese spezifsche morgenländische Dichtkunst zu einer anthropologischen Universalie. Als 
Ausweis des ursprünglichen Charakters der hebräischen Poesie aber führt er andererseits gerade die 
spezifische Struktur der hebräischen Sprache und Schrift an, grenzt sie dabei innerhalb der 
morgenländischen Ursprungsregion dezidiert von anderen – namentlich der altägyptischen – ab und 
torpediert damit seine eigene argumentative Bewegung einer Entgrenzung der hebräischen Poesie zum 
allgemeinmenschlichen Uranfang” (Andrea Polaschegg, “Die Verbalwurzel der Hieroglyphe. Herders 
Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie als Text zwischen zwei wissensgeschichtlichen Paradigmen,” in 
Urpoesie und Morgendland: Johann Gottfried Herder: Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie, ed. Daniel 




maschal but on the basis of a whole range of other structural and morphological 
characteristics: crucially, what makes the language poetic, musical and infinitely lively 
is that all words have derived from a single verbal root lacking consonants and nouns.139 
 Polaschegg and Weidner belong to a small group of scholars who have recently 
begun to explore the multidimensional strands of Herder’s paradoxical arguments in 
Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie, and they both point out that their examinations mark 
just the beginning of a larger, barely tapped research field. What Weidner concentrates 
on in the first place is isolating, unpacking and contextualizing Herder’s parallel 
unfoldings of origins in a number of close readings. Building on these findings, I 
propose that we can begin to better understand the significance of these different origin 
narratives if we compare and contrast them with those in his non-theological writings. 
Such comparisons cannot solve Vom Geist’s contradictions, but they enable us to place 
them within a larger context of Herder’s thinking. His location of the origin of poetry in 
a Hebrew stem word, I want to propose, could be interpreted as his creation of a fable 
among other fables. A reason for the tensions inherent in Vom Geist, in other words lies 
in this double move on Herder’s part: he does not only describe and introduce his 
readers to multiple versions of the human-divine double origin of poetry but contributes 
his own narrative. He intervenes in the battle over poetic beginnings. 
Herder’s switching from an observing and describing into a narrating mode 
comes into clear focus for readers familiar with his philosophical anthropology. He 
discusses the origin question most compactly in the opening chapter of the second part 
                                                
139 Polaschegg, “Die Verbalwurzel der Hieroglyphe. Herders Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie als Text 




of Vom Geist titled “Vom Ursprung und Wesen der Ebräischen Poesie.” In this key 
chapter, he first sets out to develop the origin of poetry in exactly the same way as in 
Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel or the Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache: he 
lays out how the subject zeroes in on the multiple images of perception that address and 
stimulate his senses perpetually, how he singles out specific characteristics and fashions 
them with the aid of his “Prägekunst” into multiple media of representation.140 And as 
in Über Bild, Dichtung und Fabel, he then proposes that these acts of crafting order and 
meaning into different artistic media follow an analogical principle of structuring: given 
their bodily existence and the organization of their senses, he writes, humans process all 
experience in correspondence to their own self-understanding – this process explains 
why humans animate and personify the world, and why they assign gender categories 
and assume affective relationships among beings different from themselves.141 
In yet another step, he adds a transcendental dimension to the principle of 
analogy which was already in the Abhandlung but is missing from Über Bild, Dichtung 
und Fabel: 
Man kann diesen [den Ursprung] also menschlich und göttlich nennen, denn er 
ist beides. Gott wars, der die Quelle der Empfindungen im Menschen schuf, der 
das Weltall mit seinen Strömen rings um ihn her setzte, der diese Ströme auf ihn 
leitete, und mit den innern Empfindungen seiner Brust mischte…Himmel und 
Erde, Nacht und Tag, Tages- und Nachtgestirne, Geschöpfe auf Meer und Land 
                                                
140 “Von außen strömen Bilder in die Seele: die Empfindung prägt ihr Siegel drauf, und sucht sie 
auszudrucken durch Geberden, Töne und Zeichen…Was also auf ihn strömet, wie erst empfindet und mit 
Empfindung bezeichnet, das macht den Genius der Poesie in ihrem Ursprung” (FA 5:962). 
141 “Es ist die Natur der menschlichen Seele, alles auf sich zu beziehen, also auch sich ähnlich zu denken. 
Was uns angenehm ist, muß uns lieben; was uns zuwider ist, hasset uns, wie wirs hassen: mit dem wir 
gern sprechen möchten, das spricht auch mit uns…Hierin sind alle alte Nationen einander gleich; ihr 
Wörterbuch konnte nicht anders gesammlet, ihre Grammatik nicht anders geordnet werden, als das 
Namen in beiderlei Geschlechtern, daß Begebenheiten als Wirkungen und Handlungen lebendiger Wesen 




sind Ausmessungen des menschlichen Auges, der Bedürfnisse, der Empfindung- 
und Ordnungsgabe des Menschen…Indem er alles nennt, und mit seiner 
Empfindung auf sich ordnet, wird er Nachahmer der Gottheit, der zweite 
Schöpfer…Mit je reinerm Blick wir indes die Gegenstände der Schöpfung sehen 
und ordnen,…unsrer Analogie mit Gott zu bezeichnen: desto schöner, 
vollkommener und auch desto kräftiger wird unsre Dichtkunst. (FA 5:963-964)  
 
The origin of poetry is divine as much as it is human. God has equipped man with a set 
of sensuous capacities in such a way that it empowers him to engage and communicate 
with his surroundings in a productive and highly dynamic fashion. He has different 
perceptive devices at his free disposal and may use them according to what he regards 
as right and appropriate. The multilayered history of the different versions of the Bible 
testifies to the richness and diversity in which humans across cultures have constructed 
and mapped out the world (see FA 5:964). As world-creators and organizers, they all 
stand in an analogous relationship to God. 
 In the passage that follows, however, Herder suddenly changes his perspective. 
He no longer describes in a general fashion the human-divine double origin of poetry, 
leaving it up to other people’s judgments to make the call and to determine who 
emulated God best and made poetry “schöner, vollkommener und…kräftiger.” Now he 
enters the discussion and tells his readers “die Geschichte des Ursprungs und des 
kräftigsten Teils der Dichtkunst” [emphasis added]. By choosing the superlative form 
“kräftigsten,” he elevates one particular narrative above others: 
Ich zweifle, ob dieser Ursprung der Poesie schöner, als durch das Ebräische משל 
ausgedruckt werden könnte? Das Wort heißt drücken, prägen, ein Bild, ein 
Gleichnis prägen: sodann in Sprüchen reden…sodann entscheiden, ordnen, 
sprechen wie König oder Richter: endlich regieren, herrschen, mächtig sein 




kräftigsten Teils der Dichtkunst. (FA 5:964) 
 
Wir haben jetzt Stufenweise eine Reihe Gattungen der Dichtkunst betrachtet, die 
alle vom משל, der Rede voll Bild und Empfindung ausgingen: denn das siehet 
ein jeder, dass auch die Personendichtungen, die Fabelzüge, Rätsel, 
Sinnsprüche, endlich die eigentlichen Dichtungen…zum משל gehören. (FA 
5:976) 
 
He recalls in “Vom Ursprung und Wesen der Ebräischen Poesie” what Eutyphron also 
communicates to Alciphron, namely that the origin of poetry is located in the unique 
structure of the Hebrew language.142 Herder proposes that the universally shared 
anthropological process of creating meaning by gearing one’s sensuous “Empfindung” 
toward isolating a particular “Bild” from the constantly moving stream of perceptions 
manifested itself for the first time in the Hebrew משל (m š l), the maschal. All genres 
and forms of artistic expression point back to this Hebrew stem word. 
 Weidner relates the explanation of the history and meaning of maschal that 
Herder lays out in Vom Geist and other texts to those of his contemporaries and 
predecessors (Michaelis, Locke, Condillac, Lowth) as well as to modern linguistic 
research. He discusses the characteristics of ancient Hebrew and concentrates 
specifically on the structure and semantics of its verbal roots. He points out that the 
semantic connections Herder establishes between maschal and “drücken, prägen” is 
highly speculative and can hardly be found in the history of the word. Moreover, 
                                                
142 Compare especially the first conversations between Alciphron and Eutyphron: “Und wenn Sie 
[Alciphron] sich in die Zeit des Wanderns, des Wegziehens, in allen Situationen des Hirtenlebens 
versetzen: so tönet auch noch in der entferntesten Bedeutung etwas vom Urklange des Wortes, dem Bilde 




Herder’s assumption that the roots constitute the oldest elements of Hebrew words are a 
misconception.143  
There is no need at this point to go any deeper into the history of ancient 
Hebrew, because this brief synopsis of Weidner’s research already suffices to highlight 
the fictive character of Herder’s origin account. His strategy of dovetailing the origin of 
poetry and the maschal, I suggest, can be interpreted as his contruction of a fable. In 
“Vom Ursprung und Wesen der Ebräischen Poesie” he does not just describe how other 
individuals and civilizations have constructed contested narratives over the beginnings 
of poetry, but he contributes such a story himself. If we approach the narrative about 
poetic beginnings as growing out of a Hebrew stem word within the larger context of 
his anthropological understanding it becomes more comprehensible. 
We already saw in the Denkmal essay that Herder was deeply concerned with 
how the ways in which individuals shape history impacts themselves, disciplines, and 
cultures. In fact, he explores throughout a variety of writings how specific “Ideen,” 
“Ideale” or “Idealgebäude” form subjects, scholarly and educational projects, and a 
culture’s self-understanding. The essay “Haben wir noch das Publikum und Vaterland 
der Alten” published in the Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität investigates these 
themes. He, for instance, draws attention to the power the ancient philosopher had over 
the souls and actions of his audience by virtue of establishing certain ideals and 
                                                
143 Daniel Weidner, “‘Menschliche, heilige Sprache’: Das Hebräische bei Michaelis und Herder,” in 
Monatshefte für deutschsprachige Literatur und Kultur 95 (2003): 2.171-206. On the semantics of 





axioms.144 And in an introduction to a collection of Oriental stories, Palmblätter. 
Erlesene morgenländische Erzählungen für die Jugend (1786), he suggests that it is 
necessary to craft ideals, models and coherent, orientation-giving narratives out of the 
messiness of history “damit sie [die Geschichte] zur Bildung des Geistes und des 
Herzens Gutes enthalte.“145 So too does he in a conversation between Alciphron and 
Eutyphron: Alciphron questions the historical reality of the paradise stories and 
suggests that they are probably nothing more than idiosyncratic and naive inventions of 
the human mind. Eutyphron advises him not to fixate so much on questions regarding 
these stories’ reality status and historical accuracy but to inquire how much good they 
did for the development of humanity and how they helped humans to define their place 
and goal in life.146 “Vom Ursprung und Wesen der Ebräischen Poesie,” however, shows 
that Herder does not just describe constructions of history but also participates in the 
process by creating stories. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                
144 “Ein Lehrer der Philosophie, wie er sein soll, hat ein Reich über menschliche Seelen, in welchem er 
mächtiger als ein König gebietet. Er pflanzt Grundsätze, er gibt Ideen, er stellt Ideale fest, die nachher auf 
tausend Gedanken und Handlungen seiner Zuhörer, ja aller derer, auf welche sie wirken, erkannten und 
unerkannten Einfluß haben” (FA 7:314). 
145 Palmblätter. Erlesene morgenländische Erzählungen für die Jugend, collected by August Jacob 
Liebeskind with an introduction by Johann Gottfried Herder, edited by Dieter Laux (Leipzig: Insel 
Verlag, 1976), 5-13. 
146 See for instance Eutyphron’s response to Alciphron’s skepticism in this text part: “Alle Ideen, die dazu 
beitrugen, trugen zu seiner Besserung bei; die Bilder des Paradieses von Unschuld, Liebe und Vergnügen 
im Schoße der Natur haben dies unstreitig getan….Lassen sie mich, wenn meine Zunge durch keine 





The purpose of this chapter was to investigate Herder’s way of fashioning the 
modern use of ancient Greek and Hebrew literature in the context of his anthropological 
thinking. I hope to have shed light on facets of Herder’s thinking which recent critical 
literature on this topic has not paid attention to. In different ways, critics have assumed 
that Herder’s main objective lies in saving his readers from the illusion of identifying 
with the past and in honing their acquisition of a shrewd consciousness for the limits of 
understanding the life worlds and works of others. As I have demonstrated, however, 
Herder does not specify how one ought to engage with the texts he collected, translated 
and reworked from multiple national origins. He untethers them from any sort of 
specific purposes, be they aesthetic, moral, or didactic. 
Against the backdrop of his idea of man and his understanding of the 
development of knowledge, the principal aim of his work is the sharpening of his 
contemporaries’ awareness for the plurality of human forms of “Selbstschöpfung” and 
aiding them in developing the cognitive, affective and imaginary capacities of their 
senses so that they can become better agents of their own self-fashioning. The 
specificities of the goals toward which individuals work and for which they practice 
their talents lie in their own free discretion. Herder perceives his task and the task of 
other scholars, teachers, and ministers as creating environments congenial to the 
unfolding of individual objectives.  
I investigated at different points in the chapter what Herder’s liberal, non-
restrictive attitude implies practically for the ways in which individuals, institutions, 




severing profane and religious literary texts from the goal of serving a defined set of 
purposes, Herder opens up the field in such a way as to allow the exploration of 
literatures of the past on a global scale. And their concrete modern use, value and 
degree of importance comes to depend on such components as the authority, talent and 
public and institutional influence of the subject engaging these poetic texts and other 
artworks. Herder’s memorial essay on Winckelmann gives insight into this shift toward 
individual and disciplinary authority. He links the truth and value of Winckelmann’s 
“Idealgebäude” of Greek culture to the ways in which it authorized a specific classical 
discourse and became a chief point of orientation for his self-understanding.  
The chapter’s final part focused on Herder as a historical figure, as a 
professional theologian and reformer who sought to secure the Bible a central place 
during a time in which its authority had come under attack. His discussions about the 
human-divine origin of poetry in Vom Geist demonstrate his deep concern to maintain 
the Bible’s status as a book whose compositions are not like those of any other. As 
critics have shown, however, the claim that the beginnings of poetry are rooted in the 
unique structure of the Hebrew language contradicts his general propositions about 
poetic compositions as diverse human-divine creations. In light of his non-theological 
and anthropological origin discussions, I suggested interpreting his location of all poetic 
beginnings in the Hebrew stem word maschal as a fable, as Herder’s own creation 






Transcendentalism’s Critical Instruments: German Historical Scholarship and the 




For anyone concerned with the thriving of key ideas and texts of German 
Romanticism beyond German speaking territories in the nineteenth century, the 
literature of American Transcendentalism provides extensive resources. There one finds 
them in myriad forms—translations, literary reviews, references in essays, treatises, 
lectures, sermons—and refracted in modes of thinking and arguing.147 In fact, the latest 
history of the country’s first major cultural movement suggests that it was the sweeping 
interest in all aspects of eighteenth century German intellectual activity that unified the 
Transcendentalists in their early years. In the introduction to American 
Transcendentalism: A History, Philip Gura identifies three principal traits the group’s 
members shared in common: almost all of them were New Englanders associated with 
                                                
147 For the most comprehensive overviews see Henry A. Pochmann, German Culture in America: 
Philosophical and Literary Influences 1600-1900 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957); Henry 
A. Pochmann, ed., Bibliography of German Culture in America to 1940 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1953); Bayard Quincy Morgan, A Critical Bibliography of German Literature in 




Harvard and the Unitarian church, and almost all had “a distinct philosophical bent 
toward German idealism.”148 
Critics have focused on this penchant for idealist thinking with regard to the 
group’s preoccupation with the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and, above all, Kant. 
The other object of critical scrutiny regarding the Transcendentalists’ engagement with 
idealist concerns has been their reception of historical Bible criticism, in particular their 
translations and discussions of works by critics like Johann Gottfried Eichhorn, J. A. 
Ernesti, J. D. Michaelis, Johann Gottfried Herder, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and 
Wilhelm de Wette. Besides Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s discussions of Kantian thinking 
in the Aids to Reflection and Thomas Carlyle’s reviews of German literature in British 
quarterlies, the two latest histories of Transcendentalism refer to the first English 
publication of Mme de Staël’s Germany in 1814 in New York as the key English-
language conduit for the rising interest of New England’s intellectual circles in German 
philosophy, literature, and historical criticism.149 
Gura’s American Transcendentalism and Barbara Packer’s The 
Transcendentalists both evaluate the group’s orientation toward eighteenth century 
                                                
148 Philip F. Gura, American Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 6. 
149 Given that Transcendentalism first began as a religious movement, Gura’s American 
Transcendentalism places particular emphasis on the reception of German biblical criticism. On his 
assessment of Staël’s role in the reception process, see 26-27. The other recent major history detailing 
both the movement’s philosophical and theological orientations with regard to the import of German texts 
is Barbara L. Packer’s The Transcendentalists (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2007); on 
Staël, see 21-24. On Staël’s mediating role in America see also Mueller-Vollmer’s chronology of 
German-American culture transfer in British America and the United States 93-97, the book’s chapter 
“The Significance of Anne Germaine de Staël’s Germany for a New Program and a New Direction of 
Anglo-American Literature,” 201-221, and also his essay “Staël’s Germany and the beginnings of an 
American national literature,” in Germaine de Staël: Crossing the Borders, ed. Madelyn Gutwirth (New 




German thinking and Staël as one of its central intermediaries as integral to the 
intellectual development of the movement. Such a transnationally oriented depiction of 
America’s rise as a culture of modernity, however, has by no means always been the 
norm. In evaluations of the role of German culture in New England, earlier studies 
usually follow two lines of argumentation that often intertwine: Some suggest that the 
German influence resides in authorizing and buttressing native intellectual impulses and 
conclude that the Transcendentalists’ engagement with Germany contributed nothing 
that transformed the group’s own nascent impulses in significant ways. Others focus on 
the distortions that philosophical concepts underwent in the reception process and 
highlight the Transcendentalists’ shortcomings in grasping them in their complexity. 
But in either case, such studies come to the conclusion that German philosophy played a 
marginal role during the movement’s formative period.150   
The works by Gura, Packer or Mueller-Vollmer differ significantly from these 
earlier approaches: they neither revert to the Transcendentalists’ preoccupation with 
                                                
150 Stanley Vogel’s German Literary Influences on the American Transcendentalists (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1955) provides a classic example for the assessment of German traces in 
Transcendentalist literature as a confirmation of the country’s own intellectual impulses. Whatever New 
England writers may have discovered by reading German philosophers and theologians through the works 
of Coleridge and Carlyle was never more than the conception of their own preconceived ideas: “The 
value of this German philosophy to these New Englanders, however, lay not in obtaining an exact 
doctrine but in the authorization it gave to their own ideas, and especially the presence of God in the 
individual heart. …Transcendentalism was a faith rather than a philosophy, and it went to Germany to 
find confirmation of that faith,” (see the inroduction to this chapter). Pochmann’s German Culture in 
America strictly concentrates on the correct appropriation of the information that was received from 
Germany and finds, for example, fault with Emerson’s misunderstanding of Kant (607/n.430). Sigrid 
Bauschinger’s Posaune der Reform: Deutsche Literatur im Neuengland des 19. Jahrhunderts (Bern: 
Francke Verlag, 1989) also highlights the faulty American adaptations of works by Kant, Fichte, and 
Schelling and seeks to prove that the “persistently progressing myth of American Transcendentalism as 
descending from German idealism is unfounded” (60). For a more detailed overview of the different 
appraisals of German culture in America, see Mueller-Vollmer, British America and the United States, 
75-92. On American misconceptions of German historical scholarship, see Carl Diehl, Americans and 




German thinking so as to highlight the originality and independence of American 
culture, nor are they concerned with centering their examinations on questions of the 
degree of the “correctness” of adaptation processes. Rather, their focus lies on 
representing the emergence of Transcendentalism as a process shaped by global cultural 
forces within which Germany played the major role in the early years.151 Mueller-
Vollmer aligns the rise of Transcendentalism directly with European and particularly 
German Romanticism and suggests that American’s leading intellectuals reiterated in 
their own ways the processes of thinking that propelled European Romantic debates 
decades earlier.152 
This mode of regarding Transcendentalism as a movement that took shape 
within an extensive network of cross-cultural correspondence, reception and 
                                                
151 Mueller-Vollmer’s work is hardly ever cited by the critical literature on German culture in nineteenth 
century America even though British America and the United States, 1770s-1850s, vol. 2 of The 
Internationality of National Literatures in Either America: Transfer and Transformation (Göttingen: 
Wallstein Verlag, 2000) is still the book that provides the most comprehensive recent overview of the 
different roads of the reception of German literature in the nineteenth century and provides a 
comprehensive review of the critical literature in the field. Mueller-Vollmer notes that assessments by 
such critics as Krusche or Bauschinger have been “cultivated by several generations of literary and 
cultural historians. These, with few exceptions, have described Transcendentalism as a product home-
grown from native American soil and seed and have maintained that its supporters’ international and 
transcultural aspirations were virtually insignificant and of no real consequence for American cultural and 
literary history” (77). Mueller-Vollmer has made issues of transatlantic influence of utmost importance to 
any understanding of Transcendentalism and demonstrates that American intellectual culture during the 
decades from the 1820s through about the 1840s is unthinkable without taking into account the pivotal 
role German texts played in shaping it. 
152 Mueller-Vollmer makes that claim particularly with regard to Emerson, arguing that he is neither “an 
original author of truly American genius” nor can he be said to have derived his ideas “ready-made from 
European sources.” Instead, Emerson’s writing is part of the literary corpus of Romanticism which 
reveals an American distinctiveness: “Emerson’s allegedly subservient relationship to European sources 
cannot be treated differently from the relationship in which Novalis and Coleridge find themselves with 
regard to Kant, Fichte and Schelling, or in which de Staël stands with the theories of poets of German 
Romanticism. Consequently, the interpreter of Emerson’s inaugural work Nature must view this text as 
belonging to a literary province within the larger realm of European Romanticism” (214). The 
Transcendentalists, developing their aesthetics and nature philosophy, repeat in their own way the very 




transformation processes has sparked a continuously growing accumulation of sources 
in the field of transnational German and American studies. These source studies, 
however, rarely deploy their findings to provide perspectives on the role of the German 
impact that go beyond familiar insights. Regardless of whether their focus lies on the 
reception of historical Bible criticism or on Transcendentalist reworkings of the Kantian 
critiques, the investigations draw the same general conclusion: German idealist 
thinking, so the story always goes, manifests itself in a “subjective turn” that becomes 
the Transcendentalists’ distinguishing characteristic. Their perceptions of the world are 
“centered on individual consciousness rather than external fact”; they regard their ideas 
not as coming through the senses, not as stimulated externally but find themselves 
knowing intuitively and internally what is true and good. In short, the same 
argumentative patterns that dominate critical assessments of Staël’s representation and 
mediation of German culture also underlie the overall appraisal of the role German 
Romanticism for the formation of American Transcendentalism.153 
Works concentrated on the reception of Biblical criticism arrive at the same 
conclusion via a different route: they demonstrate how the translations and reviews of 
German theological texts by Transcendentalist critics like James Marsh or George 
Ripley transfer the idea of divine authority from the letter into the interior world of the 
                                                
153 Compare Gura, American Transcendentalism, 8; Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, “Translating 
Transcendentalism in New England: The Genesis of a Literary Discourse,” in Translating Literatures, 
Translating Cultures: New Vistas and Approaches in Literary Studies, ed. Mueller-Vollmer (Berlin: Erich 
Schmidt Verlag, 1998), 81-106; Barbara L. Packer, “Romanticism,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Transcendentalism, ed. Joel Myerson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 84-101. On the 
correspondence between the argumentative patterns dominating the critical literature on Staël’s De 
l’Allemagne and the reception of German Romanticism in America, see the introduction to my first 




subject. Under the influence of German historical criticism, American critics begin to 
treat religious texts no longer as infallible testimonies of divine revelation but as 
historical records that tell in different ways how humans have experienced the spiritual 
world. Against the backdrop of their reception of German critical efforts, 
Transcendentalists install the subject’s soul as the resource we ought to tap so as to 
develop an intuitive understanding of religious truth.154 
Drawing on a wealth of rarely discussed and unexamined translations, reviews 
and addresses concerned with historical criticism in the fields of religion and classicism, 
this chapter proposes that we need to go beyond such indiscriminate appraisals 
regarding the function of German texts during the formative years of America’s first 
major cultural movement. Through close examination of different texts, I ask what such 
a shift of authority in favor of the individual’s inward consciousness and capacities 
really means. The chapter’s first two parts investigate this question through the 
resonance of Herder and Schleiermacher in Transcendentalist works. A variety of 
translations and reviews testify to the widespread interest the writings of the two 
German theologians sparked among New Englanders; they explain Herder’s and 
Schleiermacher’s popularity with the particular ways in which they put scholarly 
inquiries and learning practices into the service of a new understanding of divine 
revelation and experience.  
What, however, are the characteristics of a modern notion of religion whose 
formation is linked to processes of learning and the deployment of critical instruments? 
                                                




The subject American critics introduce vis-à-vis Herder and Schleiermacher, I argue, 
hones his religious integrity through continual critical labor centered on strategies of 
self-abandonment, empathy, recognition, and the cultivation of a poetic-philological 
mode of engaging with religious texts. The chapter’s second part extends the scope of 
inquiry by examining the role of the social sphere, of structures of communication 
between a preacher and his congregation, for the formation of such a subject. I 
demonstrate in both parts how this connection between religious revival and learning 
processes fundamentally changes our perspective on the impact of German biblical 
criticism on the formation of Transcendentalism. 
Finally, I turn to the domain of classicism and ask how the adoptions of German 
critical instruments transformed the ways in which American scholars imagined their 
relationship to ancient Greek culture. I thereby focus on writings of both 
Transcendentalist critics and classicists such as Robert Patton and Cornelius Conway 
Felton who were exposed to German scholarship in different contexts and refashioned 
educational institutions in the Boston area. An examination of the reforms of classical 
studies in the classroom undergirds the chapter’s central claim that the introduction of 
historical scholarship gave rise to a notion of individual authority centered on self-
transformative activities of learning. The practices of reading, writing and discursive 
interaction in classes and lectures on classical works parallel those exercised in 
theological seminars and congregational addresses. The educational goal of these 
activities in the field of classical studies, however, is not cast in religious terminology 




With my concentration on how the Transcendentalists developed their positions 
on religious and educational matters through detailed explorations and translations of 
German scholarly practices, I obviously build on critical works by Americanists and 
Germanists who have sought to make a strong case for the use and value of 
transnational studies. Whether through examination of Staël’s and Herder’s works or 
the migrations and transformations of historical critical practices in early 
Transcendentalism, my central objective throughout is to bring to light cross-culturally 
shared interests and questions regarding modern functions of ancient sacred and profane 
cultures and their works. Figures like George Ripley, James Marsh or Cornelius 
Conway Felton, who usually play a tangential role (at best) in critical work on these 
issues, move thereby into the center, because their writings and translations articulate 
concerns that occupied the thinking of leading intellectual figures on both sides of the 
Atlantic. And as chapter four will show, an investigation of their treatment of German 
criticism forms an important backdrop for a better understanding of Emerson’s public 
lecturing and thinking about forms of religious revival in a transnational context. 
To the field of Transcendentalist studies, such research contributes a more 
nuanced perspective on how the movement’s early critics participated in crucial 
German debates; and to the field of German eighteenth century studies this research 
focus contributes a better understanding of how key critical questions and practices that 
developed in a particular situation in Germany travelled, thrived, and were transformed 
beyond German-speaking lands. By letting the topics under investigation motivate my 




fundamentally from the ones that have propelled the majority of transnationally oriented 
scholarly productions in the field of American Studies over the past years. To prevent 
confusion, it is therefore necessary to briefly review the approach’s career in the 
discipline, and explain why I suggest pursuing it differently. 
 As Winfried Fluck has pointed out, the term “transnational” carries nothing less 
than the hope for a radical deconstruction of what scholars have perceived as a set of 
coercive power structures holding together ideals that make up the American Dream. 
The “transnational turn” marks the current culmination of a long tradition of revisionist 
criticism that has constituted the history of the field. For the past four decades, critics of 
American literature have set themselves the task to deconstruct what they refer to as the 
myths of American exceptionalism. In ever more radical and rhetorically highly 
sophisticated models of interpretation, they have been trying to carve out spaces of 
opposition strong enough to escape the forces of the nation state and to “counter the 
ideological hold of the idea of America.” In these critical projects, race, class, and 
gender studies or, more recently, also queer, disability, and animal studies are invested 
with the promise to construct identities of “cultural otherness.” The figure of the margin 
bears the hope of escaping “the homogenizing pressures of national identity” by 
actively cultivating the attributes of its otherness, and by defining them in what is 
designated alternatively a transnational, global, hemispheric of planetary context.155 
 One of Fluck’s crucial points of critique of this body of revisionist studies is that 
methodological concepts such as “transnational” remain “empty box[es]” in their 
                                                
155 Winfried Fluck, “The Romance with America: Approaching America Through its Ideals,” American 




treatments of literature. That is because it is not the topic under scrutiny that motivates 
the scholar’s interpretive extension across national boundaries but rather the idea of 
undermining an American ideology. Such operations cannot but fail; in fact, they end 
up buttressing the exceptionalist vision of America they set out to destroy. According to 
Fluck’s analysis, the problem is that instead of examining the elements that constitute 
the American Dream in their historical frames of reference, scholars treat stories of the 
frontier, of American democracy and independence as given, self-evident realities. In 
the act of criticizing, they base their critique on the same hermeneutical premises that 
consolidate the ideals they wish to dismantle.156 
 While modes of analysis that advocate for the liberating powers of 
denationalization and exterritorialization still dominate the academic publishing market 
(at times “urg[ing] on us the entire planet as a unit of analysis”), A New Literary History 
of America from 2009 changes the tune.157 With the publication of this history, 
American scholars follow in the wake of Harvard University Press’ other national 
literary histories, A New History of French Literature (1989) and A New History of 
German Literature (2004). To be sure, these histories each introduce their approach to 
narrating literary history differently, but they also share a common goal manifest in the 
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use of the indefinite article in their respective titles: instead of laying claim to being The 
New History of…, the publishers market the respective volume as A History of…, 
thereby drawing attention to the coexistence of a variety of ways of assessing the 
literary developments of a country. In the introduction to the German history, David 
Wellbery states that the volume “has no single story to tell, but sets many stories in 
relation to one another” and provides “multiple points of entry” that “allow[…] for 
various reading agendas” to unfold.158 Similarly, the American history defines the 
book’s goal as “to set many forms of American speech in motion, so that different 
forms, and people speaking at different times in sometimes radically different ways, can 
be heard speaking to each other.”159 
 In light of these projects, a manner of employing the category of the 
transnational to facilitate the uncovering of literature’s adversarial functions does not 
seem cutting edge but rather dated. The revisionist criticism that has driven the 
popularity of transnational approaches in American Studies would fall under what 
Wellbery calls traditional literary history writing; that is, a mode of “treat[ing] 
individual texts and performances not as singular occurrences, but as illustrative 
instances of some force, tendency, or norm such as the spirit of an age or a nation…. To 
grasp the historical character of a literary text is, according to this way of thinking, to 
see the individual case as typical of something else, and therefore as replaceable.” Such 
inherited strategies gloss over and harm the “temporal center around which it [each 
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work] crystallizes.”160 In distancing itself from these strategies, A New History of 
German Literature proposes treating the text as a literary glass that grew out of and 
refracts in singular ways a particular moment in history. To such an end, the following 
chapters employ a transnational approach to analyze early nineteenth century American 
texts concerned with questions of religion and classicism, and to illuminate measures 
that were taken to reform educational institutions and the ministry in New England. 
 
 
Transcendentalism and the Power of Philology: Herder, Schleiermacher and the 
Transformation of Biblical Scholarship 
 
While Herder’s works were discussed in the earliest histories of 
Transcendentalism, only the recent scholarship by Philip Gura and Ernest Menze has 
begun to uncover more fully the wide extension of his New England reception and 
assigned him a vital role in the period’s formative years.161 Gura assembles a number of 
key journal reviews by New England theologians seeking to revolutionize Unitarian 
models of spirituality by popularizing an intuitive approach which they explicitly align 
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with Herder.162 His history of American Transcendentalism suggests that the many 
reviews, translations, and addresses grappling with finding timely forms for expressing 
religious faith are the source for us to understand how Transcendentalism began.163 
Drawing on a variety of Transcendentalist discussions and translations of Herder’s 
theological writings, Menze maintains that a Herderian statement like “Religion…is a 
matter of the inward nature, the higher consciousness of man” would have been a fitting 
first article “if the Transcendentalists had ever drawn up a creed.”164  
In his essay contribution to Transient and Permanent: The Transcendentalist 
Movement and Its Contexts, Robert Richardson makes a similar claim with regard to 
Schleiermacher. Although the movement has widely branching roots reaching back to 
different traditions such as liberal Platonism or the Scottish common sense 
philosophers, Richardson finds that “the central religious impulse of Transcendentalism 
most nearly resembles the early religious position of Friedrich Schleiermacher.” This is 
– and here we can draw direct parallels to critical assessments of Herder’s function in 
early Transcendentalism – because “Schleiermacher locates true religion not in doing or 
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in knowing, but specifically in feeling.”165 The Schleiermacher who has made it into 
American literary histories and the Encyclopedia of Transcendentalism broke new 
ground in people’s spiritual lives because he located the source of religious sentiments 
in the individual’s emotions.166 
For anyone not familiar with the religious turmoil and heated controversy 
dominating the decades around the turn of the century, it is easy to overlook why 
proclamations of the power of intuition and inward faith were revolutionary and posed 
an enormous provocation in America’s intellectual climate. The chapter therefore 
begins with a brief introduction of the religious historical background crucial for 
understanding how and why the Transcendentalists’ enthusiasm for a religion centered 
on feeling formed. Drawing on reviews, writings, and translations by George Ripley, 
James Marsh, Frederic Henry Hedge, Samuel Osgood, and George Bancroft, I then 
examine what such a subject-focused notion of religion really means in the context of 
American engagements with the theological writings of Herder and Schleiermacher.  
While Gura, Menze, and Richardson have noted many of the general debts to 
German theology that I will examine here, I have found that the existing critical 
literature still leaves us with an insufficient and misleading impression of the 
characteristics of the spiritual restoration that Transcendentalist reviewers introduce 
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with their texts on the two German scholars. That is because the terms and phrases 
critics have isolated to describe the role of German scholarship convey a limited notion 
of the characteristics of religious truth that American critics work out with Herder and 
Schleiermacher. Without further explication, designations like “inward nature” or 
“individual consciousness of truth” evoke subjective faith as a phenomenon that exists 
removed and disconnected from currents of time and history. The problematic nature of 
such a representation of religious integrity come into view when we examine the ways 
in which the Transcendentalist critics direct attention to the relations Herder and 
Schleiermacher set up between religion and practices of scholarship. 
Tracing the relations between philological modes of inquiry and the formation 
of a subject that perceives religion as internal to its mind and soul is this chapter’s 
central objective. To be sure, the Transcendentalists regard the distinction Herder and 
Schleiermacher set up between religion as a form of higher consciousness and its 
specific historical manifestations as foundational to the rise of a modern, doctrine-free 
and subject-focused understanding of divine revelation. At the same time, however, 
Ripley and his intellectual circle also suggest that this distinction does not imply a 
hierarchical relationship between a timeless idea of religious essence towering over its 
timely articulations in the form of sacred texts and theological doctrines. Rather, the 
reviews and translations propose that the German critics fundamentally reorganize this 
relationship. 
The subject that American critics introduce with Herder and Schleiermacher 




express, revise and transform its spiritual sentiments and to bring to bear the same 
questioning attitude towards the religious articulations of other individuals and cultures. 
Through the lens of Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s philological techniques, critics like 
Ripley, Marsh, Hedge, and Bancroft articulate notions of modern revelation premised 
on education. And I argue that this connection between religious revival and learning 
processes fundamentally changes our perspective on the impact of German Biblical 
criticism on the formation of Transcendentalism. 
A number of Transcendentalist critics identify Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s 
concept of empathy as a conduit for religious revival structured around learning 
practices. Through exercises of self-abandonment, the individual opens up, feels 
himself into plural modes of religious expression and encounters language as a medium 
that does not ossify but record human experiences of the divine in boundless poetic 
ways. In light of this timely nature of religious expressions, the subject begins to 
discover and hone the capacities of his own “higher consciousness.” He fashions 
himself as a “God-Man” vis-à-vis his poetic-philological activities. Drawing on recent 
scholarship focused on the creative facets of the science of philology, I spell out the 
details of what I call poetic-philology.167 The “God-Man” that materializes in this cross-
cultural discursive matrix is anything but withdrawn and aloof from the currents of his 
time; he hones his religious integrity through continual critical labor and activity. He 
employs strategies of selection, amplification, personalization and an affective style of 
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writing, and he thereby seeks to fashion an independent religious persona that gains 
recognition and is authentic enough to withstand critical attacks. 
 
The promotion of revelation as something that lies potentially within everyone’s 
reach conflicted in every respect with the Calvinist doctrine adhered to by the orthodox 
wing of New England Congregationalism. Already the liberal theologians of the 
Transcendentalists’ fathers’ generation had vigorously revolted against Calvinism 
because they perceived the Calvinist idea of man born sinful and fully dependent on 
God’s mercy as humiliating and detrimental to individual progress.168 
 For Ripley, Emerson and many others of their generation, however, the 
Unitarian dissociation from Calvinist doctrines and association with the Protestant 
tradition was not radical enough. They found fault with and rejected even the opinions 
of the liberally minded members of the Unitarian church. The most polarizing issues 
among the affiliates were the unresolved contradictions posed by the distinction 
Unitarianism drew between natural and revealed religion. Following John Locke’s 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, they held fast to the thesis that humans 
receive all knowledge through the senses. According to sensationalist philosophy, 
natural religion relied on the idea that whatever we can learn about God, immortality, 
and morality we learn through observing and interacting with the world around us. 
Revealed religion, by contrast, resulted from God’s violations of the laws of nature; 
Unitarians considered Biblical miracles, testimonies in the Gospels and Jesus’ 
                                                




resurrection as infallible credentials for God’s ability to rise above natural laws. 
Because of its capacity to objectively prove divine interventions, revealed religion 
inhabited a higher rank than natural religion among the majority of Unitarians.169 
 When young American intellectuals begun to learn about German historical 
criticism, their hope was that the latest findings in Biblical scholarship would help settle 
the controversy over the nature of religion by confirming the authenticity of miracles. In 
1812 the orthodox Revered Moses Stuart, head of Harvard’s Andover Theological 
Seminary, and the Harvard graduate Edward Everett became involved in a bidding war 
over the four volumes of J.G. Eichhorn’s Einleitung in das Alte Testament (1780-83). 
Joseph Stevens Buckminster, one of New England’s most influential and recently 
deceased ministers, had brought the Eichhorn volumes back from Europe. Stuart won 
the auction but he gave Everett the permission to borrow his purchase. And Stuart had 
another book that he wanted to makes accessible for a larger circle of readers and for 
which he was trying to find a translator; that book was Herder’s Vom Geist der 
Ebräischen Poesie. Everett turned the request down and focused on translating sections 
from Eichhorn instead. Stuart, however, did not give up and was able to win over his 
student James Marsh to take on the challenge. With few exceptions, critics rarely note 
his contributions to the spreading of Herderian thinking with his complete translation of 
Herder’s incomplete The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry (1833). Rather, he is best known for 
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his edition of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection.170 Marsh would later become a 
Congregationalist minister and a key figure of the Vermont Transcendentalists; he 
served as president of the University of Vermont and took a chair in philosophy.  
 Stuart, Everett and Marsh are prominent examples of a growing interest in the 
methods of historical inquiry prevalent in Germany. When Harvard appointed Everett as 
the first professor of Greek literature, he was first sent him off to study for two years at 
the university in Göttingen before taking up duties in Cambridge. Everett left in 1815 
and was the first American to earn a German doctoral degree. Many others who would 
later occupy important positions in New England’s intellectual life followed his lead, 
among them George Ticknor, Frederic Henry Hedge, George Bancroft, and Emerson’s 
older brother William. Through studying with the Orientalist Eichhorn and the historian 
Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren, these Americans became familiar with the 
scholarship of figures such as Herder, Schleiermacher, Christian Gottlob Heyne and 
with F.A. Wolf’s groundbreaking Prolegomena ad Homerum.171  
 The critical discoveries New England’s intellectual pioneers brought home from 
abroad, however, were not the ones they had set out to find. The techniques of historical 
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interpretation they studied and learned to employ uncovered unsettling insights into the 
nature of miracles upon which the Unitarian understanding of the truth of revelation 
rested. Eichhorn’s literary and historical analysis of writings of divine inspiration 
suggested that religious texts could not be regarded as belonging to a special category of 
texts requiring critical methods that differ from those scholars employ for interpreting 
other literatures. In the Prolegomena Wolf explicitly transferred the methods of 
Eichhorn’s higher criticism to the field of classical studies, and the American Göttingen 
students found in Wolf’s text a powerful demonstration of the proximity between 
ancient pagan and religious texts. They discovered the analogous relationship between 
Eichhorn’s treatment of the Bible as a collection of human literary texts stemming from 
multiple origins and Wolf’s deconstruction of the unity of Homer’s poetry.172 In light of 
such insights it dawned on Everett and his intellectual circle that they would have to 
give up on the idea that German historical methods would ever help them make a 
convincing case for miracles as objectively verifiable bedrocks of divine truth. 
 In fact, many felt that the threat that such criticism posed to the stability and 
legitimacy of Unitarian faith went beyond what they could handle. Everett did not 
continue to pursue the research on sacred texts after he had returned to Harvard; rather, 
                                                
172 On the Göttingen students’ studies with Eichhorn, see Elizabeth Hurth, “Sowing the Seeds of 
Subversion: Harvard's Early Göttingen Students,” SAR 1992: “[in] Eichhorn’s ‘higher criticism’ the time-
honored doctrines of scriptural inspiration and authenticity were questioned by a literary and historical 
analysis which studied the Bible as a collection of literary documents presenting the same problems as 
any other ancient writing. Eichhorn’s interest in the Bible as the product of a particular historical and 
cultural conditioning not only undermined the alleged uniqueness of the biblical narratives but, more 
importantly, also brought the factual question about the historical accuracy of the Bible into the arena of 
theological debate” (93-94); Hurth, Between Faith and Unbelief: American Transcendentalists and the 
Challenge of Atheism, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, vol. 136 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 5-30. 
Packer points to the Göttingen students’ parallel investigation of Eichhorn’s higher criticism and Wolf’s 




he followed Wolf’s lead in his attempt to graft the philological methods he had learned 
from Eichhorn onto the study of classical texts. Bancroft switched careers and found an 
outlet and field of experimentation for his critical insights in secondary school teaching. 
Upon returning to America, he founded Round Hill School in Northampton, which he 
modeled on the German gymnasium.173 William Emerson noted in a letter from 
Göttingen to his brother Waldo: “my mind seems to have undergone a revolution which 
surprises me. I cannot avoid tracing much of this to the books and lectures of 
Eichhorn.”174 The intellectual revolution he had undergone abroad was so strong that he 
felt incapable of returning to his ministerial duties. Uncertain of what to do, he asked 
Goethe for advice but, contrary to what William had hoped for, Goethe told him not to 
retire from the pulpit but to regard his clerical post as a forum for teaching people. 
William, however, did not follow Goethe’s recommendation; he renounced the ministry 
and begun to study law.175  
 This skeptical withdrawal and professional reorientation of many of the 
Göttingen students, however, did not impede the rise of a fundamentally new 
understanding of the nature and modern role of religious writings in New England; 
feelings of anxiety coincided with an enthusiastic embrace of German higher criticism. 
Above all the translations and reviews of Schleiermacher, Herder, and their student and 
friend Wilhelm Martin Leberecht De Wette reflect that the German expositions of the 
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historicity of divine texts did much more than spread doubts and spiritual alienation 
among Transcendentalists.  
The Unitarian minister and Transcendentalist Samuel Osgood regarded De 
Wette as “the rightful successor of Herder and Schleiermacher, the third of an illustrious 
trio, who more than all others have rebuked the dead supernaturalism of the old school, 
and the skeptical rationalism of the new, and sought to kindle a living faith congenial 
with the age.”176 De Wette gained popularity among Transcendentalists not just through 
his theological works but, more importantly, through his autobiographical two-volume 
novel Theodore; or, the Skeptic’s Conversion. History of the Culture of a Protestant 
Clergymen which was translated by James Freeman Clarke.177 A discussion of the 
reception of De Wette’s literary and theological works would exceed the limits of this 
chapter. The reviews and translations of Herder and Schleiermacher, however, show 
many parallels to the Transcendentalists’ discussions of De Wette which I will point 
out. 
Among the American critics dedicated to evaluating German theological works, 
George Ripley stands out. His two reviews of Marsh’s translation of The Spirit of 
Hebrew Poetry are the most nuanced and learned American investigations of Herder’s 
thinking. They were published in the May and November issue of the Christian 
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Examiner and General Review in 1835.178 The journal was the most important 
mouthpiece of Unitarianism and the intellectual forum for the publication and broader 
circulation of key concerns of the Transcendentalist movement in the early years.179 In 
1836 Ripley familiarized the readers of the Christian Examiner with Schleiermacher’s 
thinking by introducing and translating Friedrich Lücke’s reminiscences of his teacher 
“Erinnerungen an Friedrich Schleiermacher.”180 The Unitarian minister Ripley was a 
core figure of the Transcendentalist group. He had attended Harvard together with his 
cousin and friend Emerson, helped to found the Transcendental Club – a regular 
meeting point for anyone concerned with rethinking the premises of Unitarian theology 
in the movement’s early years –, and was a major force in translating and promoting 
German Biblical scholarship, literature, and philosophy among his contemporaries. He 
owned most of Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s works in the original. Most famously, he 
edited a 14 volume series titled Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature between 
1838 and 1842 which contains translations of what he considered canonical French and 
German writings.181  
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 Ripley’s reviews are eclectic compositions. The author intermingles lengthy 
autobiographical sketches with evaluations of the significance and value of the 
reviewed texts. Moreover, he uses the review format as a forum for his own reflections 
on the authors under discussion and inserts excerpts from his translations of their works. 
Both the Schleiermacher and Herder reviews highlight the distinction the two critics 
draw between religion and theology as foundational to the restoration of spirituality. 
The division, Ripley writes, inaugurated “a new era in the history of science” by making 
a peaceful coexistence of faith and its historical manifestations possible: 
Religion, [Herder] argued, even according to its etymological signification, is a 
matter of inward nature, the higher consciousness of man…It was the grand 
central point, around which clustered the holiest feelings of the man, the citizen, 
and the friend, the most sacred bond of his inward consciousness, the altar of his 
purest and strongest affections.182 
 
According to Ripley’s summary of Herder’s position, religion designates moments in 
which humans perceive a strong bond between themselves and a higher being. Their 
feelings and affections uphold this bond that anyone can build regardless of the position 
or rank he inhabits. Translating and paraphrasing Herder, Ripley locates God’s 
“kingdom…among us” and emphasizes that it was Herder’s central project “to bring the 
conviction of its truth to the individual consciousness of man.” By the same token, he 
states that Schleiermacher’s primary merit lay in regarding “religion in its essential 
elements,” that is as a form of feeling and a state of human consciousness.183 
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 Crucially, such states are not to be conflated with “religion in its outward 
manifestations.”184 Historically distinct expressions of human spirituality such as 
miracles belong to the field of theology. Ripley points out that both Herder and 
Schleiermacher were concerned with depriving theology of its exceptional status and 
desired to integrate it in the canon of the other sciences. He upholds that theology is not 
a field of inquiry “invested with any peculiar rights” but a science like any other with 
sets of “propositions for and against which we may dispute” and which need to be 
scrutinized and questioned like those of any other science.185 
 By introducing religion as a human disposition whose credibility is severed from 
specific historical incidents, Ripley takes the edge off of Unitarian disputes over the 
truth status of Jesus’ miracles. The reviews discuss them as authentic recordings of 
Jesus’ divinity but not as authoritative ones. The historical figure of Jesus was human 
like anyone else but distinguished himself by his exceptional ability to bring the human 
and divine world together. His divinity “consisted in the divine attributes which were 
manifested in his person.” Like nobody else before and after him he unfolded the divine 
qualities that are potentially accessible to anyone at any time and became a “God-Man” 
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who made the “constant and intimate connection between the human soul, and the Spirit 
of God” an integral part of life.186 
 Ripley concludes that Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s mode of distinguishing 
sharply between Jesus’ godly qualities as a human being and his ways of transforming 
them into actions and molding them into methods of teaching is of major importance for 
the renewal of faith in early nineteenth century America. The distinction opens up the 
Bible to rigorous and unrestricted critical examination without weakening the subject’s 
trust and hope in the power of revelation in both past and present times: “Revelation 
pervades every age….Every age has had its mission in the unfolding of truth, and 
contributed its share towards the spiritual culture or man.”187  
Recent critical inquiry into the role of German Biblical scholarship for 
Transcendentalism’s propagation of a new religious consciousness normally stops here. 
By not taking this investigation any further, however, it leaves us under the impression 
that the Transcendentalists’ approval and adoption of scholarly instruments and 
practices from abroad went hand in hand with the rise of the idea of the individual as a 
self-sufficient and inward-looking being. The critical literature suggests that the 
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remembers the human relations in which this spirit was manifested. Schleiermacher thus reconciles some 
of the most perplexing antitheses between the two opposing systems, and lays a broad foundation for a 
faith which is equally in accordance with the results of science and the wants of the heart.” 




individual gains integrity by reverting to interior sources of empowerment, and critics 
undergird the claim by citing passages in which translations and reviews refer to these 
sources alternatively as man’s inward nature, his mind, soul, higher consciousness or 
reason.188 
 The Transcendentalists, however, go far beyond making abstract references to 
man’s soul and mind as conduits of divine revelation in modern times. In conversation 
with Herder and Schleiermacher, they demonstrate that the distinction between man’s 
spiritual qualities and their historically specific articulations brings with it 
fundamentally new ways of thinking about the relations between the spirit and the 
letter. More specifically, they suggest that revelation is not simply planted in the human 
mind and soul but gains shape in critical and creative engagements with Scripture. 
Frederic Henry Hedge’s Reason in Religion lucidly exemplifies the dependence 
of the subject’s religious feelings on their continuous realization in material and written 
formats. A Unitarian minister, writer, critic, and translator, Hedge also belonged to the 
group of Göttingen students, and he was, like his friend Ripley, a prominent figure who, 
in the early years of Transcendentalism, made German literature accessible for an 
American audience through numerous translations. Reason and Religion as well as 
many of his other writings make recourse to arguments put forth by German 
theologians, especially by Schleiermacher.189 Reflecting on how historical inquiry has 
changed the status of the Bible and the Church, he asks to what sort of source the 
individual can now resort to find an “expressed and unmistakable answer of God” and 
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provides an answer: “However desirable infallibility is…we have not been so 
constituted as to see infallibly or to act infallibly” and even if we could have “infallible 
authority in religion” such a state would be undesirable. Uncertainty, he writes, “is very 
essential to our growth, as individuals and as society.” In that sense, Hedge suggest that 
the way for the individual to experience revelation is through continues explorations of 
how religious feelings gain shape through different modes of expression: “no existing 
letter can endure for ever…every form in which the spirit clothes itself, every body it 
puts on, is transient.” Revelation, he writes, is a lifelong education.190 
Similarly, Ripley links the characteristics of the human mind and soul that gain 
prominence with the rise of historical criticism to the project of education: “A ship on 
the ocean needs the wind; the human mind demands continued inquiry and discussion 
on both sides.” This Herderian analogy illuminates in the most condensed fashion what 
Ripley regards as foundational to Herder’s understanding of the subject. What the 
individual needs for its divine potentials to unfold and to keep its modes of thinking 
from falling into stagnation is an environment that acts on it like wind and water act on 
a ship: to remain afloat and in motion, the subject has to expose itself and open up to the 
challenges posed by interrogations and debates. 
A powerful “aid” that helps the subject to cultivate mental plasticity is “sound 
philological learning.” One ought to bring an inquisitive and skeptical mindset to the 
writings of the Bible and all religious doctrines and “sacred records”:191 
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[Herder] desired to have all opinions confronted together, that their genuine 
character might be ascertained. The only security of the progress of science and 
the ultimate establishment of the truth was to be found, according to his view, in 
the calm comparison of different opinions, without excitement and without 
prejudice. He carried this principle so far, as to suppose that the best interests of 
religion were promoted by the free utterance of any doubts that were felt, either 
with regard to the received dogmas of the church, or the origin and character of 
Christianity itself.192  
 
The individual gains freedom and integrity in matters of faith by comparing and 
critically scrutinizing different opinions about religious records and by questioning 
them. A person who calls into doubt his own propositions and the propositions of others 
acts in accordance with “the best interests of religion.” 
 Hedge and Ripley introduce a notion of religious integrity that places high 
demands on the individual. To be true to religion, to this “higher consciousness” of 
oneself means to choose a life path paved by continuous trial and error. Hedge—whose 
fascinating observations deserve a much more elaborate treatment than my own and 
other critics’ cursory ones—explores this dynamic with regard to the subject’s attempts 
to bring spiritual experience into written and material forms. He argues that the 
formation of one’s higher self is underwritten by alternating modes of expressing, 
revising, destroying and recreating one’s experience through different media. Ripley 
identifies in Herder’s texts a similar process in the context of his discussion of how one 
ought to engage with existing records of human spirituality. Herder links the vitality and 
                                                




progress of man’s “higher consciousness” to the cultivation of a critical stance that does 
not settle on propositions and established doctrines. 
Throughout his reviews, Ripley probes deeply into the details of how Herder 
seeks to accomplish the formation of a mind that integrates the unsettlement of 
propositions into his modes of spiritual revival, into his return to “the consciousness of 
his own nature.”193 Ripley identifies Herder’s concept of empathy as a conduit for the 
formation of such a mind-set, and thereby picks up on what Marsh’s “Translator’s 
Preface” to The Spirit of Hebrew Poetry introduces as the lens for us to understand the 
characteristics of Herder’s notion of religious recovery: 
The work, of which a translation is here offered to the public, has long 
been celebrated in Germany, as one of distinguished merit…It taught 
them [the Germans], too, in the study of Hebrew antiquity and Hebrew 
poetry, as the works of Lessing, Winkelmann, and others had done in 
regard to Grecian antiquity, to divest themselves of the conceptions, and 
modes of thought, which are peculiar to their own country and 
institutions, and of the peculiar spirit of their own age; by the force of 
imagination to place themselves in the condition of those ancient 
patriarchs and prophets…to see the world as they saw it, to feel as they 
felt, to imbibe and to express their spirit in its truth and simplicity.194 
 
What makes up the practice of empathy in the field of both classical and theological 
studies are exercises of self-abandonment. Throughout the preface Marsh details what 
such acts of displacement mean for the modern reader and critic. He has to divest 
himself of everything he takes for granted and regards as normative in his own life 
world. He has to depart from habits and modes of thinking with which he is comfortable 
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and try to abandon the range of emotions accompanying them.195 By the same token, 
Ripley elaborates on Herder’s modes of self-abandonment as the precondition for the 
modern mind’s “pursuit of truth.”196 
 According to Marsh and Ripley, it is by means of his practice of imaginary 
displacement that Herder sets himself apart from the text on which his reworkings of the 
Old Testament are modeled, Robert Lowth’s De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum 
Praelectiones.197 Marsh writes that Lowth’ text, though valuable, does not meet the 
same high standards as Herder’s “classical standard work” because of “the point of 
view, from which it contemplates the subject…it treats.”198 What diminishes the quality 
of Lowth’s De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum in Marsh’s eyes is that he forms his opinions 
about Hebrew poetry too much against the backdrop of Greco-Roman standards of 
composition. With their promotion of Herder as a Biblical critic who made himself a 
name with a particular method, Ripley and Marsh could count on a readership having 
already heard of Lowth’s and Herder’s treatment of the Old Testament. In an 
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anonymous review that appeared in the North American Review in 1830, the author 
writes that Michaelis’ acquaintance with Lowth’s lectures in Oxford gave the first 
impulse to a new reading of the Old Testament among German theologians, “open[ing] 
their eyes on a new scene of the most interesting research” and “form[ing] absolutely a 
new era in intellectual activity.” The article also introduces the work that took its point 
of departure from Lowth, Herder’s Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie.199 
The comparisons with Lowth’s text help the American critics bring into focus 
the highly demanding nature of Herder’s approach to the Hebrew scriptures and 
demonstrate the method’s advantages at the same time.200 Ripley, above all, is 
concerned with exemplifying why Herder’s “path of inquiry” is worth adopting and 
leads “students of the Bible” to “excellent success.” Drawing on passages from 
Herder’s genesis interpretation, he shows that approaches to the text that are not 
underwritten by strategies of empathy and self-abandonment are detrimental to our 
understanding of the story of creation. Instead of trying to excavate and recreate the text 
in its larger context, we press it into “foreign systems” and “preconceived theories”; we 
do nothing but  “blindly cling to the letter” and turn it into a “definite and formal 
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fulfillment” of our preconceived propositions. By violently imposing ourselves “we 
rush into innumerable follies…into a world of dreams and shadows.”201 
 If, by contrast, we resist corseting biblical stories into modern systematic frames 
and follow instead “the genius of the passage, of the language, of the nation…in which 
it was produced” the text will resound as beautiful poetry in our ears.202 The exercise of 
divesting ourselves of what we take to be normative habits, emotions, and modes of 
thinking helps us to see the Hebrew verses as lively records, telling us of the ways in 
which ancient Hebrews experienced God’s presence in their lives in numerous ways. 
Against the backdrop of Ripley’s and Marsh’s explications of Herder’s 
empathetic method, we gain a good sense of what kind of labor is needed on the part of 
the subject to hone his mental flexibility and avoid the pitfalls of doctrinal imposition. 
The question still open, however, is in what ways such intellectual labor serves what the 
American critics identify as the main goal of all critical inquiry: the restoration of man’s 
faith in feeling and experiencing the divine and act as a “God-Man.”203 Or, to put it 
differently, in what ways does Herder not just say but also perform his claim that the 
gift of revelation was no privilege of the past but is potentially available to everyone at 
anytime? 
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This question leads to the heart of Ripley’s review where he evaluates Marsh’s 
translation. Ripley acknowledges “the literary enterprise and industry of an American 
scholar in undertaking and completing such a difficult task.” At the same time, 
however, he is highly critical of the quality of Marsh’s work as a translator: 
In justice to Herder it ought to be stated, that he suffers much under the 
hands of Professor Marsh. The vivacity and animation which breathe 
from every page of the original are evaporated in the translation. The 
spirited and graceful style of Herder, in the composition of this work, 
would hardly be recognized in the new costume which is given to his 
thoughts...[Marsh] often overlays the breathing life of the original with a 
thick shroud of words.204  
 
Marsh’s English fails to bring out the vivacity of the original language. In large bodies 
of footnotes running over several pages, Ripley places his own translation side by side 
with Marsh’s to exemplify his point. He shows how Marsh covers up Herder’s 
“graceful” and “spirited” style that is “breathing with life” with a wordy translation, 
exhibiting grammatical flaws and a faulty diction. In short, Ripley resumes that 
“Herder’s spirit is not in it.”205 
 Ripley’s critique draws attention to the restorative and creative side of Herder’s 
philological practice. What Marsh’s translation fails to convey is that Herder combines 
the exercise of self-abandonment with a strong formative impetus. Drawing on Madame 
de Staël’s discussion of Herder’s work in Germany, Ripley provides a detailed 
introduction to this creating dimension of Herder’s approach to Hebrew poetry: 
It is seldom that we meet with a writer, whose soul is so penetrated with the true 
spirit of antiquity, and who is so capable of bringing up the faded past in vivid 
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reality before the eye. “It seems, in reading him,” says Madame de Staël, “as if 
we were walking in the midst of the old world with an historical poet, who 
touches the ruins with his wand and erects anew all the fallen edifices.” He 
brings to his subject a freshness, a gushing enthusiasm, which spreads a charm 
over the driest details, and reminds us more of the eloquent conversation of a 
friend than of the learned discussion of a critic. Every thing is in motion, every 
thing has life, he is never languid himself, and he never permits languor in 
others; and we are led on from page to page of profound learning, of curious 
research, of wide and scholar-like investigation, with as little feeling and satiety 
or fatigue, as if we were reading a fascinating novel. He is unrivaled in the 
power of giving a picturesque beauty to the most barren subjects, so that the 
wilderness springs up into bloom and luxuriance under his magic touch. His 
own pure and noble spirit breathes through his productions. They seem to bring 
us into the presence of the author, where we hear his deep and thrilling voice, 
gaze upon his serene brow, and receive a revelation of his inmost heart. We 
cannot read them without knowing and loving the mind, from whose inspiration 
they proceeded. The great object of his life was the spiritual elevation of 
humanity; and, in his view, the means of his accomplishment was to infuse the 
spirit of Christ and his religion into the hearts of men. Such fervent love of man, 
such deep sympathy with Christ…these are so distinctly impressed on the whole 
face of his writings, that, in reading them, we feel that we are enjoying the 
intimate communion of an exalted and holy mind.206 
 
 
Ripley demonstrates through the lens of Herder’s critical techniques how the modern 
reconstruction of a religious text can be turned into an instrument for man’s “spiritual 
elevation.” The passage details how Herder realizes his life’s objective, the infusion of 
“the spirit of Christ into the hearts of men,” by rendering the text a site for the critic to 
act as a “God-Man.” Obviously convinced by the success of Herder’s efforts, Ripley 
concludes that in reading Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie he feels as if he were 
witnessing an “intimate communion of an exalted and holy mind.” 
                                                




It is illuminating to discuss the individual characteristics of the innovative facet 
of Herder’s approach against the backdrop of recent critical literature on the practice of 
philology. Ripley’s enthusiastic championing of Herder’s infusion of his spirit into his 
writings in some ways meshes with an aspect that Gumbrecht’s Die Macht der 
Philologie and Güthenke’s “German Classical Scholarship and the Language of Love” 
consider integral to the science of philology.207 Güthenke examines the artistic 
component of critical inquiry specifically in eighteenth century classical scholarship, 
while Gumbrecht extends his observations concerning the imaginative qualities of 
scholarship to the science of philology in general. 
Gumbrecht argues that philological activities – that is the identification of 
fragments, editing, and the composition of commentaries – always resemble the creative 
work of writers and poets to a greater or lesser extent. Translations, collections, and 
editions bear their author’s signature. This affinity between poetic arts and scholarly 
investigations stems from the fact that any philological practice is underwritten by a 
structure of desire. Driven by the impulse to render the object and author under 
investigation present, the philologist seeks structures of coherence between textual 
fragments and attempts to give them shape. He draws on his imagination to fill out 
empty spaces surrounding his materials and thereby exercises power over them. 
Drawing on the Benjamin philology, Gumbrecht argues that the critic endows the 
                                                
207 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, Die Macht der Philologie: Über einen verborgenen Impuls im  
wissenschaftlichen Umgang mit Texten, transl. Joachim Schulte (Frankfurt  
am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003). I adopt the link Gumbrecht draws between philology and power for my own 
title; Constanze Güthenke, “The Potter’s Daughter’s Sons: German Classical Scholarship and the 




objects he singles out over the course of his inquiries with an aura of exclusivity and 
turns them into sacred objects. 
Gumbrecht in Die Macht der Philologie points out that this link between the 
practice of historical reconstruction and imagination has been considered problematic 
and frowned upon by scholars, because it suggests a lack of control on the part of the 
critic and a mode of researching that appears insufficiently scholarly. He insists, 
however, that we need to view the unique characteristics of a critic’s historical text 
reconstructions as a vital component of his philological work. In their distinctiveness 
these reconstructions have given rise to a variety of different styles of philological 
inquiry in the disciplines that call for investigation.208 
Building on insights like Gumbrecht’s that draw attention to the significance of 
the creative side of scholarship, Güthenke makes the stylistic and linguistic 
manifestations of the subjective dimension of philology the focal point of her 
investigations of eighteenth century classical scholarship. She argues that the period’s 
leading classical scholars preferably employ a language of love, interpersonal affection 
and emotionality in their writings. Throughout her essay she examines how the 
language of love impacts and shapes the historiography of the field of classicism, our 
perception of the past, and the scholar’s self-understanding. Drawing on a large body of 
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classical criticism, she shows how the discourse of interpersonal affection personalizes 
and enlivens the past in intimate ways and exemplifies how scholar like Winckelmann, 
F.A. Wolf, Schlegel or Herder invest the objects they examine with human 
characteristics and emotions. This individualizing mode of inquiry, in turn, has 
powerful feedback effects on the scholar himself: a past “invested with the 
characteristics of a human figure” can become a “correlative to the figure of the 
scholar” and crucial for his self-representation as a researcher and as an individual. 
Moreover, such personal acts of figuration shape the scholarly discourse and determine 
its place in conceptualizing modernity.209 
Gumbrecht’s and in particular Güthenke’s observations are useful for analyzing 
Ripley’s representation of Herder’s mode of inquiry. In Ripley’s eyes, Herder 
accomplishes his goal of making his readers feel that the divine resides in man himself 
by performing how to go beyond being a “learned critic” toward becoming a “historical 
poet” or what I call a poet-philologist. In that function Herder unfolds powers that 
Ripley compares to those of a magician: like the magician with his “wand,” the poet-
philologist touches “the most barren subjects” and turns them into magnificent ones; he 
erects “ruins” and transforms the “wilderness” into a blossoming landscape. He endows 
the objects he singles out with a magical aura of exclusivity. 
Through such acts of transformation, the past not only comes vibrantly alive, 
radically altering our perspective on it, but it also moves closer and becomes thereby 
more personal and accessible. Ripley writes that Herder’s way of approaching his 
                                                




subjects reminds him of a conversation he would have with a friend. The author of the 
ancient writings himself seems to emerge as a friend, as a “mind” we cannot but love; 
through Herder’s style of writing the author materializes as a person with physical 
characteristics, revealing his most intimate emotions to us: we can “hear his deep and 
thrilling voice,” “gaze upon his serene brow” and gain insight into “his inmost heart.” 
As Güthenke points out, such personal, affective and selective strategies of 
configuring the past have a feedback effect on the scholar himself. Ripley observes that 
Herder impresses his “sympathy” and “intimate communion” with the divine “on the 
whole face of his writings” and thereby fashions himself as a “God-Man.” Herder 
exhibits the scholar’s ability to bring out his affinities with God vis-à-vis his activity as 
a poet-philologist. Through his intimate language and style, his strategy of zeroing in on 
individual objects he forges a personal perspective on the past which, in turn, enables 
him to fashion himself as a modern theologian able to turn religious records of the past 
into instruments for a timely and subject centered mode of practicing religion. 
In his review “Writings of Herder” in the North American Review, George 
Bancroft also regards Herder’s poetic-philology in the field of biblical criticism as his 
works’ distinguishing trait. Herder, Bancroft states, did not gain recognition as a writer 
but “he knew how to estimate the excellence of others”: 
He could hold his mind aloof from the objects by which he was immediately 
surrounded, and enter upon the study of a foreign work, as if he had been of the 
country, for which it was originally designed…He did more than translate. 
Wherever he found a beautiful idea, a just and happy image or allegory, he 
would seize upon it, and, giving it a form suited to his own taste, present it to the 
world anew. Deeply versed in biblical criticism, he often met amidst the rubbish 




fables, narrations, proverbs, and comparisons. These he did not fail to select, to 
amplify and arrange, and thus put in currency again many a bright thought, 
which day covered with the rust of learning, or buried under a mass of useless 
criticism.210 
 
Herder’s strength lies in singling out a “beautiful idea,” an “image,” an “allegory” or a 
small literary genre from the mass of ancient fragments and present his findings “to the 
world anew” by skillfully employing the instruments of philology. He fills out the 
empty spaces around fragments by amplifying and arranging them; he renders his 
materials contemporary and appealing to his readership by “giving [them] a form suited 
to his own taste.” 
Concerning his philological method in the field of Biblical criticism, 
Schleiermacher holds the same position as Herder among American intellectuals. In 
fact, Ripley’s review casts the double focus of “the power of interpreting” into even 
sharper relief than in the articles on Herder. In confronting the critic’s “renunciation and 
surrendry of self” with strategies of “personal appropriation,” Ripley relies on his 
translation of Friedrich Lücke’s “Erinnerungen an Friedrich Schleiermacher.” The 
Göttingen theology professor had published his recollections of his teacher only a few 
months after Schleiermacher’s death in 1834 in the journal Theologische Studien und 
Kritiken.211 Ripley’s translation is interesting not just because of being yet another 
indication for the strong footprint that German scholarship left on the 
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Transcendentalists’ critical thinking. Rather, the translation of Lücke’s text and its 
further discussion by Samuel Osgood in his review of De Wette reveal the formation of 
a contested discourse over both the powerful potentials of a poetic-philology and its 
equally powerful pitfalls. 
Lücke singles out Schleiermacher’s “Critical Letter on the First Epistle to 
Timothy” (1807) [“Ueber den sogenannten ersten Brief des Paulos an den Timotheos”] 
as exemplary of both the strong appeal of his “artist-like, graceful” style of criticism 
and of the objections it raised among his colleagues.212 When Schleiermacher took up 
the letters, they had been the object of contested discussions among theologians who 
had serious doubts about their authenticity; Eichhorn, for instance, had rejected the 
letters as false.213 Regardless of their doubtful origin, however, Schleiermacher made 
them the object of his research and introduced with his findings a new critical voice in 
the discipline: 
He loved him [Paul] above all others…but as it often happens with the love 
exercised by commanding characters, Schleiermacher insensibly transformed the 
Apostle into himself. He made him reason with logical precision as well as write 
with rhetorical skill. While he saw himself in Paul rather than Paul in himself, it 
is certain that, with all his rare sagacity and almost magical power in his 
exegetical reasonings and statements, he presented an interpretation of himself 
rather than of the Apostle. But this cannot prevent us from attaching a high 
value to his services in exegetical theology; since, even in the very instances in 
which the ascendency of his own mind led him to err, he was able to awaken a 
greater degree of life and of scientific activity, in this sphere of exertion, than a 
hundred ordinary individuals, whose want of a strong and original character 
renders them incapable of ever making a mistake.214 
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According to Lücke’s recollections, Schleiermacher reconstructed the writings 
and the life story of Paul as a site for narrating his own biography and scholarly 
development. Driven by his strong affections for the apostle, his scholarly examinations 
become in the first place a sounding board for Schleiermacher’s own reasoning and 
rhetorical practices. Lücke comments on the potential dangers of such a self-reflective 
mode of criticism and warns that it can surely not be “entrusted in the hands of 
everyone.” Such “conjectural criticism” rests on thin ice and is too heavy on the 
“appropriation” side of philology. At the same time, however, Lücke also notes the 
powerful appeal of his teacher’s revivals of Paul; even “students of classical philology,” 
he recalls, “envi[ed] us this production” and thereby raised the popularity of biblical 
studies more than any other scholarly examination, eagerly attempting to avoid the 
dangers of conjecture and imaginative recovery.215 
Lücke’s assessment of the value of Schleiermacher’s theological scholarship, 
however, did not receive approbation everywhere. Osgood picks up on Ripley’s 
introduction of Lücke’s “Recollections of Schleiermacher” to demonstrate why De 
Wette was more than “the rightful successor of Herder and Schleiermacher.” While all 
of them contributed in major ways to the transformation of scholarship into an 
instrument for the revival of “religion and revelation,” De Wette’s work surpasses those 
of his teachers in Osgood’s eyes: 
[De Wette] seeks to revive the lives and times of the sacred writers, and throws 
himself into their feelings, and thus to judge all Scriptures by that same spirit in 
which it was written. To borrow the phraseology of Dr. Lücke in his 
                                                




recollections of Schleiermacher, De Wette, as a critical interpreter, has more of 
abandonment than appropriation; is more disposed to yield his own mind to the 
author, that to draw the author over to him…While Schleiermacher would make 
Paul “reason with logical precision and write with rhetorical skill,” De Wette, 
although himself a philosopher, would leave the apostle to reason and write in 
his own way, and would try to find out that way.216 
 
Osgood holds Schleiermacher’s self-reflective criticism against him because it occludes 
and distorts the apostle’s own voice too much. De Wette’s writings on the same topic, 
by contrast, do not overturn the fine balance between “abandonment” and 
“appropriation” because he refrains from insensitively “stamp[ing] his own 
individuality upon everything.” 
Osgood’s response to Lücke’s representation of Schleiermacher’s writings on 
Paul is telling in that it shows the extent to which American critics regard the 
restoration of man’s religious authority in the context of critical techniques. Osgood 
judges the three major proponents of the new notion of faith that thrived in the early 
years of Transcendentalism by their poetic-philological methods. He measures the 
authority of their claim that God is internal to the self by their style of critical inquiry.  
Against the backdrop of my analysis of texts by critics like Osgood, Bancroft, 
Marsh, Ripley and Hedge, it should be clear why we can only really begin to 
comprehend the functions and manifestations of German biblical scholarship in 
Transcendentalist discourses if we take the relationship between religious revival and 
instruments of textual investigation into view. In the works under examination, the 
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subject who conceives religion as an integral part of his soul and consciousness is not 
empowered in the sense of being knowing, of being able to rely on a stable notion of 
faith. Rather, man is empowered in the sense that he begins to discover the capacities 
and functions of his faculties in wholly new ways. By working toward dissolutions of 
preconceived ideas and dogmas and by unsettling the authority of holy records, he gains 
a completely new perspective on the human role in shaping religion. He begins to see 
that he plays the main part in the project of modern revelation and identifies poetic-
philological practices as a crucial vehicle to work toward the project’s realization. 
 
 
Religious Sociability and the Reinvention of the Ministry 
 
The preceding examinations demonstrated how Transcendentalist critics 
articulate a notion of religious renewal premised on a set of learning activities through 
their probing into Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s poetic-philology. This part of the 
chapter broadens the scope of inquiry by arguing that the Transcendentalists investigate 
the relationship between modern revelation and strenuous educational efforts not only 
through practices of reading and writing but also in the social domain of public oratory. 
Drawing on letters, translations, and reviews engaging Herder and, more importantly, 
Schleiermacher, I focus on how Ripley develops the idea that a person becomes an 





The key text addressing the interdependence of religion and the social is 
Ripley’s translation from the fourth speech of Schleiermacher’s Über die Religion. 
Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. While Ripley provides multiple 
translations from the Reden and Der Christliche Glaube in letters and reviews, he 
singled out the fourth discourse “On the Social Element in Religion; or on the Church 
and Priesthood” to be published in the first American anthology of German fiction and 
criticism, Frederic Henry Hedge’s Prose Writers of Germany.217 So as to assess the 
extent and significance of the social element of religion for Ripley and his fellow 
ministers, I read the translation of the fourth discourse along with a series of pamphlets 
Ripley addressed to his mentor Andrews Norton, the leading professor of theology at 
Harvard Divinity School.218  
I argue that Ripley’s first letter responds to his teacher’s orthodox views by 
representing the alumni of the Divinity School as an ideal religious community in the 
sense of Schleiermacher’s fourth speech. A comparative analysis of the two texts shows 
that the members of Schleiermacher’s imagined community and Ripley’s group of 
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Divinity School graduates conceive of religious truth as something no individual may 
lay an exclusive claim to. According to their views, man’s feeling and higher 
consciousness of the divine is limited in that he can only seize it in partial ways; the 
community, however, is a setting congenial to the thriving of religion because the 
members broaden and enrich each other’s personal perspectives through 
communication. 
Both texts show how such a conception of religious revival based on reciprocal 
formation calls for a fundamental unsettlement and reorganization of church 
hierarchies. A community where every member has an equal claim to religious truth 
without possessing it in its entirety cannot be organized along set divisions between 
clergy and laymen. Instead, the legitimacy of leadership gets linked to the individual’s 
spiritual capacities to revive religion, and to render this revival a communal experience 
on which the audience has a formative impact. While Schleiermacher and Ripley 
indicate that such a democratization of hierarchical structures gives rise to a plurality of 
new vantage points on religion, the egalitarian shift also places altogether new 
responsibilities on the preacher and his congregation. 
On the one hand, the individual legitimates his elevated position within a 
religious community by making spiritual realms accessible in ways that meet the 
group’s approval and initiate their participation and fellowship. On the other hand, 
however, he has to also maintain the infinite, non-conclusive character of religion by 
preventing the formation of an exclusive group closely attached to their leader and 




challenge through Lücke’s representation of his teacher’s activities as a preacher and 
lecturer. Moreover, Ripley highlights Herder’s strategies of preaching as exemplary in 
how to uphold the fine balance between creating strong communal alliances and 
keeping alive religion’s unfathomable nature. A central text addressing the new role of 
the preacher is Ripley’s “Letter to a Theological Student,” modelled explicitly on 
Herder’s Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend and published in the 
Transcendentalist journal The Dial, and, more importantly, Ripley’s free translations 
from Herder’s Der Redner Gottes in the Christian Examiner.219 
 
The Harvard professor and conservative Unitarian Norton, who was the co-
editor of the Christian Examiner, felt offended by the series of articles his student had 
published on German theological scholarship and attacked him publicly in a letter that 
appeared in the Boston Daily Advertiser on  November 5, 1836.220 The letter warns 
Ripley of destroying the foundations of the Christian faith by calling the status of 
miracles as secure evidence into question. The publication sparked a controversy 
between teacher and student that lasted over three years and found its most elaborate 
manifestation in Norton’s A Discourse on the Latest Form of Infidelity and Ripley’s 
response to it in the form of three book-length letters.221  
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The Discourse urges the “former pupils of the Theological School” to stand up 
for the conviction that the foundation of the Christian faith is “the belief that 
Christianity is a revelation by God of the truths of religion” and that “the divine 
authority of him whom God commissioned to speak to us in his name was attested…by 
miraculous displays of power.” Norton warns the Divinity School graduates of the 
“Modern German School of Infidelity” as articulated in the theological writing of 
Schleiermacher and De Wette; the German critics, he argues, propagate an atheistic 
world view, because in his eyes their “denial of the possibility of miracles” equals “the 
denial of the existence of God.”222 
Ripley frames his first letter engaging with Norton’s conception of the 
foundations of faith and of German higher criticism not as a response to a personal 
controversy but to a deep conflict that has opened up between the Divinity School 
professor and his former students. Ripley assumes the position of a spokesperson for his 
fellow graduates by not signing the letter with his name but as “an Alumnus of That [the 
‘Cambridge Theological’] School.” Throughout all three letters, he works toward two 
main goals: to meticulously disentangle and dispute the individual components of 
Norton’s position, and to reconstitute religious faith as a power that is “founded in the 
essential nature of man.”223 The third letter pursues the reconstructive goal over a 129 
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page long discussion of Schleiermacher’s theological thinking in which Ripley 
intersperses translations from Schleiermacher’s works with critiques of what he regards 
as Norton’s distortions, unqualified generalizations and mistranslations of them. 
 The first letter is the primary resource for us to specify the ways in which 
Ripley’s religious revival project is linked to the domain of social interaction. His mode 
of arguing resonates in crucial aspects with Schleiermacher’s fourth speech to which I 
turn first. In this speech, Schleiermacher encourages his readers to join him in his 
endeavor to fundamentally rethink the conception of religion and to “erect it again upon 
a new basis.” This basis, he claims, has to be a social one: “If religion exists at all, it 
must…possess a social character.” More specifically, he suggests that the reason for the 
social core of religion lies both in “the nature of man” and “in the nature of religion.” 
Religion’s distinctive trait is its infinite nature which makes it impossible for a 
“single individual” to comprehend it in its entirety. Nothing, Schleiermacher writes, 
confronts the subject more directly and more powerfully with the limits of his capacities 
than religion. Man’s “total inability to exhaust [religion],” however, does not imply that 
he cannot experience and express it.224 On the contrary, religion unfolds and becomes 
alive only in moments it gets transformed from being “universal” and “indeterminate” 
into a specific material form or mode of expression. The spiritual world’s flourishing is 
contingent upon the sphere of human life and activity.225  
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Individuals in different times and at different places bring their religious 
experiences into a plurality of forms and thereby embrace and articulate “a small 
portion” of its infinity. To compensate for the limited grasp and incapacity to settle 
questions of religious truth alone, the subject seeks support in social surroundings: “that 
which he cannot immediately reach, he wishes to perceive, as far as he can, from the 
representations of others…he is anxious to observe every manifestation of it…seeking 
to supply his own deficiencies.” Schleiermacher’s speech renders the revival of 
religious feelings a communal effort in which each participant contributes toward a 
more comprehensive understanding of that which exceeds the individual’s knowledge. 
Through dynamic communicative exchanges where “every one feels equally the need 
both of speaking and hearing,” people complement each other.226  
Schleiermacher’s claim that the community is a space where religion finds 
expression in multiple forms through people’s reciprocal formation resonates 
powerfully in Ripley’s first letter. He attacks Norton for his hubristic declaration that 
“the truth of Christianity can be supported by no other evidence than that which appears 
satisfactory to [himself].” In light of the “immeasurable variety of mind which is found 
everywhere,” Ripley writes, it is presumptuous of Norton to propagate a one-
dimensional conception of religion and pressure his colleagues and congregation into 
following his lead.227 In his eyes, Norton’s adherence to a single doctrine runs counter 
to the nature of religion and man’s experience thereof:  
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A dead level of uniform opinions must be dreaded by every earnest speaker of 
truth, no man has the whole, but each a part, of reality; and a friendly 
comparison of ideas from different points of observation, as it is the most 
delightful mental exercise, is also the most certain means of avoiding error, and 
of building up a comprehensive faith on a strong foundation.228 
 
The “earnest speaker” of religion knows that he will never find himself in possession of 
its “whole truth” but only of a fraction that he may build up and enhance through social 
interaction. The social sphere is essential for the healthy growth of a religious spirit; 
conscious of the limits of their individual conceptions of religion, the members of the 
community hone them by fostering an ethos of “a friendly comparison of ideas.”  
To this point, we gain the impression that Schleiermacher and Ripley unsettle 
the domain of orthodox criticism and the institutional structures of the ministry by 
propagating a radically egalitarian and pluralistic approach to religious and theological 
questions. If the members of a church assume that “no man has the whole, but each a 
part” of religious truth then that requires a fundamental democratization of ranks in the 
church that accommodate the coexistence of different views. Ideally, the reformed 
community is organized in such a way that 
Every man is a priest, so far as he draws around him others, in the sphere which 
he has appropriated to himself, and in which he professes to be a master. Every 
one is a laymen, so far as he is guided by the counsel and experience of another, 
within the sphere of religion, where he is comparatively a stranger. There is not 
here the tyrannic aristocracy…this society is a priestly people, a perfect 
republic, where every one is alternatively ruler and citizen.229 
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In Schleiermacher’s vision, leadership is no longer contingent upon a person’s pre-
assigned position in a church hierarchy; he “comes forward before the rest…not 
because he is entitled to this distinction” but because he feels impelled by “a free 
impulse of the spirit.” An individual legitimizes his elevated position within a church 
community by virtue of his abilities to access and acquire a sound understanding of a 
specific sphere of religion. While he may act as “a priest” in that region, he has to 
renounce his position of authority in another. He only serves his post truthfully if he 
abstains from claiming to rule over religion entirely. Its infinite spirit thrives best in an 
environment where people draw attention to the limits of their understanding and seek 
to colonize the spiritual world by inhabiting alternatively the position of a priest and 
layman. 
 While such democratic structures, however, grant every member of a 
community the same opportunity, Schleiermacher’s dynamic conception of religious 
leadership is not pluralistic in the sense that everyone’s approach is of equal value: 
“Every man is a priest,” he suggests, only in “so far as he draws around him others.” 
The subject needs to legitimize his position by gathering around himself others who 
find his mode of treating spiritual questions compelling and seek out his guidance: “It 
will rather be his [the preacher’s] first endeavor, whenever a religious view gains 
clearness in his eye…to direct the attention of others to the same object, and, as far as 
possible, to communicate to their hearts the elevated impulses of his own” and to 




on the basis of his own calling but once others begin to recognize his mode of practicing 
religion as authentic and as a way to learn from. 
 Those points in the text that link the individual’s preaching to his congregation’s 
recognition provide precise articulations of the parameters of Schleiermacher’s new 
ideal of religious leadership. What poses a particular challenge to the preacher is that 
while he needs to seek people’s attachment to and approval of the sphere of religion he 
has seized, he has to prevent the formation of a sectarian spirit and resist “the endeavor 
to make others similar” to himself. He may not suggest that what he preaches “is 
essential to all” and attempt to convert others with “that horrible expression ‘no 
salvation except with us.’”230 
Schleiermacher’s ideal of leadership clearly places high demands on those 
following it truly. The religious community should organize itself in a way that makes 
the position of the preacher available to everyone. The individual who feels entitled to 
inhabit the role needs to create a sense of belonging among all members by gaining 
their trust in his ways of leading them into spiritual worlds. Yet while it is his duty to 
seek their fellowship for his vision of truth, it is also his responsibility to unsettle that 
very vision so as to maintain and safeguard religion’s infinite nature. Ripley’s letter lays 
out a similar model of religious authority. He is clearly concerned with representing the 
“Alumni of the Cambridge Theological School” as a group of people who regard 
themselves as members of a religious community organized along Schleiermacher’s 
                                                




premises. On the letter’s opening pages, Ripley introduces himself as writing in the 
name of an association that 
[is] composed of ministers whose principal bond of union is personal respect 
and friendship; who are united by the sympathies of education and of devotion 
to similar pursuits; but who neither claim authority over each others’ faith, nor 
profess to regard uniformity or speculative opinion, as desirable, even if it were 
possible. Many of them have been fellow-students at the same school; a 
common interest in theology first brought them together, and has not since 
divided them; others are connected by habits of social and professional 
intercourse; and all, it is to be presumed, are engaged in the investigation of 
truth, without being restrained by a creed which they have agreed to support…. 
Their mutual intercourse has been agreeable and salutary; they have shed light 
on each others’ minds; they have warmed each others’ hearts; the progress of 
truth has been advanced by their mutual endeavors; and it is seldom, indeed, that 
the widest differences of opinion have produced any interruption in the perfect 
bond of charity by which they are united.231 
 
Ripley represents the divinity school ministers as an association whose modes of 
interaction are in harmony with Schleiermacher’s claim that religious truth is not found 
in a single creed but becomes manifest in plural forms and articulations, growing out of 
social surroundings. What unites the group is what Ripley broadly defines as their 
shared interest “in the investigation of truth.” In pursuing this goal, they cultivate a 
respectful and friendly manner of communication that refrains from building up a 
“broad line of distinction between the clergy and the rest of the community.” They do 
not seek to exert authority over one another by forcing faith in a particular direction but 
rather aim at creating an environment that promotes the conversation between 
“intelligent and reflecting men of every pursuit and persuasion.”232 Instead of 
empowering one individual to settle religious questions for everyone, they pursue the 
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solving of such questions as a “mutual endeavor” that thrives among people who “shed 
light on each others’ mind.” 
Like Schleiermacher’s speech, Ripley’s letter links the democratization of 
modes of interaction among members of the divinity school to the rise of a conception 
of religious leadership centered on the capacity of individuals to find support for their 
views: 
They [the members of the Theological School] never disguised the results to 
which they had come; they gave them a due proportion of attention in their 
public services; they rejoiced in their discussion, even when it was called forth 
by rude attacks…they were content to wait for the prevalence of their 
views….In the exercise of their ministry, they had been confirmed in the 
soundness of their ideas;…They saw their opinions rapidly spreading among the 
young members of the profession…a profession of faith in Christ, and a sincere 
and virtuous character were the conditions of fellowship, rather than any 
agreement in theological opinion.233 
 
Through the process of exercising the ministry, the divinity school graduates hone the 
soundness of their religious understanding by holding their own in discussions over the 
adequacy of specific interpretations. Convinced by what they have found out to be true, 
the ministers patiently seek their listener’s enthusiasm for and adoption of their 
opinions. At the same time, however, Ripley also emphasizes in a Schleiermacherian 
fashion that the young preachers do not thereby attempt to mould those people feeling 
attracted to their views into servants of them. In their position of authority, the ministers 
                                                




act as those kind of teachers they would seek out for themselves, that is as “teachers, 
who, wise, honest, and competent, would refuse bondage.”234  
Regardless of whether one is in the position of the speaker or listener, of the 
preacher or layman, Schleiermacher’s and Ripley’s understanding of religious 
leadership and truth place the subject in taxing situations. How can a preacher win his 
congregation’s trust, draw them into the world of his spiritual visions and concurrently 
unsettle their absorption in it? How is he to compose a speech that leads its listeners into 
new divine regions yet imparts to them a feeling that they are discovering something 
that both corresponds to and veers away from their preacher’s view? Ripley follows up 
on these questions in translations and discussions focused on both Schleiermacher’s and 
Herder’s understanding of the new role and function of the preacher. One crucial 
resource for Ripley are Friedrich Lücke’s recollections of Schleiermacher. 
Throughout the letters to Norton, Ripley recalls verbatim or refers to what he 
states in the review of Schleiermacher in the Christian Examiner.235 Schleiermacher as 
channeled through Lücke’s representation provides him with answers to the question of 
how a preacher sets in motion speech that oscillates between authoritative statements 
and their subversion. About his experience of Schleiermacher as a “preacher and 
teacher of theology” in Halle, Lücke recalls that through his particular ways of selecting 
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and representing “various elements of theology,” and through organizing them 
“according to the laws of his peculiar individuality” he had a significant impact on his 
audience: 
He fathered around him a crowd of hearers, filled with enthusiasm and 
reverence, whom he firmly attached to his person, and who, quickened and 
excited by the influence of his writings and discourses, have since labored and 
still continue to labor in the spirit of their master. His influence is presupposed 
in the formation of every one.236 
 
In that sense, Lücke resumes, one could say that Schleiermacher “founded a school.” 
Those he engaged with his speaking felt so attracted and illuminated by his mode of 
making the realm of religion accessible to them that they would direct their striving 
toward a continuation of their teacher’s legacy. In “another sense,” however, Lücke 
brings to mind that Schleiermacher concentrated all his energies on overturning his own 
findings so as to prevent the formation of “a school which would appear with a distinct 
party purpose.” 
Regarding himself a life-long “seeker,” he was “always anxious…to form every 
one as a seeker for truth” and to surround himself with “free, self-acting, independent 
scholars” instead of “followers.” In pursuing this goal, Schleiermacher developed a 
number of strategies directed at avoiding too close of an attachment between himself, 
the topic, and his audience. Translating from Lücke, Ripley introduces individual 
elements of these strategies, referring to them as Schleiermacher’s “pulpit eloquence.” 
In his eyes, such eloquence is the way toward a reform of preaching in New England 
                                                




that he finds already well underway. Schleiermacher’s mode of public address 
demonstrates how to cast off the “shackles of memoriter preaching” and popularize 
innovative forms of communication between preacher and congregation that Ripley also 
discovers spreading among his fellow ministers. In particular he highlights the sermons 
of New England’s popular minister Joseph Stevens Buckminster and exclaims that his 
addresses even surpass Schleiermacher’s.237 
A distinguishing characteristic of the “pulpit eloquence” that Ripley discovers in 
Lücke’s text is that the preacher treats the genre of the sermon as a “living product.” 
Prior to every Sunday mass, Lücke recalls, Schleiermacher had the broad outline of his 
sermon in mind, 
but he wrote nothing down until Saturday evening, and then only the text and 
the theme, or at the utmost a brief sketch of the divisions of his discourse. Thus 
prepared he went into the pulpit. Here arose his discourse, in respect to its form 
and execution, as the living product of his previous meditation, of the exciting 
influence of the assembled church, and of the constant command of his mind 
over the arrangement of his thoughts and language.238 
  
Instead of addressing his hearers with pre-conceptualized interpretations of a particular 
theme corseted in set phrases, Schleiermacher let the topic gain shape in the 
communicative situation that unfolded between him and his audience. The sermon 
developed under the formative impact of elements that exceeded his control such as 
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“the influence of the assembled church” and the twists and turns his own thinking was 
taking during his performance.  
In the weekly Sunday addresses, Lücke remembers, Schleiermacher would 
always first assemble the elements of his speech in “tones of ordinary conversation,” 
then arrange them in a web of ideas and let those flow into “a rich stream of arousing 
and quickening appeals.” Throughout this performance, he guided his audience into 
new spiritual regions while letting them participate in the process of finding the way. 
Another strategy he employed to animate his listener’s participation was through the 
building of thematic bridges between “the most profound religious ideas” and their own 
“practical life,” “the circumstances of the church, the family, [and] the country.” 
If he felt, however, that one or more persons of his cohort were tending too 
strongly to a specific point of view, he would make an effort to break up the forming of 
a sectarian spirit by becoming intentionally provocative: “Schleiermacher, from the 
living centre on which he stood, could not fail to perceive the partial and exclusive 
direction of the day, and whenever they threatened to obtain preponderance, held it his 
duty to contend against them, by indirectly adding to the weight of the opposite side.”239 
He always tried to balance out any form of exclusivist religious understanding, often by 
completely dismantling the propositions around which he had organized his own 
lectures and sermons. Lücke writes that some of his adherents in church and at the 
university reproached him therefore for being inconsistent, while Schleiermacher 
                                                




himself responded to such accusations by claiming that his interventions were the only 
way to serve the essential spirit of religion in a consistent fashion. 
Ripley brings to light a comparable form of “pulpit eloquence” in Herder’s 
work. Through translations from and discussions of Herder, he introduces preaching as 
a discursively open event that posits new challenges to both speakers and listeners. A 
year after he wrote the first letter to Norton, The Dial published his “Letter to a 
Theological Student” that takes recourse to Herder’s Briefe, das Studium der Theologie 
betreffend;240 through the publication of earlier translations, the New England reading 
public was already familiar with Herder’s Briefe.241  
Unlike the letter to Norton, the “Letter to a Theological Student” imparts to its 
addressee a disillusioning assessment of the current state of the ministry and theological 
training in New England. Ripley warns the student determined to enter the profession of 
the deceptive nature of the liberal spirit people advocate. While nearly everybody 
claims to be a “liberal Christian” and propagates freedom of thought, he writes, the 
ministers who actually attempt to exercise free expression in their professional activities 
find themselves in deep trouble and confronted with cries of outrage that are “by no 
means musical.” 
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In light of this backward state of the profession, even an ambitious neophyte 
with strong reformating impulses is quickly lured into following a “safe and approved 
path, rather than one which suits his own ideas.” To become a true preacher, however, 
he has to find ways to resist preaching “what he finds in books” and go beyond being “a 
good mechanic in the pulpit.” “No man can preach well,” Ripley tells his student in a 
Herderian fashion, “unless he coins his own flesh and blood, the living, palpitating 
fibres of his very heart, into the words which he utters from the pulpit.”  
As in the Schleiermacher discussions, Ripley addresses the challenges posed by 
a new mode of preaching centered on the preacher’s authority. Through forms of 
“coining,” of inscribing himself in the story his sermon tells, the preacher renders 
transcendental realms accessible to himself and those he engages. He should thereby, 
however, not put his listeners into a position where they feel that their speaker reigns 
autonomously over the realm he narrates. Rather, the theological student should aim at 
attaining “a clear and living system of truth” in communication with his audience. In 
closing the letter, Ripley recommends to his student the Briefe as the manual detailing 
for ministers how to accomplish such a goal and reform the clerical profession.242 
Ripley himself examines through Herder’s “The Preacher of God” [“Der Redner 
Gottes, 1765] how the new model preacher may both inscribe his signature on the 
sermons while making their unfolding contingent upon the audience’s contributions. In 
the passages that Ripley translates freely in his review, Herder imagines the role of the 
ideal preacher from the perspective of a listener: “The Preacher of God! Where is he?... 
                                                




I have found him, even among us. More than one, few indeed, I have found…. I see him 
before me. He stands in the midst of his friends and children.” As in Schleiermacher, 
Ripley discovers in Herder’s work a fundamental dehierarchization of the relation 
between the preacher and his congregation. The listener imagines his preacher as 
someone being on a same level with other members of the community and describes 
him as someone he “should choose for [his] friend.” 
These structures of equality are also reflected in the preacher’s un-authoritarian 
way of addressing his audience. In a number of rhetorical questions, the listener reflects 
on how best to describe his preacher’s style and concludes that none of the familiar 
categories suffice to capture it because he detects “no dogmatic articles, no scholastic 
explanations and divisions, no skeletons of a formal method.” Rather, what comes to 
mind when he attempts to characterize the sermons is the image of a man and a friend: 
I see his image now. The image of a man, whom…I should choose for my 
friend, to whom I could freely give my whole heart…. [H]e began with 
presenting an instance taken from the experience of life, which he accompanied 
with one or two observations. The fact was not unknown to me, but I had never 
before regarded it in that light. I inwardly thanked him for the discovery. So did 
all his hearers; for the circumstance he alluded to was before our eyes, yet we 
had never seen it. We felt that we must listen to such a man, for he saw more 
than we. But he did not chide us for our blindness. He proceeded, like the 
teacher who gives his pupil the joy of making a discovery for himself. He 
merely led us into our own little world, into our sphere, and into our hearts. He 
showed us truth, as if he showed it not; so that we felt….”243 
 
The preacher gains his listener’s respect and trust by virtue of a highly developed sense 
of perception: “we felt that we must listen to such a man, for he saw more than we.” He 
                                                




establishes his leadership by honing the community’s awareness for the religious nature 
of the everyday and common, by turning a familiar “circumstance…before [their] eyes” 
into a site of divine revelation. Crucially, the preacher thereby upholds his position of 
authority without becoming authoritative; instead of imposing a particular mode of 
seeing on his audience he gives them “the joy of making a discovery for [themselves].” 
In this regard, Herder’s preacher resembles Schleiermacher’s because both safeguard 
the infinite spirit of religion by abstaining from telling people what religious truth is and 
from suggesting that they adopt a specific point of view. What distinguishes a good 
sermon, in the eyes of Herder’s listener, is one that travels beyond the preacher’s 
control and unfolds in the individual hearts and spheres of activity of those absorbing it. 
Ripley’s letters and translations provide a window into how Herder’s and 
Schleiermacher’s theological thinking contributed to the rise of a new understanding of 
religious truth and authority in New England. The way for the individual to develop his 
spiritual nature is through social interaction. Whether it is the excerpt from 
Schleiermacher’s fourth speech, Lücke’s recollections of his teacher, Herder’s 
introduction of the preacher of God or Ripley’s letters to Norton and his student – each 
one of these texts is concerned with exploring institutional conditions and modes of 
address and communication that best foster the individual’s spiritual growth and 
development. Through linking matters of spiritual revival to forms of social interaction, 
Ripley not only casts a new light on how individuals negotiate questions of religious 
truth but also of religious leadership. Not rank or the adherence to doctrines legitimize a 




the twin gestures of making spheres of spiritual life accessible and of promoting other 
people’s independent discovery of them. 
 
 
Classicism, Self-Culture, and the Rise of the Art of Liberal Education 
 
With its focus on American scholars’ concern with historical criticism, the 
preceding examinations brought to light new facets of the nature of the transformations 
that the understanding of religion underwent in the early years of Transcendentalism. I 
demonstrated that the subject Transcendentalists introduce in conversation with such 
figures as Herder or Schleiermacher hones religious dispositions through continual 
practice in the domains of reading, writing, and social interaction. The chapter’s final 
part shifts the focus from the field of religion to classicism. I examine how American 
classical scholars’ investment in adopting German historical methods transformed their 
modes of relating to and aligning the contemporary age with the world of antiquity. 
As in the domain of religious studies, the dissemination of new historically 
informed translations, critical editions of the classics, and Greek dictionaries led 
American scholars to fundamentally rethink and reform their methods of making the 
literatures of the ancient past integral to educational curricula and of communicating 
classical values to the broader intellectual public. For instance, Alpheus Crosby, a 
teacher of Greek and Latin at Dartmouth College, derides classicists ignorant of the 




Study, as Part of Liberal Education” warns its readers not to follow the lead of those 
“lovers of the classics” who “seem to regard the whole business of classical study, as a 
sort of magic, in which it is only necessary that at particular times they should repeat 
certain formulas, and the shades of the mighty dead…will come and confer upon them 
the highest intellectual endowments.” Instead, Crosby proposes treating the study of 
antiquity as “a plain honest art” that “will reward all according to their efforts.”244 
What follows zeroes in on the nature and function of such critical efforts by 
nineteenth century American scholars, seeking to interpret classical works within the 
cultural historical contexts of their origin. The main argument is that the avant-garde of 
America’s classicists worked toward establishing classical philology as a mode of 
learning most useful to the education of a citizenry that conceives of the modern subject 
as a product of self-culture. The leading Unitarian preacher and Transcendentalist 
William Ellery Channing famously coined the term “Self-Culture” in his introductory 
address to the Franklin Lectures in Boston in 1838. In its most basic sense, Channing 
describes forms of cultivation directed at the self as “the care which every man owes to 
himself, to the unfolding and perfecting of his nature.” According to his understanding, 
a subject who conceives of itself as a product of self-culture feels the duty to 
continuously “act upon [itself],” to “engage in the work of self-improvement,” and to 
“strenuously…form and elevate [its] mind.”245 To be sure, the details of Channing’s 
understanding and treatment of self-culture in the antebellum contexts in which he 
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found such efforts of cultivation flourishing are a complex and contested subject matter. 
It is therefore important to mention up front that I use the term in the most basic sense 
that Channing lays out—that is, as an umbrella term for strategies the self employs in 
order to work on itself. Self-culture, I suggest, sums up best the goal of the learning 
techniques a new generation of classicists employs to highlight the benefits of classical 
studies and to consolidate their place at the heart of liberal education. 
By suggesting, however, that classicism’s primary objective lies in facilitating 
students’ self-forming abilities, scholars bestow upon their field both new significance 
while decentralizing it at the same time. The writings central to this chapter by 
Harvard’s Greek professor Cornelius Conway Felton, by Robert Bridges Patton—
himself a teacher of Greek and Latin at Middlebury College—and by James Marsh all 
share this aspect in common: in these texts, the introduction of new methods of classical 
philology coincides with a turn toward other literary traditions. Explicitly or implicitly, 
these scholars suggest that serving as a path toward self-culture is not a privilege of 
classical studies alone, but rather that other languages and literatures can potentially 
fulfill the same function. Moreover, they propose that such a broadening of the 
spectrum of philological inquiry not only benefits the realm of education but also 
modern culture at large. Students’ critical engagement with different editions of literary 
works, collections, translations, and dictionaries, these scholars write, can be 
inspirational and stimulate the new generation to contribute to the advancement of 




Drawing on my discussion of Staël’s De l’Allemagne in chapter one, I 
demonstrate that the German recasting of the Ancient-Modern debate and its mediation 
by such figures as Staël and the Schlegel brothers forms a crucial intellectual historical 
backdrop for this interest of American scholars in establishing philology as a practice 
that serves both educational and broadly gauged cultural concerns. Particularly the 
writings by Marsh and Felton suggest strong connections between American 
engagements with questions of the Ancient-Modern debate and the rise of a new 
understanding of philology as central to self-culture and the invention of a modern 
American cultural tradition. 
The chapter’s overall framework and focus on marginal figures of the 
antebellum period takes its cue from Caroline Winterer’s research in The Culture of 
Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life 1780 – 1910. 
Beginning in the 1820s, Winterer writes, a new generation of American classicists with 
ties to the Boston area and Harvard College eroded old methods of classical learning by 
introducing German historical methods into the American College curriculum.246 She 
proposes that the best way for us to understand the characteristics and the impact of this 
erosion is to examine the writings of classicists such as Felton, Bridges, or Patton 
among a number of other figures who shaped educational institutions and who have 
otherwise been left out of scholarly inquiries. 
Winterer explains this neglect of the works of these classical scholars with our 
own fixation on original scholarship rather than pedagogy and teaching. Such concerns, 
                                                
246 Caroline Winterer, The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 




however, are anachronistic because they disregard the fact that “until the late nineteenth 
century, American scholars would not have made such distinctions between scholarship 
and teaching. Their chief avenues for scholarly output were college textbooks, articles 
in literary and popular journals, and lectures directed at the learned public. In these 
venues they did not display the results of their own new research; rather, they distilled 
the fruits of German and English scholarship for a broadly educated American 
readership.”247 In other words, Winterer’s research suggests that we can only 
comprehend the roles and functions of the productions of nineteenth century American 
scholars if we refrain from evaluating them as scholarly contributions, aimed at sharing 
new findings. Rather, we need to regard them as windows into the period’s ideas of 
pedagogical reform and treat them as materials that give insight into how teaching 
practices and goals in classical studies were transformed under the impact of 
historicism. 
Winterer’s main argument is that during the antebellum period, classical 
scholars and other educated citizens shifted their attention from “words” to “the worlds” 
of antiquity. Prior to this shift, the study of the Greco-Roman past had been focused on 
language acquisition structured around practices of repetition, scanning, rote 
memorization, recitation, and translation. The Collectanea Graeca Majora, the period’s 
most popular textbook for students and teachers of Greek, suggested that the way 
toward gaining insight into the past was through the internalization of grammatical 
rules. The circulation of new textbooks, editions of the classics, and dictionaries from 
                                                




Germany, however, expanded upon this exclusively linguistic focus toward the world of 
Greece as a whole. American Classicists began to practice the historical study of the 
Greek language and culture and encourage their students to employ philological 
methods.248  
Crucially, Winterer highlights the reader’s immersion into the past as the most 
significant aspect responsible for the increase of the popularity of classical studies in 
antebellum college curricula. My own examinations of several of the texts Winterer 
investigates, as well as some she neglects, lead me to draw a rather different conclusion 
from her. Winterer claims that  
Under the influence of German historical scholarship, they [classical scholars] 
encouraged students to reimagine their own relationship to antiquity, seeking not 
so much to imitate the ancients as to absorb their spirit through the critical, 
historical study of authentic ancient texts….[T]hey imagined the shift from 
words to worlds as a process of becoming Greek, literally of self-transformation 
through a historicized encounter with the classical past.249 
 
According to Winterer, the pedagogical goal of imbibing the spirit of the past and of 
“becoming Greek” is for the student to achieve a purifying effect. She argues that 
American intellectuals recruited the past for the purpose of resisting the ills of 
modernity: “they looked to the remote past as a way to combat such cancers of 
modernity as materialism, civic decay, industrialization, and anti-intellectualism. The 
new way of reading texts in the classical classroom was a way for students to enter fully 
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into the classical past, to shed their modernity and imbibe the purifying spirit of 
antiquity.”250 
 Winterer points out that the popularization of classicism as a form of anti-
modernism coincided with another major development, namely the rise of the 
humanities: “the word humanities emerged after 1850 in America as a neologism to 
describe a kind of elevating, holistic study of literature, music, and art.” Instead of 
gearing student training early on to a clearly prescribed area of expertise, the humanities 
proposed to educate students at a higher and more broadly gauged level. The shared 
goal of the different fields was thereby the formation of a well-rounded “cultured 
person” familiar with a wide rage of subjects.251 Until this day such an ideal of 
education is still retained in the institution of the liberal arts college. 
 My own examination of these key texts suggests, however, that the chief works 
that classicists published during the antebellum period demonstrate a strong 
commitment to clearly delineating how and why the study of languages and literatures 
should lie at the core of the overall project of the humanities to produce a “cultured 
person.” In light of this commitment, the anti-modernist project Winterer highlights 
appears less central. In fact, I would argue that the writings by Marsh, Felton, and 
Bridges pursue a decidedly pro-modernist agenda. As I mentioned before, their shared 
aim is to establish philology as a mode of learning most beneficial to the education of a 
subject capable of confidently facing and forming the challenges of modernity as a man 
and citizen. 
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 Marsh’s writings are the natural starting point for any investigation of how 
American critics developed this stance. Although not a classical scholar in the 
professional sense, his expertise and thematic interests connect his work in major ways 
to the realm of classical knowledge, and his influence runs deeply and broadly 
throughout New England intellectual and pedagogical circles. In 1822 he published an 
essay on “Ancient and Modern Poetry” in the influential North American Review.252 His 
objective throughout is to introduce his readers to the longstanding controversy over the 
relation between ancient and modern cultures. Referring to Staël, he explains that in the 
second half of the eighteenth century German critics fundamentally altered the debate 
by proposing a thoroughgoing historicism in which cultures differ fundamentally from 
one another; they thereby made a strong case against the modern adherence to 
outmoded classical rules and art forms. 
“Ancient and Modern Poetry” reviews the major arguments of the “general 
controversy” between Ancients and Moderns as Marsh had encountered it in a pamphlet 
by the Italian scholar Ludovico Gattinara di Breme (1780-1820). Marsh’s essay is a 
perfect example of the tangled trajectories of intellectual historical discourses: di Breme 
was friends with Staël and August Wilhelm Schlegel, with whom she traveled Italy. 
And di Breme, as Marsh notes, wrote the pamphlet to defend Staël’s position in a 
controversy she had with Italian journalists about the relation between ancient and 
modern cultures: 
                                                




The little work before us [di Breme’s]…stands intimately connected with this 
subject….It was called forth by the attacks of certain journalists on the opinions 
and conduct of Mad. de Staël. Their national pride…seem to have been 
wounded by the contrast which she drew, when among them, between their 
ancient and modern writers. In defending her opinions Signor di Breme enters 
into the distinctions, of which we have spoken, and it is on this account chiefly, 
that his work has attracted our notice…. The point, upon which he has expressed 
himself most fully, is the difference in form and structure between the ancients 
and the moderns, and the question, whether the system of rules, to which the 
Grecian productions were conformed in this respect, be the only and 
unchangeable principles of the arts.253 
 
Throughout his essay, Marsh recapitulates Staël’s arguments against the adherence to 
the “form and structure” of classical art and draws attention to the “very essential 
difference in the characteristics of ancient and modern literature.” While the ancient art 
forms were harmoniously embedded in the cultural communities within which they 
emerged, their modern neoclassical reconstructions bear no relation to the current 
cultural historical situation: “the so called golden age of French literature,” Marsh 
suggests by quoting di Breme’s text, “cannot…boast a single poem that is characteristic 
and truly indigenous.” In a Staëlian manner, Marsh “adopts some of the boldest German 
notions respecting the nature of the arts and of creative genius” and introduces his 
American readership to what he refers to as the romantic principle—the idea that the 
value of art hinges upon the degree to which it manifests an organic relationship to the 
life world and people it engages. 
 The essay exemplifies the transformation of the role of classical culture. Marsh 
brings into focus the manner in which classical aesthetics changed from being a model 
                                                




of “form and structure” or “system of conventional rules” to becoming an example for 
the organic principle of art. Referring to works by Friedrich Schiller and Schlegel, he 
locates the cause for the harmoniously unified impression the culture of antiquity 
conveys in people’s affective response to their environment: “We must conceive them 
[the Greeks] as cast, in the full possession of their senses, imagination, and feeling, 
among the wonders of external nature. Their minds, of course, would be open to the 
entire…influence of the objects around them.”254 Such openness and finely tuned 
perceptiveness of mind fostered, Marsh writes, ideal conditions under which a vibrant 
artistic life could thrive. Echoing critics like J. G. Eichhorn, Herder, and Staël, he 
identifies similar conditions in the Germanic mythological tradition and in ancient 
Hebrew writings;255 and he proposes that the revival of these literatures would 
counterbalance the current overemphasis on science and reason and stale imitation by 
inspiring people to engage more affectively with ancient texts and their own times.256 
 At this point, we can see how core issues that gained prominence with the 
historical turn of American classicism developed out of a critical involvement with 
outcomes of the German Ancient-Modern debate: Taking ancient cultures as models, 
Marsh’s discussion suggests that the cultivation of an affective and engaged response to 
works of the past as well as to one’s immediate surroundings has revitalizing effects on 
oneself and on the development of a modern art and literature. Moreover, it becomes 
clear that the literature and language of ancient Greece is by no means the only resource 
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able to facilitate such processes of individual and artistic revitalization. Reviewing such 
works as Herder’s writings on myth or Eichhorn’s introduction to the Old Testament, 
Marsh highlights a whole range of other literatures as potentially suitable.  
After “Ancient and Modern Poetry,” Marsh published a “Review of Stuart on 
the Epistle of the Hebrews,” using the discussion of Stuart’s work as a forum to 
establish philology as the practice that serves the subject best to hone his emotional and 
cognitive faculties. In his assessment, philology figures as the most productive means 
for the subject to form itself in the process of exploring and reimagining the relation 
between different cultural traditions. He argues “that every scholar, who is aiming at a 
liberal education, should be essentially a philologist,” and thus seeks to secure that field 
of inquiry a central place at the heart of liberal learning.257 
In pursuing this objective, Marsh detaches the practice of a historically informed 
criticism from any specific field of study. He advises his readers to treat philology as an 
exercise whose usefulness is not contingent upon selected fields of application: “Let the 
question then be, whether philological pursuits and the critical study of language be in 
themselves, and without regard to the individual merits of the work or author read, a 
comparatively useful method of attaining knowledge and mental culture.”258 His 
primary interest lies in bringing into view and in promoting the value of the process of 
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interpretation as such for the individual’s development: “With this question [the 
question regarding the intrinsic use of philological pursuits] before us, we 
might…inquire whether the process, by which the meaning of the author’s words is 
therein determined and knowledge acquired, be not as well suited as any other process, 
for developing and cultivating the best faculties of the mind.”259 
What, then, are the characteristics of textual criticism that lead Marsh to hold it 
in such high esteem? Significantly, he proposes that the activities of “the philologist, the 
critical student of words” open up his mind to the relationship between how human 
modes of forming language have altered frameworks of human life throughout history. 
Reminiscent of Staël’s explications in De l’Allemagne, Marsh introduces the notion of 
words as archives, containing 
the notices of the senses generalized by the understanding, the collected results 
of the experience, not of one generation only, but of ages, the products of art, the 
acquisitions of science, the principles and ideas, which their philosophic minds 
may have unfolded, and which have a living and life-giving energy for the 
minds of every succeeding age.260 
 
Languages are repositories of human experience and invention, telling those capable of 
unlocking them stories of the flourishing, decline, and transformation of human activity. 
The passage clearly indicates where the interests of a nineteenth century American 
scholar engaging with foreign languages and literatures lie. Marsh’s primary question is 
not how such critical endeavors contribute to an existing body of philological 
scholarship but rather in what ways the works of others act upon the minds of those 
                                                
259 Marsh, “Review of Stuart on the Epistle to the Hebrews,” 115. 




engaging them. He is interested in how a text’s “living and life-giving energy” resonates 
with and forms the mind. So the objective of critical exercises such as immersing 
oneself in the past and of trying to “see with their [the ancients’] eyes and hear with 
their ears” is in the first place a pedagogical one. Given that words record “the progress 
of the mind,” Marsh declares, nobody can dispute that “these words and organized 
forms of language are necessary or useful to us in the cultivation of our minds.”261 
 Besides its enriching functions, philological studies also confront students with 
the delimiting characteristics of language: “situated as we are in society, we 
unavoidably learn words before we can have much insight into the meaning of them and 
the consequence is, that we acquire a habit, of which the most critical and philosophical 
minds hardly divest themselves, of using them often without any definite and precise 
meaning.” According to Marsh, drawing attention to such instances—and working 
toward the active dissociation of the semantic field a particular set of words has come to 
be associated with—forms an essential part of education. 
 Finally, Marsh touches on the broader cultural implications of making philology 
the cornerstone of liberal learning. He proposes that American culture at large benefits 
from turning a vast variety of literatures and languages into objects of critical 
investigation: “Even the most uncultivated dialects of our western forests, or the islands 
of the Pacific, exhibit in their structures new and striking combinations of mental 
phenomena, which cannot but increase our admiration of those principles of intellectual 
                                                




organization.”262 Observations such as these implement philology as a practice that 
uncovers the value of languages, dialects and literary traditions of cultures that have so 
far been considered unworthy of becoming vital ingredients for the thriving of 
America’s modern cultural life. 
In his efforts to implement philology at the center of liberal learning, Cornelius 
Conway Felton pursues a similar line of argumentation as Marsh. Felton’s “Lecture on 
Classical Learning” opens with a summary of the Ancient-Modern debate, forming the 
intellectual historical backdrop against which the author established the reasons why 
current methods of teaching the classics need to be reformed and how that reform can 
take shape: “we bring them [the ancients] to the standard of modern tastes…instead of 
transporting ourselves back to the time when they lived.” Like Marsh, Felton introduces 
immersion, self-abandonment, and historical contextualization as the new crucial 
instruments for a critical engagement with classical literature.263  
It is also obvious from the outset that Felton’s interest in promoting these critical 
instruments to his audience is pedagogical rather than scholarly. What these historical 
methods help students to uncover are the subject and reality-forming capacities of 
words. Language, Felton writes, is “that power by which all other powers are guided 
and fashioned, by which all emotions are described, by which all playful efforts of 
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fancy are made distinct to the perceptions of others, by which, more than by all our 
powers besides, the creations of genius are illustrated.” Philological pursuits teach the 
student that language is “the most essential [mode] by which the operations of intellect 
are distinctly made visible. In studying language, therefore, we are in fact studying 
mind, through the agency of its most purely intellectual instrument.” Languages make 
us aware that we are “fearfully and wonderfully made.” 
The educational and cultural benefits of learning about the relationship between 
language and processes of world formation take center stage in Felton’s lecture: “In 
mastering language, we…attain the power of wielding this most efficient instrument,” 
and students learn “to act with energy, dignity and success, upon the various objects 
presented to us in life.”264 Moreover, their concentration on the dynamic relationship 
between language and cultures in different times and places refines their attentiveness to 
the dangers of bringing this dynamic relationship to a standstill, and of letting “our 
thoughts and feelings…repose too much upon the objects nearest to us” and of 
permitting “a constant reference to self become the habitual direction of our thoughts.” 
Felton concludes from these observations that while such laborious critical 
training in the classroom “may not lead to the invention of a single new mechanical 
agent…[and] increase[…] our fortunes a single dollar…it will give us an enlarged view 
of our nature; it will disclose the workings or our common powers under influences 
widely different from any that have acted upon ourselves.”265 Furthermore, Felton joins 
Marsh in his remark that this focus on historical method in the field of classical learning 
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has opened up new areas of investigation, urging us to rethink categories of artistic 
value: “the endless field of modern literature is opened to the student of polite letters; 
and he is taught that taste and genius were not the exclusive possession of the Greeks 
and Romans.”266 
More explicitly even than his colleagues Felton and Marsh, Robert Patton calls 
attention to the disparity between the kind of citizen modern America asks for and the 
citizen that school and college instructors produce by employing antiquated methods in 
the classroom. According to Patton’s “Lecture on Classical and National Education,” 
the old models of classical education have failed to “keep up with the progress of 
society” by falling short of contributing to the education of a “self-governing people” 
crucial for the progress of a liberal nation.267 To improve this situation, Patton asks for 
more public libraries that give people free access to a broad range of reference works 
and dictionaries, and he also proposes that instructors incorporate these materials into 
their college teaching curricula. According to Patton, “the possession and use of these 
very means of research are calculated to expand the mind, raise its standard of literary 
attainment and merit, whet the curiosity, and give a keener edge to the mind in all our 
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inquiries.”268 Critical investigations based on a range of reference works have an 
empowering effect on the student: 
I appeal to the ingenious student. When has he felt the keenest relish for 
knowledge, the greatest degree of literary impetus, the most generous 
aspirations, and the most rigorous resolutions? After plodding heavily through a 
page of the “Majora,” formally, mechanically, and doubtingly; confining his 
attention to the single page, and a common dictionary; with no other view, than 
to elicit a general meaning to each sentence, which may pass current in a 
recitation room? Or when all the works of reference which illustrate the author, 
have been put in requisition to satisfy his prying mind…leaving the mind in that 
delightful command of the whole portion.269 
 
By contrasting the old with the new method of interpreting ancient texts, Patton 
demonstrates clearly why he rejects one strategy and promotes the other. The 
comparative approach to critical research puts the subject into a position of power, 
challenging his faculties of judgment and discrimination. Highlighting his own teaching 
practice as an example, Patton suggests that the instructor’s primary task is to facilitate 
and support such a comparative and critical mode of investigation and learning. He 
regards it as “one of the best means” to produce “a well disciplined mind,” and by that 
Patton means a subject who “is able to apply its powers, at pleasure, at any time, and on 
any subject.”270 Patton’s other crucial text, the “Address to the Philological Society of 
Middlebury,” elaborates on these same themes. The author’s main concern is to make a 
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strong and convincing case for the advantages of philological learning. He argues that 
“philological pursuits, when properly directed” induce such faculties as “clearness and 
distinctness of thought…habits of discrimination” and introduce students to “the subtle 
workings of the soul…and the ever varying tones of feeling.” In short, the advantages 
one derives from such studies resides in their comprehensiveness, in the “consistent and 
proportionate exercise of all our mental powers.”271 
At this point we can see that we would miss the most pressing concerns of the 
writings by scholars such as Patton, Felton, or Marsh if we were to treat their texts as 
research materials that sought to compete with and contribute to the extensive body of 
classical research from Britain and Germany. The scholars of the antebellum period had 
neither the necessary resources nor the institutional infrastructure and training that the 
conducting of research on a scale comparable to Europe would have required. Their 
interests in engaging with the latest findings in the field of classicism from abroad 
clearly lay in a different domain. For all three of them, the historical turn figures as an 
event that caused them to rethink the ways in which the rise of philology, and its 




This chapter has developed a different approach to understanding the role of 
German culture in the formative years of Transcendentalism. While there is a consensus 
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among critics with regard to the emancipatory force of transnational German 
Romanticism, I have argued that we need to scrutinize more carefully the nature, uses, 
and manifestations of such terms as higher consciousness or intuition that began to 
colonize American texts with the arrival of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
German works. My research on different lines of transmission of historical criticism in 
the domains of religion and classicism has shown that the notions of the subject’s 
liberation and independence associated with the historical critical strand of German 
Romanticism are linked to complex processes of critical labor in the areas of reading, 
writing, preaching, and teaching. 
Through the lens of the German scholars’ philological techniques, critics like 
Ripley, Marsh, or George Bancroft articulate notions of revelation premised on 
demanding educational efforts. The subject they introduce works toward religious 
integrity through constant critical effort centered on strategies of self-abandonment, 
empathy, recognition, and the cultivation of a poetic-philological mode of textual 
engagement. The chapter’s second part examined a similar set of critical techniques and 
exercises in the social sphere of preaching and lecturing. Finally, I turned to the domain 
of classicism and demonstrated how the rise of these critical methods transformed 
modes of instruction in the college classroom, and how scholars such as Patton, Marsh, 
and Felton promoted philology as bestowing on students a set of core capacities crucial 
to facilitating the project of self-culture. 
 I suggest that my focus on these rarely discussed reviews, writings, and 




modify our perspective on the impact of German historical criticism during the 
antebellum period in fundamental ways. Moreover, I claim that these findings are 
crucial to reevaluating the characteristics of the transnational modes of thinking, 













We know Emerson best today as a thinker of transition, as someone who regards 
human life as a ceaselessly revising process. His renowned epigrammatical 
exclamations suggest that the individual “in the right state” needs to be “Man Thinking” 
(CW, vol. I, 53) and to respond to life’s insecurities and “slippery sliding surfaces” 
(CW, vol. III, 28) with an always active, alert and self-corrective mind.272 Several of the 
most influential contributions to Emerson scholarship of the past decades focus on 
teasing out the incessant ambiguities of a mode of thinking centered on continual 
change. Critics such as Richard Poirier or Jonathan Levin examine the transitional 
dynamic of Emerson’s thinking as a precursor to pragmatism,273 while in Stanley 
Cavell’s writings, Emerson figures as a founder of an American philosophy revolving 
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around self-reliance or on what Cavell describes as a notion of “moral perfectionism” 
that is not driven by “a state of being but a moment of change, say of becoming.”274 
This figure of “becoming” has emerged as a powerful nodal point for critics to 
approach Emersonian thinking within transnational philosophical contexts. Cavell 
suggests that his writings anticipate Heidegger and Wittgenstein, and draws out lines of 
influence which Emerson’s works had on Nietzsche.275 Regarding Emerson’s ties to 
German philosophers, the Emerson-Nietzsche relation has become an important topic 
among critics. Reviewing Jennifer Ratner-Rosenhagen’s American Nietzsche: A History 
of an Icon and his Ideas, Ross Posnock refers to the relationship between the two 
thinkers as “one of the most significant acts of transatlantic cross-fertilization in 
Western intellectual history.”276 Compared to recent criticism which has put Emerson in 
dialogue with philosophers such as Nietzsche, Wittgenstein or Heidegger, and which 
has contributed to illuminating the continuously transformative thrust of Emerson’s 
writings in multiple nuanced ways, criticism centered on his relations to German 
intellectual history in his own time seems rather unambitious or even dated. 
The existing works on Emerson’s relation to German thinkers of his generation 
are much like those reviewed in chapter three on ties between Transcendentalism and 
German classical and biblical scholarship. The primary merit of the research by critics 
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such as Leon Chai, Robert Richardson, and Elisabeth Hurth resides in detailing the 
strong connections Emerson’s thinking bears to biblical scholarship and religious 
historiography across the Atlantic. If we compare the conclusions these critics draw 
about the nature of Emerson’s thinking to the criticism that has become most influential 
and productive in the field of Emerson studies, however, there is a significant 
discrepancy. To date, the Emerson that emerges from publications reconstructing the 
development of his thinking against the backdrop of the Transcendentalists’ relation to 
German intellectual history does not share much in common with the Emerson whose 
primary interest lies in examining the dynamics of human life, religious experience, and 
nature as driven by continuous transformations. 
Rather, for the Emerson who inhabits these publications, moments of change 
and the gesture of becoming constitute temporary stages on the subject’s way toward 
forming a stable, strong, and confident self. Turning to Emerson’s philosophy of history 
and his notion of religion as an experience of feeling, Chai works out affinities to 
Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit and Schleiermacher’s 
Über die Religion. These works and their popularity among Emerson’s 
Transcendentalist cohort, Chai suggests, shaped his understanding of religion as a form 
of self-development, leading up to “the individual mind’s consciousness of the 
Universal Mind within itself.”277 Similarly, in several articles Richardson demonstrates 
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Schleiermacher’s and Herder’s role in showing Emerson “how one might reinstate the 
individual as the center and starting point of history and cosmology.”278 Hurth offers the 
most in-depth survey of how Emerson’s decision to resign from the ministry and his 
turn toward what she calls his “spiritual idealism” were formed by a long series of 
intense intellectual exchanges between Boston, Berlin, and Göttingen.279 She 
demonstrates how these exchanges were accompanied by a rapidly growing distribution 
of translations and reviews of works by a large number of German scholars, among 
whom Herder and Schleiermacher inhabited an important but by no means exclusive 
role. 
There is no need to probe more deeply into the research of these contributions 
because the resonances with the scholarship on the Transcendentalist movement 
reviewed in the previous chapter are obvious: the underlying assumption is that German 
criticism helped to authorize and consolidate Emerson’s view of the individual as 
independent and powerful. Chapter three demonstrated that we need to reassess and 
modify our understanding of the characteristics of this shift in favor of the individual to 
which the dissemination of German scholarship contributed in America. Likewise, I 
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argue that we need to reexamine how Emerson develops his stance on the individual in 
conversation with aspects of the transnational discourse laid out in chapter three. 
The main focus of “Transcendentalism’s Critical Instruments” was to 
demonstrate that the notion of subjecthood that Emerson’s contemporaries introduce 
vis-à-vis their reception of German historical criticism is a connected and relational one. 
Transcendentalist critics link what they refer to as self-culture in a secular context and 
man’s cultivation of a “higher consciousness” in a religious one to processes of learning 
and critical labor. I examined how these processes are recorded in textual practices and 
modes of lecturing and preaching. Drawing on these findings, this chapter argues that 
the cross-cultural intellectual landscape as it becomes manifest in addresses, reviews, 
and translations by Emerson’s contemporaries forms a crucial backdrop for 
understanding his concern with life’s contingencies and risks, compelling us to embrace 
them. This attitude is memorably inscribed in such statements as “People wish to be 
settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them” (CW, vol. II, 189). 
More specifically, the chapter’s first two parts establish the connections between 
Emerson’s thinking of mobility and the contemporary historical and scholarly discourse 
as it was unfolding most prominently in the fields of religion and classicism. His 
engagement with these discourses is illuminating because they provide a broad 
transnational context explaining why he promoted such unconventional and creative 
treatments of literatures that had been paradigmatic over centuries. As in Ripley’s or 
Marsh’s discussions of German scholarship, he introduces history as something that 




exemplifications of this human making and meaning. My argument is that we need to 
approach Emerson’s way of determining the use of literatures as sites for the continuous 
breaking and remaking of habits and traditions in light of his cultural explorations of 
ancient history and literatures. Contemporary conversations over methods of research 
and practices of preaching and learning played a major role in forming his belief that all 
engagements with the past – be they out of scholarly or private interest – ought to serve 
the subject here and now. They form the backdrop against which he develops his 
original practices of reading, writing, and lecturing. Moreover, I will demonstrate that it 
is this new perspective on the functions of the past for the present that authorizes 
Emerson’s valorization of the low and common as sites that are aesthetically as valuable 
as the impressions nature made on humanity’s earliest civilizations. 
According to Emerson, the historical perspective on the past does much more 
than make us rethink the status of customs and habits and recast categories of aesthetic 
value; crucially, it paves the way to a fundamental rethinking of religious practices. It is 
no news, of course, that the latest scholarly findings helped buttress Emerson’s doubts 
over institutionalized religious forms and removed the Bible from its privileged place. 
In the critical literature focused on German influence, however, it remains unclear how 
these insights are related to his activities of writing and lecturing. Comparisons show 
that as with non-religious writings, he treats sacred texts not as authoritative documents 
but as models to learn from. In his eyes, we need to approach figures such as Jesus and 
Paul as men teaching us exemplary strategies of commemoration and as providing key 




one his Transcendentalist colleagues would highlight as worthy of imitation in 
Schleiermacher’s or Herder’s interaction with such sacred authorities. For all of them, 
figures like Paul or Jesus demonstrate that true spiritual engagement can never be tied to 
a static set of rituals and symbols but needs to be reworked and renewed continuously. 
The key to religious revival lies in small individual acts the subject can participate in 
and perform in a variety of ways. 
While the objective of the first two parts is to demonstrate that the historical 
discourse Emerson engages in helps to better understand why he would postulate the 
unsettling of customs, aesthetic standards, and religious forms, the third part asks what 
it really means to make the breaking of established ways of thinking and modes of 
living integral to one’s way of life. I approach this question from two angles: I 
concentrate on the activities he suggests a true American scholar ought to exercise and 
on his role as a public lecturer. A number of critics have worked out connections 
between Emerson’s style of thinking and the lectern, arguing that the institution of the 
lyceum had a major impact on the development of his writing and lecturing in such 
idiosyncratic and radically eclectic ways. By focusing on how the figure of the 
American scholar and Emerson’s self-fashioning as a freelance lecturer are linked to his 
engagement with contemporary scholarship, I seek to add to and reinforce criticism that 
has treated him as a “connected critic,” as someone whose “thought and action evolved 
immanently out of the society in which he lived.”280 There are a number of striking 
connections between the textual practices worked out in my previous chapters – 
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abandonment of habits, the development of a language of love and friendship, poetic 
philology – and Emerson’s statements regarding his lecturing activities and the tasks of 
a true scholar. 
By bringing into focus ways in which contemporary critical discourses have 
formed Emerson’s thinking, this chapter contributes a more nuanced understanding of 
the nature of his long established connection to German historical scholarship. To the 
field of Emerson studies more generally, it contributes a transnational perspective on a 
facet of his thinking that has sparked much controversy: my research shows that his 
concern with departing from and breaking with habits and traditions accompanies an 
equally strong sense that one can create and fully appropriate new forms of life and art 
or realms of religious experience. Especially those studies that have turned to 
Emerson’s non-conformist writing as a way out of the pervasive ideology of American 
culture (on which see the introduction to chapter three) view such moments as evidence 
for Emerson’s inability to escape America’s systematic ideological power. 
Johannes Voelz’s Transcendental Resistance: The New Americanists and 
Emerson’s Challenge seeks to dissociate Emerson from this influential strand of 
criticism, suggesting that such readings reintroduce “a form of idealism” because they 
are premised on the assumption that an uncorrupted ideological space exists. 
Dismantling this ideological takeover of Emerson step by step, Voelz argues that 
idealist exclamations in his texts that seem to disrupt and countermand their overall gist 
need to be understood as his response to the entirely new situation in which he found 




space for himself as a public lecturer and make sure he attracted an audience for his 
thinking.281 I align my own approach with critics like Voelz who seek to make the 
ambiguous nature of Emerson’s writing and lecturing plausible by uncovering their 
relations to the intellectual landscape in which he lived and worked. 
 
 
“Man can paint, or make, or think, nothing but man”: On History and the Use of 
Books 
 
While German intellectuals were quite popular in America well into the 
nineteenth-century, the reverse was clearly not the case. There is, however, one 
remarkable exception: Herman Grimm, son of Wilhelm Grimm and the younger of the 
Grimm brothers, compared his discovery of Emerson’s writings to the discovery of a 
new continent.282 A brief excursion into Grimm’s observations on his long-term 
correspondent Emerson is a good introduction to the relationship between contemporary 
scholarly debates and the characteristics of Emerson’s thinking about mobility. 
Interestingly, Grimm draws a direct link between Emerson’s style of thinking, writing, 
and lecturing and the latest critical developments in modes of practicing research and 
teaching at nineteenth-century American educational institutions. 
 Just three days before his death on June 16, 1902, Grimm received the New 
York State lawyer Frederick William Holls in his home in Berlin and asked him to 
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publish the letters he and Emerson had written to each other between 1856 and 1871. 
Holls was permitted to make copies from the manuscripts Grimm had given to the 
Goethe-Schiller archive in Weimar and published his translation of the correspondence 
in New York in 1903.283 What had sparked Grimm’s interest and motivated him to get 
in touch with Emerson in the first place was a random reading of his first major essay, 
Nature (1836): 
Bei einem mir befreundeten Amerikaner fand ich vor Jahren einen Theil der 
Essays von Emerson zufällig auf dem Tische liegen. Ich sah hinein, las eine 
Seite herunter und war erstaunt, eigentlich nichts verstanden zu haben, obgleich 
ich mir meines Englisch ziemlich bewusst war. Ich fragte nach dem Autor. Er 
sei der erste Schriftsteller Amerikas und sehr geistreich, aber manchmal etwas 
verrückt, und er könne sogar öfter seine eigenen Sätze nicht erklären. Aber 
niemand sei so angesehen als Charakter und Prosaist. Kurz, dies Urtheil lautete 
so wunderbar, ich sah wieder in das Buch: einige Sätze sprangen mir so 
einleuchtend in die Seele, dass ich eine Art Trieb empfand, es einzustecken und 
zu Hause genauer anzusehen....Ich nahm Websters Dictionary und fing an zu 
lesen. Der Satzbau erschien mir ganz außergewöhnlich. Bald entdeckte ich das 
Geheimnis: es waren wirkliche Gedanken, war eine wirkliche Sprache, ein 
reeller Mensch, den ich vor mir hatte...ich kaufte mir das Buch. Ich habe seitdem 
nicht aufgehört in Emersons Werken zu lesen, und jedesmal wo ich sie von 
neuem vornehme, scheint es mir als sähe ich sie zum erstenmal. 
...alles erschien mir alt und bekannt als hätte ich es tausendmal gedacht oder 
geahnt, alles neu als lernte ich es zum erstenmal....und wenn ich dann wieder 
seine Sätze las, flog die zauberische Luft über mein Herz von neuem, es 
erfrischte sich das alte abgearbeitete Getriebe der Welt, als hätte ich niemals so 
reine Luft gekostet. Ich hörte neulich von einem Amerikaner, der Emersons 
Vorlesungen beigewohnt, es gebe nichts ergreifenderes, als diesen Mann zu 
hören. Ich glaube das. Es geht nichts über die Stimme eines Menschen, der aus 
tiefster Seele das ausspricht, was er für wahr hält.284 
 
This passage from Grimm’s essay “Ralph Waldo Emerson” (1861) documents a reading 
experience that many readers of Emerson are likely to share: his idiosyncratic syntax 
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and style leave a puzzled and bewildered first impression, and yet there is something 
captivating about these sentences that keeps one coming back. His language appeals to 
Grimm because – to use one of Emerson’s well-known sentences – he finds his own 
thinking returning to himself “with a certain alienated majesty” (CW, vol. II, 27). 
Thoughts that have crossed his own mind multiple times appear fresh, pure, and unique 
in Emerson’s prose; Grimm’s experience of the world seems to renew itself through 
Emerson’s words. And according to the testimony of those who attended his lectures, 
his live readings were equally able to convey this almost magical feeling of renewal, of 
fresh insight into perceptions and experiences one thought to have fully uncovered.285 
Excited about his discovery of this American author and the quality and 
energizing effects of his prose, Grimm attempts to translate individual pieces and win 
over a German audience for Emerson. His initial efforts, however, do not find the 
resonance he had hoped for. The explanations he gives for the lack of interest shown by 
German intellectuals in Emerson’s works is crucial to my main argument in this 
chapter: 
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Emerson betrachtet die Welt wie sie um ihn lebendig ist; was vor ihm geschah 
und gethan ward, ist nur eine Stufe zu der Höhe, auf die er sich gestellt hat. Die 
Lebenden haben das Vorrecht vor den Toten. Und wenn die Griechen noch so 
schön gedichtet haben, gemeißelt, gedacht, gesiegt, geherrscht haben: sie sind 
tot und wir leben....Wozu soll ich meine Seele mit Kenntnissen beladen, die ich 
nie gebrauchen werde, oder über Dingen mich abarbeiten, deren Nutzen ich 
nicht einsehe?286 
 
Wie sehr Emerson hier das vorausgeahnt hat, was heute in Amerika der 
vorherrschende Gedanke ist, oder wie sehr jene Lehre Emersons dem heutigen 
Amerika in Fleisch und Blut übergegangen sei, zeigt die Beschaffenheit des dort 
sich regenden wissenschaftlichen Lebens. Bei uns geht man aus von dem, was 
die Wissenschaft für sich verlange – gewiss der höhere Standpunkt; in Amerika 
von dem, was den Lernenden dienlich sei – in vielen Fällen der praktischere und 
besser zum Ziele führende. Zuerst sollen die Lebenden zu ihrem Rechte 
kommen....Wer Gelegenheit gehabt hat, amerikanische Professoren und 
Studenten kennenzulernen, wird die einfache Art bemerkt haben, mit der sie auf 
die Hauptsachen losgehen, mit welcher unbefangenen Frische sie sich 
zurechtzufinden wissen. Der Amerikaner sucht alles zu umfassen und auf dem 
kürzesten Wege sich anzueignen. Emersons Lehre ist die von der Souveränität 
der Persönlichkeit. Zu erkennen, wofür ein junger Mensch gut sei, und ihn 
rücksichtslos für den Weg, den er einschlagen will, auszurüsten, ist die große 
Pflicht, auf die er hinweist.287  
 
These two excerpts taken from Grimm’s obituary of Emerson and the essay on him in 
the Fünfzehn Essays collection draw an interesting analogy: Grimm views Emerson’s 
candid approach to things, his way of not letting the past inhibit and stifle him in his 
enthusiasm and love for expressing his experience of the present, as paradigmatic of 
nineteenth-century American scholarship. In a way Grimm’s assessment of the different 
methods in which “Wissenschaft” has been practiced in Germany and America mirror 
the two sides of the late nineteenth-century “Methodenstreit,” the discourse concerning 
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the method and meaning of classical studies between the philologist Ulrich von 
Wilamowitz-Möllendorff and Friedrich Nietzsche. “Viewed through a wider lens,” the 
clash between the two “was a struggle between historicists and humanists, Wissenschaft 
and Bildung, scholarship and life.”288 While Nietzsche insisted on the necessity of a 
humanist motivation for doing philological and historical research, Wilamowitz argued 
that the scholar’s sole task is to investigate the classical past by assembling as much 
historical information as possible about the object under scrutiny, regardless of present-
day viewpoints.289 
 Following Grimm’s description of the directions American and German 
intellectual life was headed, Emerson and nineteenth-century American scholars clearly 
emerge as exponents of the humanist viewpoint while German scholars emerge as 
practitioners of Wilamowitz’ understanding of scholarship. Although the passage above 
suggests that practicing “Wissenschaft” for the sake of “Wissenschaft” takes priority 
over putting research into the service of humanist goals, Grimm is by no means 
consistent in his appraisal. He also writes that an approach centered on examining how 
scholarly activities may cast new perspectives on everyday life and thinking would be 
of great benefit for the revival Germany’s cultural and research landscape: 
Emerson geht von einem Gedanken aus, der Amerika früher bewegt hat als uns. 
Auch uns steigt heute die Frage auf, wie es den folgenden Generationen möglich 
sein werde, die ungeheuren geistigen Vorräte…zu bewältigen, ohne der eigenen 
Arbeit Eintrag zu tun.290 
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Ich begegne bei [Emerson] vielen bekannten Thatsachen, noch benützt er sie 
nicht, um die alten abgenutzten Rechenexempel noch einmal mit ihnen zu 
konstruieren, sondern jede steht an einer neuen Stelle und dient zu neuen 
Kombinationen. Von jedem Dinge sieht er die direkte Linie ausgehen, die es mit 
dem Zentrum des Lebens in Verbindung setzt. Was ich kaum zu denken gewagt, 
weil es mir allzu kühn erschien, brachte er so ruhig vor, als wären es alltägliche 
Gedanken, die sich von selbst verstehen. Er ist ein perfekter Schwimmer im 
Elemente des modernen Lebens.  
 
Unsere Geschichtsbücher enthalten sehr genau den Inhalt einzelner Fächer der 
Geschichte, aber ein Gefühl des großen allgemeinen Stromes entbehren 
sie....Wir haben die Kenntnisse im Kopfe...und [sind] jeden Augenblick bereit 
die geforderte Summe an Wissen bar auszuzahlen...aber die Ehe dieser 
Gedanken mit dem Geiste, der sie beherbergt, ist eine kühle Konvenienzheirath 
ohne Gemeinschaft und ohne Kinder. Wie scheut man Gespräche, in denen die 
Kenntnisse als Eigenschaften des Charakters verwerthet werden sollen! Man 
will nirgends Konsequenzen ziehen. Was über den Bereich des Positiven, durch 
Bücher zu belegenden hinaus geht, sind bedenkliche Konjekturen.291 
 
According to Grimm, one reason for the lack of interest Germans show in Emerson lies 
in how people teach and have been taught to treat knowledge. Emerson’s bold way of 
combining elements with one another and of thereby bringing into view relations 
between things that seem to bear no affinities to one another cannot fall on fruitful 
ground in a society that rates forms of personalized knowledge as unscientific and 
speculative. Stepping beyond the confines of compartmentalized thinking within 
disciplines is not part of the intellectual life of German institutions of education and 
research as Grimm experiences them. 
The parallels Grimm detects between Emerson and the critical trends in his 
country open up a line of investigation that needs to be pursued further; his observations 
regarding Emerson’s important voice in promoting a humanistically oriented direction 
                                                




of scholarship and the methodological divide he makes out call for a more nuanced 
investigation. Ironically, it was precisely the reception of elements of German 
scholarship that advanced the humanist direction which critical engagements with the 
past took in America. Emerson’s ways of taking great liberties in drawing out 
connections between the works of others, commonplace thoughts, and present-day life 
does not portend but is being formed by the humanist impulse dominating nineteenth-
century New England scholarly culture. The aspects critics like Ripley, Marsh, or 
Felton find most interesting in the German works they review and translate from fall 
into the same category with those Grimm highlights as typical for American 
scholarship: the emphasis on the individual, on placing a premium on creative and 
personal facets of interpretation while paying less attention to the factual and scientific 
side of doing research. 
But what exactly is the relationship between this rise of a humanistically 
oriented scholarship and Emerson’s propagation of a fragmented and eclectic style of 
writing and lecturing? I will demonstrate that he advances a historical and 
anthropological understanding of ancient texts that helps us better understand why he 
would develop his writing and speaking the way he does. Like nearly every figure I 
have turned to in this dissertation, Emerson recapitulates the arguments of the Ancient-
Modern debate. In his early lecture on “The Present Age” (1837), given as part of “The 
Philosophy of History” lecture series at the Masonic Temple in Boston, Emerson recalls 




“golden age” of the self-united ancients (EL, vol. II, 168).292 And like every German 
intellectual involved in the debate, he turns to Shakespeare as the modern poet best able 
to bridge the separation. Shakespeare, he writes in “Thoughts on Modern Literature,” 
“is an apology for the analytic spirit of the period, because, of his analysis, always 
wholes were the results” (W, vol. XII, 323). More specifically, he suggests that it was 
the “influence of the genius of Shakespeare” that “almost alone has called out the 
genius of the German nation into an activity which, spreading from the poetic into the 
scientific, religious and philosophical domains, has made theirs now at last the 
paramount intellectual influence on the world, reacting with great energy on England 
and America” (W, vol. XII, 312).293 
What is it in Shakespeare’s ways of relating to the past, though, that could 
energize the flourishing of culture in Germany? “Shakespeare; or, the Poet,” Emerson’s 
portrait of him in the Representative Men series, provides an answer: his power lies in 
the way he enters into labors of his predecessors and reorganizes their materials: “Every 
master has found his materials collected, and his power lay in his sympathy with his 
people and in his love of the materials he wrought in” (CW, vol. IV, 110). Shakespeare 
reworks what he finds with love and sympathy and makes sure his compositions bear an 
immediate relation to his readers’ present-day experiences. (I will return to the role 
                                                
292 See also the essay on “Quotation and Originality” for Emerson’s recapitulation of key arguments of 
the Ancient-Modern debate: “Now shall we say that only the first men were alive, and the existing 
generation is invalided and degenerate? Is all literature eavesdropping, and all art Chinese imitation?” 
(CW, vol. VIII, 187-188). 
293 In the portrait “Shakespeare; or, the Poet” which Emerson published as part of the Representative Men 
series, he refers to him as “the father of German literature,” and writes that “it was the introduction of 
Shakespeare into German, by Lessing, and the translation of his works by Wieland and Schlegel, that the 




affect plays for Emerson’s notion of reading and composing texts in the chapter’s third 
part.) Emerson notes how Shakespeare’s simultaneous work as a librarian, 
historiographer, and poet (see CW, vol. IV, 113) helps him to convey the impression 
that “the rude warm blood of the living England circulate[s] in [his] play[s]” (CW, vol. 
IV, 111). 
It becomes evident how Emerson’s appraisal of Shakespeare’s function in 
German culture corresponds to those aspects on which other Transcendentalist critics 
focus; they all highlight the reworking and appropriation of historical fragments as the 
most innovative aspect of German criticism. In his early lecture on “Human Culture” 
(1837), Emerson writes that it was the rise of the concept of culture that empowered 
scholars to cultivate such subject-centered and innovative approaches in ancient studies: 
“The new view which now tends to remould metaphysics, theology, science…and 
professions, and which, in its earnest creation, must modify or destroy the old, has as 
yet attained no clearer name than Culture. His own Culture, the unfolding of his nature, 
is the chief end of man” (EL, vol. II, 215). Emerson draws a direct link here between the 
rise of a cultural understanding of all aspects of human knowledge and activity and 
man’s calling to make self-culture the main objective of his striving. 
Emerson invests a great deal in drawing attention to figures whose works 
express what he regards as pioneering treatments of traditions. Practices of revival that 
help to isolate individual fragments from a wide range of historical materials and 
connect them to current themes are valuable for the individual and modern culture at 




is that has empowered people to deal with the achievements of their predecessors in 
such highly individual and undogmatic ways. What are the characteristics of this new 
cultural view that Emerson espouses in his lecture on “Human Culture?” What concept 
of history endorses present- and subject-centered procedures of engaging the past? 
In answering this question, we can see how closely Emerson’s promotion of a 
creative modern fashioning of works of others is bound up with contemporary criticism 
at home and abroad. In the second lecture on “Literature” (1839) of “The Present Age” 
series, he discusses the “new epoch in criticism” dating from the ways “ancient history 
has been dealt with by Niebuhr, Wolf, Müller, and Heeren,” and in particular from 
“Wolf’s attack upon the authenticity of Homeric poems” (EL, vol. III, 225). He 
demonstrates that their research reveals in different ways the openness of ancient 
history; issues we thought we had settled appear inconclusive in light of the outcome of 
their findings. The new insights about the lack of unity and fragmentary nature of the 
Homeric poems lead Emerson to draw a number of interesting conclusions relevant for 
the practice and functions of historical research in his own time: 
Out of histories written in so narrow a mind as most of our histories are, 
laborious indeed but without a pious and loving eye to the universal 
contributions of nature to a people, nothing can come but incongruous, broken 
impressions, unsatisfactory to the mind. But the views obtained by patient 
wisdom studious of facts and open to the permanent as well as partial causes 
would give an analogues impression to the landscape. As it studies history, so it 
looks at the sciences in a higher connection than before….Our own country, I 
may remark, shares largely in whatsoever is new and aspiring in thought. Our 
young men travel in foreign countries and read at home with hungry eyes 
foreign books. Wishful eyes are cast to Germany…but here is Germany or 
nowhere.  





The biggest shortcoming of the method of history writing customary in his own country 
is that it leaves the mind with “broken impressions”; it provides a potpourri of collected 
data but no coherent interpretation. We can see in this early lecture what would become 
the hallmark of Emerson’s view on how the modern individual ought to approach 
history: for it to be of any value, the interpreter needs to take on an active role as a 
shaper of facts. There are obvious resonances between this lecture and the essay on 
Shakespeare in which Emerson calls Shakespeare the “father of German literature” 
because of his ability to bring the past back to life in a loving manner (CW, vol. IV, 
117). In the lecture on “Literature,” he also gestures at the important role a “loving eye” 
plays for viewing the significance of historical materials in broader contexts. And more 
than that, he suggests that a subject who has learned to exercise his “loving eye” will 
also begin to see the landscape differently. What he learns through studies of cultural 
history, in other words, has a formative impact on his visual capacities to draw 
fragments together in a new field of vision. His way of turning the transnational rise of 
a different historical consciousness into an occasion for a pervasive recasting of 
aesthetic categories marks one of the most interesting aspects of his historical thinking 
to which I will return below. 
 For now it is important to note how exactly Emerson supports his claim that 
historical work is useful only in so far as it serves the present. Like many of the German 
scholars he mentions, he approaches the issue both from a historico-critical and 
anthropological angle. In his course of lectures on “The Philosophy of History,” he 




“Shakespear” when he sets up his historical understanding294 – to distinguish adequate 
and inadequate history writing from one another. Writings that document events in a 
chronological style are useless because they fail to cast into relief individual distinctions 
between different periods. Such writings appear like a “shell from which the kernel 
[has] fallen” because data (“shells”) have been abstracted and severed from original 
events and forms of life (“kernel”) (EL, vol. II, 9). According to Emerson, such 
recordings can neither do justice to the individual flavor of historical events nor to the 
nature of human reception and generation of meaning. 
 Similar to Herder, he suggests in “History” that we have to approach the myths 
and sagas of other cultures as a series of continuous human attempts to express their 
experiences of the world: “The shoes of swiftness, the sword of sharpness, the power of 
subduing the elements,…of understanding the voices of birds…are alike the endeavor 
of the human spirit to bend the shows of things to the desires of the mind” (CW, vol. II, 
19). He considers such representations not as signs for a naïve mind but as evidence of 
fundamental principles of human interaction with the world, as indicative of how we 
form our perceptions of things. The most sacred documents, those “ejaculations of a 
few imaginative men,” as Emerson expresses it in “The Poet” (CW, vol. III, 20), are no 
exception to this process: 
The gods of fable are the shining moments of great men. We run all our vessels 
into one mould. Our colossal theologies of Judaism, Christism, Buddhism, 
Mahometism, are the necessary and structural action of the human mind….Our 
theism is the purification of the human mind. Man can paint, or make, or think, 
nothing but man.  (CW, vol. IV, “Uses of Great Men,” 4) 
                                                




Religions are the works of some exceptionally perceptive and imaginative minds, “a 
few oracles spoken by perceiving men” (W, vol. VIII, “Poetry and Imagination,” 38). It 
is striking to see how closely Emerson’s modes of introducing the human origin of 
documents that were for so long considered worldly manifestations of higher authorities 
resemble those of Herder’s. An exclamation such as “man can paint, or make, or think, 
nothing but man,” could be read as an American response to Herder’s observation “Der 
Mensch siehet nur, wie der Mensch siehet” (FA 4:449). By gesturing at resemblances 
such as those between Herder and Emerson, I have no intention of restricting Emerson’s 
interest in German scholarly criticism to a specific figure; rather, I draw attention to 
such intellectual overlap to demonstrate the transnational embeddedness of his historical 
understanding. 
According to Emerson, literature of any provenience, be it sacred or secular, 
should be treated as “the public depository of the thoughts of the human race,” as “a 
true history of man” in which “religion is his best hour. War is his worst” (EL, vol. II, 
“The Philosophy of History,” 63). We need to bear such assertions in mind when we 
want to understand why he redefines how we ought to relate to other literatures and 
cultural histories: attempts to focus only on the “shell” of materials without putting any 
efforts into reimagining the “kernel” (that is, the circumstances and motivations that 
gave rise to documentations of poetic experience) can only lead to new formulaic and 
insignificant records, lacking individual color and character: 
Is it not the lesson of our experience that every man, were life long enough, 
would write history for himself? What else do these volumes of extracts and 




one thing to me; another to you. Since the birth of Niebuhr and Wolf, Roman 
and Greek history have been written anew. (CW, vol. I, “Literary Ethics,” 107) 
 
Just as the ancient events documented bear witness to how humans “bend the shows of 
things to the desires of the mind” (CW, vol. II, “History,” 19), so is the personal 
component involved when we reengage with such documents. The biographical and 
personal facet of historical scholarship is of most interest to Emerson. The individual 
characteristics of the author shining through his way of telling the history of Greece and 
Rome determine the value of the account: “the whole value of history, of biography, is 
to increase my self-trust, by demonstrating what man can be and do” (CW, vol. I, 
“Literary Ethics,” 102). The task of history is to exhibit to man the wide range of his 
possibilities and contribute thereby to his self-culture. 
 Emerson, I suggest, uses this perspective on history as a springboard to 
corroborate and authorize what he would work into a fully-fledged cultural practice. 
Man needs to break with traditions and conventions as much as he needs to experiment 
with and cultivate new forms of life and expressions. Emerson’s concern with the 
historical debates of his time shows clearly that leaving old forms behind is as important 
to him as the creation of new ones. For him it is the right balance between letting go and 
appropriating new habits of thinking and living that indicates the health and happiness 
of individuals and societies alike. This is the background against which we need to 
interpret provocative statements such as “every healthy mind is a true Alexander or 
Sesostris, building a universal monarchy” (W, vol. VIII, “Poetry and Imagination,” 23) 




II, “History,” 19). Taken out of context, these exclamations can be read as evidence for 
a radical notion of individualism that seeks to dominate and take absolute control over 
things; when we read them as part of his engagement with historical criticism, however, 
they appear in a different light. What Emerson finds in both ancient and modern poetry 
is that  
The world is thoroughly anthropomorphized, as if it had passed through the 
body and mind of man, and taken his mould and form. Indeed, good poetry is 
always personification, and heightens every species of force in nature by giving 
it a human volition….Every healthy mind is a true Alexander or Sesostris, 
building a universal monarchy. (W, vol. VIII, 23) 
 
Like many passages in Emerson’s texts on literature and history, this one from “Poetry 
and Imagination” suggests that the anthropomorphizing of the world we find in 
literatures of all ages should be understood as a demonstration of man’s ability to carve 
out a place in it for himself. Man’s creation of a “universal monarchy” in which all 
things have a fixed place and interact in meaningful ways indicate a healthy mind, 
convinced that its way of seeing things is right and true, and this is no flaw in 
Emerson’s eyes. The progression of cultures throughout history is a process that 
“recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other,” and in light of these changes 
bound to a continual rhythm of powerful gains and equally powerful losses and 
degenerations it is vitally important to find meaning and reliable points of orientation, if 
only momentarily.295 Literature is thereby of great help because it  
                                                
295 Emerson writes comprehensively about the nature of historical progress in “Self-Reliance”: “Society 
never advances. It recedes as fast on one side as it gains on the other. It undergoes continual changes; it is 
barbarous, it is civilized, it is christianized, it is rich, it is scientific; but this change is not amelioration. 




afford[s] us a platform whence we may command a view of our present life, a 
purchase by which we may move it. We fill ourselves with ancient learning; 
install ourselves the best we can in Greek, in Punic, in Roman houses, only that 
we may wiselier see French, English, and American houses and modes of living. 
(CW, vol. II, “Circles,” 185) 
 
Literature provides us with models that help us reinvent our own life. Examples of how 
this has been done by leading figures like Shakespeare or Goethe and by Emerson 
himself can be found in every text he composed. Nearly every essay and lecture is 
concerned with how to quote works of others productively and integrate findings in 
one’s own work; “the greatest genius,“ he proclaims famously in Representative Men, 
“is the most indebted man” (CW, vol. IV, 109.).296 
 When we take into consideration Emerson’s concern with the philosophy of 
history and his working through the latest scholarship, his undogmatic treatment of 
forms of cultural expression and habits of living appear natural. He regards ancient 
literary texts as models, suggesting that the best way to engage with them is by 
contributing to the continuous process of generating new modes of expression: “They 
say much of the study of the Ancients, but what else does that signify than, direct your 
attention to the real world and seek to express it, since that did the ancients whilst they 
lived” (Emerson quoting Goethe in JMN, vol. V, 290). What I argued in chapter three 
                                                                                                                                          
civilized man has built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet. He is supported on crutches, but lacks so 
much support of muscle. He has a fine Geneva watch, but he fails of the skill to tell the hour by the 
sun….. His note-books impair his memory; his libraries overload his wit” (CW, vol. II, 48). 
296 On Emerson’s concern with creative reading and writing, see, for instance, “The American Scholar”: 
“One must be an inventor to read well….There is then creative reading as well as creative writing. When 
the mind is braced by labor and invention, the page of whatever book we read becomes luminous with 
manifold allusion. Every sentence is doubly significant, and the sense of our author is as broad as the 
world” (CW, vol. I, 58.); see also “Quotation and Originality” (W, vol. VIII, 177-204) and Robert D. 
Richardson, First We Read, Then We Write: Emerson on the Creative Process (Iowa City: University of 




with regard to other influential Transcendentalists holds equally true for Emerson: the 
use of history and books lies in what they can do for the living generation. Regardless 
of whether Emerson turns to Wolf, Niebuhr, or Herder, the question of interest to him is 
how they manage to put their findings into the service of the individual’s development 
and present-day cultural renewal. 
 This latter aspect is particularly significant; it is no news, of course, that 
Emerson challenges established aesthetic values by turning to “the low, the 
common…the philosophy of the street” rather than what is traditionally considered 
“sublime and beautiful” (CW, vol. I, “The American Scholar,” 67). What is interesting 
and has not been commented on, however, is that he draws a direct line of connection 
between the rise of a historical consciousness and the transformation of aesthetic 
categories. The refashioning of the relationship between ancient and modern cultures 
contributes in important ways to his propagation of an aesthetics of the low and 
common. He articulates this link between history and aesthetics most elaborately in 
“The American Scholar” and the essay on “Goethe, or the Writer” in the Representative 
Men series.  
Following his famous proclamations on the beauty of the everyday in “The 
American Scholar,” he associates such an aesthetic practice with Goethe, “the most 
modern of the moderns” (CW, vol. I, 68). It has often been noted that among all the 




self-portrait.297 This observation seems particularly apt with regard to Emerson’s 
descriptions of what he takes to be Goethe’s aesthetics; the German poet emerges here 
as a powerful sounding board for Emerson’s fascination with the aesthetic value of the 
most common experiences. No one, he writes, has worked out “the distinction between 
the antique and the modern spirit of art” as well as Goethe because of how he and others 
of his period make sure that their historical discoveries have some “application to Berlin 
and Munich.” This focus on the present distinguishes the German preoccupation with 
the past from that practiced “in England and America” where “one may be an adept in 
the writings of a Greek or Latin poet, without any poetic taste or fire” (CW, vol. IV, 
158, 162). Goethe, by contrast, makes out “a thread of mythology and fable” in the most 
prosaic “actions of routine”; he finds the “genius of life” in “public squares and main 
streets, in boulevards and hotels” (CW, vol. IV, 157-158). Such passages indicate how 
far Emerson goes beyond the American classical scholars discussed earlier: he does not 
only establish in a general fashion that new perspectives on past cultures impart the 
subject with a hitherto unknown sense of responsibility and power but suggests that 
these perspectives teach us to “embrace the common” (CW, vol. I, 67) and render 
seemingly insignificant actions and perceptions as sites of aesthetic experience. Before 
following up in more detail on questions regarding the nature of Emerson’s style, 
however, I will turn to the other and most important domain of scholarship that has 
                                                
297 See for instance Joseph C. Schöpp: “‘The Powers and Duties of the Scholar or Writer:’ Emersons 
Selbstentwurf im Lichte Goethes,” in Dialoge zwischen Amerika und Europa: transatlantische 





fundamentally changed his life and thinking. 
 
“Ejaculations of a few imaginative men”: Emerson on Religion 
 
Unlike Emerson’s exposure to historical scholarship in fields other than religion, 
the connections between his resignation from the ministry and his engagement with 
German higher criticism is well documented.298 The aim here is to first map out the 
broader critical conversations to which Emerson contributes and in the context of which 
he develops his undogmatic religious understanding. I will show that we miss out on the 
significance of his engagement with the scholarly discourses of his time if we do not go 
beyond the well known observation that they helped to sever religious authority from 
historical texts and relocate it in the individual’s higher consciousness.299 
It is common knowledge that the latest contemporary research fed into 
Emerson’s doubts about institutionalized religion; as I noted earlier, he refers to Bibles 
not as divinely inspired documents but as “ejaculations of a few imaginative men” 
(“The Poet”) who were no more or less entitled to document and diffuse their spiritual 
experiences than anyone else. In light of such insights into the individual and cultural 
distinctiveness of religious expressions, Emerson becomes the most fervent proponent 
of abandoning historically obsolete rituals and of putting all efforts into finding new 
                                                
298 See the sources cited in the introduction to this chapter. See also Elisabeth Hurth, “William and Ralph 
Waldo Emerson and the Problem of the Lord’s Supper,” 203: “This rejection of a Christianity of forms 
forced Emerson all the more to affirm a new basis of religion….the proof of the validity of revelation had 
to be sought somewhere else – not in historical and external evidences but rather within the heart.” 




forms for reviving the spiritual life of his time. As with Homer or any other renowned 
figure, Emerson advocates for changing our ways of relating to spiritual leaders like 
Jesus or Paul by treating them not as authoritative models but as humans whose legacies 
we can learn from. 
The aim is to isolate emotional, intellectual, and communicative skills Emerson 
highlights as worthy of imitation in the writings and accounts of Jesus and Paul and to 
place them in the context of aspects fellow Transcendentalists would emphasize in their 
translations and discussions of German criticism. This will bring into view a number of 
features and themes relevant for a better grasp on the ways in which well known 
characteristics of Emerson’s reading, writing, and lecturing are guided by his current 
engagement with biblical research. 
William Emerson kept his younger brother up to date with the latest scholarship 
while studying at Göttingen. As I noted in “Transcendentalism’s Critical Instruments,” 
what he found out about the histories of the Scriptures from scholars such as Eichhorn 
and Michaelis shook the foundations of what he had learned at Harvard’s theological 
seminary so fundamentally that he decided to leave the profession. Hurth works out the 
conflict between the evidentialist apologetics familiar to William and the theological 
scholarship he encountered in Göttingen. To recapitulate briefly, critics like Andrews 
Norton or Henry Ware took the view that “any criticism which steered away from 
historical factuality…amounted…to a denial of the supernatural authority of biblical 
revelation and the historical personage of Jesus himself” while the studies by Michaelis 




the dissemination of these studies in New England by students returning from Göttingen 
like William “fed right into Ralph Waldo’s long-standing uncertainty about his 
profession and calling.”300 
One of the earliest manifestations testifying to Emerson’s familiarity with 
German criticism is a series of lectures on the Gospels which he began in 1831 and 
which led up to his well known “The Lord’s Supper” sermon (1832) and, most 
famously, to the “Divinity School Address” he gave on July 15, 1838 to the senior 
divinity class at Harvard. Throughout the six Gospel lectures, Emerson uses German 
higher criticism as the source that provides powerful evidence that the Bible cannot be 
regarded as a divinely inspired document.301 He speculates on questions such as the 
authorship of the Gospels and discusses Eichhorn’s theory which suggests that the 
evangelists copied from a common source. He also engages with Eichhorn’s 
questioning of Moses’ authorship of the Pentateuch and of Paul’s composition of the 
Timothy epistles.302 Moreover, he uses studies like Herbert Marsh’s “Dissertation on 
the Origin and Composition of the First Three Gospels” (1802) that offer summaries of 
Eichhorn’s and Herder’s position on questions about the gospel’s origin, and he refers 
                                                
300 Elisabeth Hurth, “William and Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Problem of the Lord’s Supper,” 191-
192. 
301 “The term ‘Higher Criticism’ was first applied to Eichhorn with regard to his Introduction of the Old 
Testament. Higher Criticism builds on the foundation of lower or textual criticism, which seeks the 
recovery of extant manuscripts as they left their authors’ hands. Higher Criticism seeks to determine 
authorship, date, meaning, and intention” (Karen Kalinevitch, “Turning from the Orthodox: Emerson’s 
Gospel Lectures,” Studies in the American Renaissance [1986], 70). On Emerson’s gospel lecture series, 
see also Richardson, Emerson. The Mind on Fire: “These [the lectures on the gospels] are detailed, 
scholarly, critical performances, summarizing the most recent biblical research. They are utterly unlike 
the personal statements of the sermons. In these lectures Emerson undertook to show what is known of 
each of the Evangelists, to provide a history of the transmission of the Bible, and to review the various 
theories about the origin of the three synoptic Gospels (Matthew, Mark, and Luke) and their relation to 
one another” (111). 




to Connop Thirlwall’s 150-page introduction to his translation of Schleiermacher’s A 
Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke (1825).303 
These multiple references make evident that Emerson was well informed about 
the latest scholarship from a variety of sources. His brother was a main resource, but he 
also attended lectures by Harvard faculty who had returned from their studies at 
German universities;304 moreover, English translations of key German works provided 
portals to what had become the object of theological debates on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Besides Thirlwall’s introduction, Frederic Henry Hedge’s edition of Prose 
Writers of Germany, containing Ripley’s translation of the fourth speech of Über die 
Religion, was crucial for Emerson’s encounter with Schleiermacher. Hedge urged him 
to study Schleiermacher, and there are resonances in the “Divinity School Address” of 
Schleiermacher’s contention that religious feelings need to be communicated.305 
Emerson also became familiar with him directly through Ripley; as I noted in chapter 3, 
Ripley composed three book-length letters in response to Andrews Norton’s public 
attacks on his students’ subversive position regarding the status of Jesus’ performance 
                                                
303 For a more detailed overview of the biblical research that Emerson uses in each gospel lecture, see 
Richardson, Emerson. The Mind on Fire, 111-113; and Schleiermacher, A Critical Essay on the Gospel of 
St. Luke, with an introduction by the translator Connop Thirlwall (London: John Taylor, 1825). Herbert 
Marsh’s “Dissertation on the Origin and Composition of the First Three Gospels” (1802) is part of his 
English edition of J.D. Michaelis’s Einleitung in das Neue Testament. 
304 “Emerson listened firsthand to the reports of Harvard’s first Göttingen students who had seen how the 
‘religion of their Fathers’ was dissolving in the crucible of historico-critical scrutiny. In 1821 Emerson 
attended several of George Ticknor’s lectures at Harvard; he also fell under the spell of Edward Everett’s 
and George Bancroft’s reports, all of which gave him a growing sense of the exegetical and theological 
context in which the higher criticism was practiced,” Hurth, “William and Ralph Waldo Emerson and the 
Problem of the Lord’s Supper,” 196. 
305 Richardson, Emerson. The Mind on Fire, 197. Richardson draws attention to the relationship between 
Emerson’s “Divinity School Address” and Schleiermacher’s Über die Religion. Like Schleiermacher, he 
argues that “religion is not served by…conventional preaching but only by living discourse….For 
Schleiermacher, as for Emerson now, the religious impulse in human nature demands not only expression 




of deeds and wonders. In fact, Ripley also wrote them in defense of Emerson who was 
viciously attacked by Norton in a Boston newspaper after he had given his address at 
the Divinity School.306 In short, Ripley’s debate with Norton “defined for the public the 
division between the Harvard-Unitarian establishment and the young 
Transcendentalists” who were almost all Harvard graduates.307 
This brief overview suffices to convey an impression of the number and 
complexity of the threads of German criticism running through Emerson’s religious 
writings. His sermons show “a gradual advancement toward historico-critical methods,” 
and he would call his decision to resign from the ministry a “German” one.308 He 
recognizes the power of scholarly insights as instruments to undercut contentions 
regarding the authority of divine revelation and evidence for the genuineness of the 
books of the Bible. The question now is how these insights manifest themselves in his 
writing. 
                                                
306 “On August 27, about five weeks after the [Divinity School address], Andrews Norton published a 
violent attack on Emerson in a Boston newspaper. Norton accused ‘the new school in Literature and 
Religion’ of a ‘restless craving for notoriety and excitement’ and sneered that its origins could be 
attributed ‘to ill-understood notions obtained by blundering through the crabbed and disgusting obscurity 
of some of the worst German speculatists.’ He attacked Cousin, ‘that hyper-Germanized Englishman, 
Carlyle,’ and ‘the German pantheist Schleiermacher.’” Ripley begun to publish the series of pamphlets 
(see chapter three) in 1839 not only to defend himself against those attacks Norton had directed at him 
and his enthusiastic reception of Spinoza and Schleiermacher, but he also composed his pamphlets in 
support of the hostilities Emerson received from Norton in response to the Divinity address: “Never 
gathered together or properly published as a unit, [Ripley’s letters] remain the unacknowledged high 
point of the influence of Schleiermacher in American thought in the nineteenth century and a declaration, 
for those who could see it, that Emersonian transcendentalism was not an aberration, as Norton claimed, 
but proceeded in one of the main currents of modern thought(” Richardson, Emerson. The Mind on Fire, 
298, 325). 
307 Kenneth S. Sacks, Understanding Emerson: “The American Scholar” and his Struggle for Self-
Reliance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 80-81. 
308 Hurth, “William and Ralph Waldo Emerson and the Problem of the Lord’s Supper,” 196. Emerson 
wrote in a letter to Mary Moody Emerson on August 19, 1832 that he was determined to leave the 
ministry: “…I can only do my work well by abjuring the opinions [and] customs of all others [and] 
adhering strictly to the divine plan a few dim inches of whose outline I faintly discern in my breast. Is that 




“The Lord’s Supper” sermon is a good starting point because it clearly exhibits 
how his familiarity with theological research permeates his way of relating to and 
employing rituals of the past. Comparing the accounts Matthew and John provide of the 
last supper, Emerson concludes that “neither of them drops the slightest intimation of 
any intention on the part of Jesus to set up anything permanent” that would have to be 
followed by subsequent generations (W, vol. XI, 5). He examines the mode of 
communication Jesus employed and finds that he spoke to his disciples like “a friend to 
his friends” (W, vol. XI, 7). Emerson concludes from the personal and informal tone of 
their communication that Jesus sought to install the shared feast as a symbolic act of 
commemoration for this particular group of friends and not for all following ages: “I 
can readily imagine that he was willing and desirous, when his disciples met, his 
memory should hallow their intercourse; but I cannot bring myself to believe that in the 
use of such an expression he looked beyond the living generation…and meant to 
impose a memorial feast upon the whole world” (W, vol. XI, 7). It therefore seems 
untimely and inappropriate, in Emerson’s eyes, to stick to forms and symbols 
dogmatically that were intended for a clearly defined occasion and audience. 
It is important to note, however, that for Emerson such a historical perspective 
on Jesus’ activities does not imply a rejection of using forms for the purpose of 
commemoration per se:  “I am not so foolish as to declaim against forms. Forms are as 
essential as bodies; but to exalt particular forms, to adhere to one form after it is 




did urge that we change our relationship to them.309 Instead of stiffly imitating his 
models, we ought to actively imitate his mode of interaction. Jesus, Emerson writes, “is 
the mediator in that only sense in which possibly any being can mediate between God 
and man, that is, an instructor of man…. [B]ut the thanks he offers…are not 
compliments, commemorations, but the use of that instruction” (W, vol. XI, 18). What 
we can learn from Jesus, in other words, is to relate to him in the same way he would to 
his disciples, that is “after the free way of friendship.” But what does such a personal, 
friendly encounter with the accounts we have of him really look like? What does a 
mode of communication founded on a reciprocal model of friendship imply for the 
practice of commemoration? Emerson specifies: 
I will love him as a glorified friend…and not pay him a stiff sign of respect, as 
men do whom they fear. A passage read from his discourse, a moving 
provocation to works like his, any act or meeting which tends to awaken a pure 
thought, a flow of love, an original design of virtue, I call a worthy, a true 
commemoration. (W, vol. XI, 20) 
 
Meeting Jesus as a friend means engaging with a selected passage from the documents 
we have recording his life and deeds. The outcome of our engagement with a feely 
chosen aspect of “his discourse” that caught our attention is as unpredictable as the 
outcome of a conversation we would have with a friend. And that is good, because in 
order to qualify as a true act of commemoration, the process of “meeting” Jesus in the 
act of reading or conversing about him has to entail an element of surprise. Thoughts 
                                                
309 Richard A. Grusin argues in Transcendentalist Hermeneutics: Institutional Authority and the Higher 
Criticism of the Bible (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991) that the reformulation of symbolic acts of 
commemoration and the transformation of the institutional settings within which they are practiced lies at 
the heart of Emerson’s religious reform ideal. The key to renewal for Emerson, Grusin claims, lies not in 




that have the potential to form into “an original design” can only thrive if we free 
ourselves from dogmatism and read with an open mind. 
 Similar principles apply to preaching: Emerson announces in the “Divinity 
School Address” that it needs to be kept in a “style of friendship” as well. According to 
him, an “appropriated and formal” mode of address is doomed to fail because “truly 
speaking, it is not instruction, but provocation, that I can receive from another soul. 
What he announces, I must find true in me, or wholly reject” (CW, vol. VII, 80-82). 
Any form of top-down instruction, in other words, cannot work; the preacher has to find 
a way to address his congregation at eye level and, instead of telling them what to think, 
to animate and provoke them to find out what is true for themselves. In “The Preacher,” 
he warns his colleagues that if “there is any difference felt between the foot-board of the 
pulpit and the floor of the parlor, you have not yet said that which you should say” (W, 
vol. X, 233). 
 Given that truth is not ready-made, not tied to a single creed or a specific person 
but evolves out of non-hierarchically structured communicative processes, it is 
important to create environments where such exchanges can flourish: “If utterance is 
denied, the thought lies like a burden on the man. Always the seer is a sayer” (CW, vol. 
I, 84.); humans need outlets such as canvasses, stones, music, or words to express their 
perceptions.310 Richardson has noted the parallels here between Emerson’s emphasis on 
                                                
310 See the following passage from the “Divinity School Address”: “It is very certain that it is the effect of 
conversation with the beauty of the soul, to beget a desire and need to impart to others the same 
knowledge and love. If utterance is denied, the thought lies like a burden on the man. Always the seer is a 




the communicative element for the revival of a vital spiritual life, Schleiermacher’s 
fourth speech in Über die Religion, and Riply’s way of modeling his representation of 
an ideal religious community thereon in the first letter to Norton.311 
 It is easy to make out a number of parallels between the presence of 
Schleiermacher or Herder in Transcendentalist discourses in general and in Emerson in 
particular. His way of premising active modes of commemoration on non-hierarchical 
communication and undogmatic practices of reading and spiritual expression resonate 
with what Ripley, Marsh and Bancroft highlight in their translations and reviews. 
Emerson’s fellow Transcendentalists’ translations and discussions of Herder’s Der 
Redner Gottes, of the Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend or of the 
introduction to Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie all suggest that the reading and 
reworking of ancient documents and conversations about them will turn out to be most 
productive when the discussion is kept within a discursive structure of friendship. In 
translating freely from Herder, Ripley examines how such a dehierarchized model of 
communication restructures the relations between preacher and congregation.312 
 Like his colleagues, Emerson is deeply concerned with filling the vacuum 
scholarship tore into religious life. And in similar ways, he explores unconventional 
modes of communication, reading and expressing religious feelings to compensate for 
                                                                                                                                          
canvas; sometimes with chisel on stone; sometimes in towers and aisles of granite…sometimes in 
anthems of indefinite music; but clearest and most permanent in words” (CW, vol. I, 84). 
311 On the relation between Schleiermacher’s Reden and Emerson’s emphasis on the communicative 
element of religious expression, see Richardson, Emerson, 290. 
312 According to Ripley’s Herder interpretation, the new model preacher may both inscribe his signature 
on the sermons while making their unfolding contingent upon the audience’s contributions. He does not 
instruct in the sense that he would impose but his teaching aims at what is perhaps best described as 




the spiritual gap which had motivated many already to turn their backs on the ministry. 
Jesus emerges thereby as a model for Emerson’s reconstructive efforts. In the 
concluding part of “The Lord’s Supper,” he turns to Paul and introduces him like Jesus 
as a prototype we can learn from: 
Although I have gone back to weigh the expressions of Paul, I feel that here is 
the true point of view. In the midst of considerations as to what Paul thought, 
and why he so thought, I cannot help feeling that it is time misspent to argue to 
or from his convictions…. I seem to lose the substance in seeking the shadow. 
That for which Paul lived and died so gloriously; that for which Jesus gave 
himself to be crucified…was to redeem us from a formal religion, and teach us 
to seek our well-being in the formation of the soul. (W, vol. XI, 22) 
 
Given his familiarity with key works by German scholars and their circulation and 
discussion in New England, it is safe to assume that Emerson was familiar with the 
contested scholarly debates regarding the authenticity of Paul’s letters. An answer to 
these authorship questions, however, is of no interest to him; what makes these writings 
powerful regardless of their authorship is how the writer relates to religious forms and 
conventions and puts them into the service of the soul’s formation. Emerson shares this 
interest in what Paul’s religious understanding can do for the individual with 
Schleiermacher. As I demonstrated in “Transcendentalism’s Critical Instruments,” in 
his discussion of Lücke’s account of Schleiermacher’s Paul interpretation Ripley 
emphasizes that the authenticity of the epistles to Timothy are not a primary concern. 
Rather, Ripley’s translation focuses on how Paul’s breaking away from formal religion 




the letter to Timothy into a creative site for narrating his own scholarly biography and 
development.313  
 Emerson’s interest in Paul, however, goes beyond introducing him as a model 
for the human freedom of making traditions; crucially, he also comes to stand in as a 
representative for Emerson’s core concern: as Branka Arsić shows, Paul figures as an 
example for the necessity of breaking with ingrained habits. His ways of treating 
traditions occupies a crucial representative function for this key Emersonian interest 
that runs like a red thread through all his writings: “Paul’s idea of leaving ritual in order 
to reach something more religious is translated by Emerson into the necessity of leaving 
our habits in order to set ourselves on the path of self-perfecting. The Pauline gesture of 
leaving thus becomes crucial for Emerson’s ethics, as it conditions what in the sermon 
he calls the process of ‘self-improvement.’”314 The text Arsić refers to here is Sermon 
144, which Emerson gave for the first time in 1832, the same year as “The Lord’s 
Supper.” He provides in it a commentary on Hebrews 6:1, “which sees perfection as an 
effect of leaving.”315 
 In her reading of Emerson’s commentary on Paul, Arsić makes an important 
observation regarding the characteristics the act of departing has in Emerson: what 
matters to him is not so much what specifically one’s breaking with particular forms of 
                                                
313 See chapter three. 
314 Branka Arsić, On Leaving. A Reading in Emerson (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 27. 
315 Arsić, On Leaving, 27. Arsić cites the text of Hebrews 6:1-2 from the KJV: “Therefore leaving the 
principles of the doctrine of Christ, let us go on unto perfection; not laying again the foundation of 
repentance from dead works, and of faith toward God, 2 Of the doctrine of baptisms, and of laying on of 
hands, and of resurrection of the dead, and of eternal judgment.” See The Complete Sermons of Ralph 




life develops into, but rather the very act of liberating oneself from a particular habit. 
This is what ignites a moment of freedom. The newly found independence might 
develop into something better, or worse, or show no improvement at all. The value lies 
in the effort made and not in the outcome. To those familiar with Emerson’s concept of 
self-reliance, this observation has a recognizable ring; Arsić’s point is to show that this 
kind of thinking existed already in rudimentary form early on.316 
The examples of Paul and Jesus show clearly that it is necessary to go beyond 
general observations regarding the relationship between theological scholarship and 
Emerson’s religious understanding. In conversation with other contemporary texts and 
discussions, he introduces the path toward a recovery of religious institutions and 
experiences as one that is tied to reforms in reading, conversing, and expressing oneself: 
ministers, or any person in a position of authority, need to make sure they address their 
audience in a way that provokes and inspires rather than simply instructs. In the realm 
of reading and expression in writing and other artistic media he also propagates the 
practice of a selective, non-conclusive, and undogmatic relationship to religious sources 
and traditions. Such openness keeps spiritual life fresh and moving; old forms and 
                                                
316 “The self possesses the counterpower to refresh life by breaking with habit, thus putting itself in 
tension with itself in a different way. Similar to Paul’s injunction to perfect Christianity by annulling the 
very essence of Christian doctrine, Emerson proposed that we set ourselves on the path of bettering the 
self by annulling its very identity. For if stepping over the threshold of the self is performed by our own 
thinking, it is through thinking that the self will hollow itself out, as if cancelling out its ‘I’ in order for a 
new self to be formed. ‘Self-Reliance’ is an elaborate version of this idea, and so represents a crucial 
formulation of Emerson’s theory of self-culture. The gesture from departing from oneself is there 
famously called aversion….The paradox of self-reliance, then, and the radicalism of its demand, is that it 
calls the self to rely on what within it is not it. Because the self doesn’t know what it relies on, the call 
may turn out to be no better than whim, and the new self perhaps worse than the one left behind. That is 
the self’s existential wager….However, the possibility of a negative outcome cannot form a basis for 
discrediting aversive self-crafting. Even if it happens that the new doesn’t substantially improve the old, 
the sheer power necessary to enact the exit from the habitual, the breeze of the unknown, the beauty of 




traditions transform into new ones, and the individual develops thereby his higher 
consciousness by both leaving behind what he experiences as outgrown symbols and 
customs and by embracing new ones. Retrospectively, Emerson’s enormous influence 
seems obvious, and we tend to see every aspect of the Transcendentalist movement 
through his eyes. A deeper probing into the circumstances in which Emerson became 
Emerson, however, show how closely some of the most radical aspects of his thinking 
are embedded within a large network of cross-cultural intellectual history. 
 
 
Loving, Forming, Abandoning: The Duties of American Scholars and Emerson as 
a Lecturer 
 
The foregoing examinations have shown a specific facet of Emerson’s versatile 
thinking that comes into view when we examine it through the lens of his philosophy of 
history and his engagement with contemporary scholarship: regardless of whether he 
concentrates on poets or researchers, what he is most interested in is how individuals 
have tapped cultural and literary resources of different origin productively and put them 
into the service of humanist practices. The historical perspective is conducive to 
regarding texts and artworks as manifestations of how humans have taken possession of 
the world and cultivated particular habits and traditions – be they religious or secular – 
in certain moments at different times and places. And Emerson is interested in works 




changing nature of norms and traditions by treating them accordingly, that is by 
cultivating a dynamic relationship to artistic standards or religious beliefs. In his eyes, 
representative figures are those who relate to traditions in a non-authoritative fashion 
and who make active use of, alter and appropriate confidently what they find without 
seeking to exercise full control. 
I have demonstrated that he shares this liberal perspective on scripture and 
myths and their scholarly and poetic reworkings with other Transcendentalists, but like 
no one else of his generation Emerson is the one who works these new insights into a 
fully-fledged modern cultural practice and a new profession, that of freelance lecturer. 
How he does this is the theme of the following pages. The features of this cultural 
practice become explicit in Emerson’s introduction of the duties of American scholars, 
and my argument is that the ways a true scholar ought to think and act is modeled on the 
characteristics I highlighted in previous discussions of researchers and writers Emerson 
and his cohort treat as models to learn from. 
One central text for this further investigation of Emerson’s techniques is, of 
course, the Harvard commencement address that now in retrospect figures as Emerson’s 
most famous: “The American Scholar” (1837). It is important to note up front that he 
often uses “poet” as an interchangeable term for “scholar” in his texts, and that this is 
not because he assumes that in every human lies dormant the potential to become a 
Shakespeare or Goethe; rather, he associates with both denominations a certain attitude 
to life and a set of capacities. This is not to say that he doesn’t also employ “poet” in its 




fiction, publishes, and gets publicly recognized for what he does and the poet who 
qualifies as one because of how he thinks, lives, and reshapes literary materials in his 
texts is often blurred.  
The same, however, cannot be said about the scholar; when Emerson refers to 
someone as a true scholar, he never just means a person committed to doing research in 
an academic sense. In fact, Emerson’s scholar does not even require any formal training 
or tutoring, and even if he has received a formal education and is an active researcher 
Emerson does not judge him by what he has found out but by how he uses his findings. 
Like his Transcendentalist colleagues, he evaluates the use of any scholarship by how it 
may further the individual in his striving for self-crafting and how it may serve the 
advancement of America’s cultural blossoming. 
For scholars and poets to be true, they have to be “Man Thinking” (CW, vol. I, 
53) just like “the scholar of the first age” (CW, vol. I, 55). The reason he qualifies as a 
model is because his ways of processing perceptions and thoughts exhibit strategies that 
help to countermand the biggest danger awaiting the most distinguished works of 
literature: 
The sacredness which attaches to the act of creation, the act of thought, is 
transferred to the record. The poet chanting, was felt to be a divine man: 
henceforth the chant is divine also. The writer was a just and wise spirit: 
henceforward it is settled, the book is perfect; as love of the hero corrupts into 
worship of his statue. Instantly, the book becomes noxious: the guide is a 
tyrant….Colleges are built on [books]. Books are written on it by thinkers, not 
by Man Thinking; by men of talent, that is, who start wrong, who set out from 





Regardless of how much creative energy once went into the composition of a book, the 
most vibrant texts turn into dogmatic “tyrant[s]” if their readers consume them as 
“thinkers” instead of “Man Thinking.” “The scholar of the first age,” by contrast, 
demonstrates how to counteract this process of fossilization by imparting to his sources 
a “new arrangement of his own mind,” and he can thereby transform any “dead fact” 
into “quick thought” (CW, vol. I, 55).317 We can see here how Emerson turns insights 
dominating New England scholarly discourse into guiding principles for cultural 
activities: instead of just suggesting that the philological and historical strategies of a 
Wolf or a Herder are noteworthy, he severs them from their specific contexts and 
proclaims that such non-fossilized approaches need to become paradigmatic for 
American scholars and poets. 
The parallels between Emerson’s “Man Thinking” and the characteristics of 
what he and his colleagues introduce as innovative scholarship become even more 
obvious when we ask how exactly one ought to acquire the qualities necessary to read 
and rework texts in ways that make it possible for them to become vehicles of 
inspiration. How can the occupation with texts become an occasion for setting in motion 
a flowing stream of thinking? In previous discussions, I worked out the central function 
that a personal language of love and friendship has for a redefinition of the 
contemporary use of ancient texts as well as for the restructuring of the communication 
                                                
317 “The scholar of the first age received into him the world around; brooded thereon; gave it the new 
arrangement of his own mind, and uttered it again. It came into him, life; it went out from him, truth. It 
came to him, short-lived actions; it went out from him, immortal thoughts. It came to him, business; it 
went from him, poetry. It was dead fact; now, it is quick thought. It can stand, and it can go. It now 
endures, it now flies, it now inspires. Precisely in proportion to the depth of mind from which it issued, so 




between spiritual leaders and their congregation. Emerson also suggests that affect plays 
a major role in reading, composing, and speaking: 
In poetry, and in common speech, the emotions of benevolence and 
complacency which are felt towards others, are likened to the material effects of 
fire; so swift, or much more swift, more active, more cheering are these fine 
inward irradiations. From the highest degree of passionate love, to the lowest 
degree of good will, they make the sweetness of life. Our intellectual and active 
powers increase with our affection. The scholar sits down to write, and all his 
years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or happy 
expression; but it is necessary to write a letter to a friend, and, forthwith, troops 
of gentle thoughts invest themselves, on every hand, with chosen words. (CW, 
“Friendship”, vol. II, 113) 
 
In this passage from the essay “Friendship,” he takes on different perspectives on the 
issue. First, he speaks from the position of the reader and listener, arguing that we need 
to be attentive to the emotions certain elements of speech or poetry stir in us. He 
compares the impact such “inward irradiations” have on the body to the “material 
effects of fire” and suggests that it is important to nourish such physical sensations 
because they increase our “intellectual and active powers” and make life sweet and 
enjoyable. Second, he turns to the scholar, proposing that he is the one to focus that 
burning spark by forging an individualized perspective on the topic under investigation, 
a perspective resembling that which one would adopt when writing a letter to a friend. 
So the bodily sensation we feel when we read or listen helps to set our thinking in 
motion; emotions are able to detach words from their fossilized state and become active 
ingredients of our thinking and writing. 
 In a third step, Emerson approaches this phenomenon from a first person 




new and noble depths, and enlarge the meaning of all my thoughts. These are new 
poetry of the first Bard, poetry without stop, hymn, ode, and epic, poetry still flowing, 
Apollo and the Muses chanting still” (CW, vol. II, 115.). He considers his own activity 
of thinking an outcome of processes structured around emotions of friendship and love 
that have such a strong and mind-broadening effect on him that they can weaken time 
and distances. By virtue of the renewal of his own thinking, the distance to the classical 
past seems to shrink, and his thoughts appear fresh and original like “new poetry of the 
first Bard.” Regardless of the angle Emerson chooses, what is important is that 
emotions play a major role in preventing stagnation in the ways we approach a text and 
speak or write about it. 
 Emerson turns the poetic-philological elements other Transcendentalists 
highlight in German scholarship (as discussed in chapter 3) into a cultural practice. To 
be of any use to himself and others, his scholar’s or poet’s occupation with texts of 
different kinds needs to bear his signature just like a personal letter would. Driven by 
the desire to get the most out of any subject that has caught his attention, he draws on 
his imagination which sets words “in a dance” just like a flute. His thinking enlarges 
like a magnifying glass and “thus begins that deification which all nations have made of 
their heroes in every kind, saints, poets, lawgivers, and warriors” (W, “Poetry and 
Imagination”, vol. VIII, 19). The affective approach, in other words, is necessary to turn 
any subject or object into an exclusive and deified one: 
If your subject do not appear to you the flower of the world at this moment, you 
have not rightly chosen it. No matter what it is, grand or gray, national or 




heart of it: then it will, though it were a sparrow or a spider-web, as fully 
represent the central law…as if it were the book of Genesis or the book of 
Doom. (W, “Poetry and Imagination”, vol. VIII, 33) 
 
The key lies in selecting the subject of one’s attention and scrutiny in such a way that it 
appears to be the only true one at that moment. I gestured at this component of 
Emerson’s thinking earlier when I examined his understanding of the nature and use of 
history. He makes a similar point in “History” when he argues that our chance to create 
modern equivalents to ancient poetry lies in “bend[ing] the shows of things to the 
desires of the mind” (CW, vol. II, 19). It is quite easy to misunderstand such 
exclamations as an attempt to win absolute control over things, but this is not 
Emerson’s objective.318 On the contrary, he is quite precise in how exactly he imagines 
appropriation operations and makes clear that the exclusive status the subject of one’s 
choosing inhabits should never suggest closure and complete mastery: 
Barthold Niebuhr said well, “There is little merit in inventing a happy idea, or 
attractive situation, so long as it is only the author's voice which we hear. As a 
being whom we have called into life by magic arts, as soon as it has received 
existence acts independently of the master's impulse, so the poet creates his 
persons, and then watches and relates what they do and say. (W, “Poetry and 
Imagination”, vol. VIII, 43) 
                                                
318 Albeit in a different context, Sean Ross Meehan makes a similar point in “Emerson’s Photographic 
Thinking,” Arizona Quarterly 62, no. 2 (2006), 27-58: Emerson suggests that the production of art is a 
process that is never fixed but always flowing, but according to Meehan’s interpretation this does rule out 
the possibility of truthful representation. Emerson engages “an understanding of all art as contingently 
and partially representative” (35); such a vision “seems at odds with the conventional, metaphorical view 
that we have tended to associate with Emerson’s notion of the representative. But Emerson’s vision runs 
against the grain of a metaphorical vision of wholeness and closure, of the ‘representative’ as a fixed and 
singular exemplar, to the extent that it is itself about, and informed by, the recognition of ‘vision’ as 
thoroughly suggestive, partial, fundsamentally metonymic” (40-41). Meehan’s argument is of interest for 
my own research regarding the nature and function of appropriation for Emerson’s cultural practice. His 
findings corroborate the argument that Emerson views the subject’s partial way of singling out 




Drawing on the historian Niebuhr, Emerson argues that whatever it is we embrace and 
express in writing, speech, or any other form, we have to grant our productions a life of 
their own. In a way the “author’s voice” has to disappear behind his own creations and 
become a witness to their independent actions. As in a dream, our inventions have to 
“speak after their own characters, not ours” so that we find ourselves “listen[ing] with 
surprise to what they say” (W, “Poetry and Imagination”, vol. VIII, 45). Ancient myths 
where “clouds clapped their hands, the hills skipped, the sky spoke” (W, “Poetry and 
Imagination”, vol. VIII, 53) inhabit a model function in this regard, because their 
personifications demonstrate straightforwardly and vividly what it means to read 
literature that has a life of its own. Today, by contrast, we have to achieve such effects 
by means of composition and style. 
 Emerson’s portrayal of the tasks of the modern American scholar and poet as 
“Man Thinking” whose writing and speaking he imagines as equally inspiring and 
thought-provoking received its impulse from the current historical discourse. The 
scholar ought to produce works that leave himself and his audience under the 
impression that they are discovering “the flower of the world” (W, “Poetry and 
Imagination”, vol. VIII, 33) through his words. At the same time, however, these same 
words cannot leave those paying attention to them under the impression that their 
meaning is confined to the topic under discussion, but rather that they have significance 
and meaning in regions that lie beyond what is uttered momentarily and beyond the 




Emerson defines as crucial for “Man Thinking” but also lies at the heart of his own 
lecturing activities. 
Although we know Emerson best today for his essays and epigrammatic 
sentences, it is worthwhile to remember that nearly all his texts were first composed to 
be given as public lectures. This is not to say that the “style of his performance” and the 
“style of his writing” need to be strictly differentiated from one another, but, as critics 
have noted, it certainly helps our understanding of Emerson’s prose to bear in mind that 
he read for and composed almost all pieces with an eye toward their public 
performance.319 My objective here is to show that the lecture platform provided him 
with an ideal setting to explore what it means to communicate aloud the insights he 
works out in his writings. The institution of the lyceum gave him the opportunity to test 
with a broad audience how to employ one’s emotions and imagination so as to cast a 
new light on the most common subjects and turn them into sanctified ones only to 
abandon them in the next moment. 
Emerson was first offered the opportunity to speak at the lyceum – “a loose 
federation of hundreds of local organizations that sponsored regular series of public 
lectures by traveling speakers” – after his resignation from the ministry and upon his 
return from Europe.320 The lyceum movement was first initiated by the Boston Society 
for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in the late 1820s and spread fast throughout 
New England and across America. The idea was that members of the different local 
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organizations would share their specialized knowledge in engineering, farming, 
education or any other field with fellow members and contribute thereby to the public’s 
general intellectual and moral advancement. Toward the middle of the century, the 
lyceum’s focus on mutual civic education began to shift more and more toward 
commercialized entertainment, and the individual branches sustained themselves 
primarily by inviting prominent speakers to give lectures.321 
The speakers were expected to broaden the public’s horizon by addressing 
topics of general interest from a non-specialized vantage point, and they were asked to 
refrain from using the platform for discussions of controversial topics such as slavery or 
religious conflicts. As Jackson R. Wilson and Johannes Voelz point out, however, 
lecturers like Emerson would employ rhetorical tricks that challenged the decorum of 
the lecture hall and its regulation to not involve the audience in potentially disputatious 
issues. Wilson assesses Emerson’s skill in finding just the right balance between 
“surprising originalities and the conventions of uplift…between the decorous and the 
‘savage’”; he demonstrates how his lectures would move “deftly from safe and 
predictable ground to language that was meant to jolt and even threaten.”322 Similarly 
Voelz examines how Emerson worked with the tension between instruction and 
entertainment typical for the public lecture at that time and distanced himself thereby 
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from commonly held norms.323 Voelz explores the rhetorical means he employed to 
“redefine[…] essential moral concepts…transforming them from precepts to be 
followed in conduct into experiences to be had by the individual listener in the act of 
giving oneself over to the lecturer.”324  
This turn away from commonly accepted norms toward individual experience by 
lecturers like Emerson has to be understood against the backdrop of the transformation 
America’s oratorical culture was undergoing in the mid nineteenth-century. At the 
beginning of the century, public discourse was strongly neoclassical, in the sense “that 
moral authority in a community is located in the public consensus of its members rather 
than their individual private convictions.” For complex reasons such as the 
transformation of professions, the increasing specialization of knowledge, and the 
popularization of Locke’s and Descartes philosophies, the collective ethos eroded and 
gave way to individualism.325  
The lyceum was a forum in which the changes America’s oratorical culture was 
undergoing became manifest in the ways lecturers like Emerson would speak. The 
institution provided suitable conditions for him to reinvent himself professionally and 
find a new platform to address the public he had lost with his resignation from the 
ministry. As Wilson notes, to make a living by traveling across the country and giving 
up to seventy lectures a year did not only mean a radical career change but also implied 
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his leaving behind “a conception of what it meant to be a man of letters” and 
reinventing his prose style.326 
As already mentioned, both Voelz and Wilson suggest that Emerson faced the 
challenge by employing a rhetorical style that both met the audience on familiar ground, 
reassuring them of the truth of common assumptions on virtually any topic, while also 
questioning and unsettling these same assumptions in the next moment. Reviewing 
newspaper reports that discuss the effect an Emerson lecture had on its listeners, Voelz 
concludes that it was this kind of style that assured his success in the lecture hall. The 
experiences many journalists report are reminiscent of Grimm’s description of his 
experience upon first reading Emerson: inspired and uplifted yet unable to summarize 
what he just read. The journalists also write about the exhilarating effect of uplift an 
Emerson lecture would have on its listeners, and like Grimm they express their inability 
to associate the effects with concrete subjects discussed in the lecture.327  
According to Voelz, the explanation for this feeling of being left with “an 
aesthetic excess,” “a surplus of oratory” that cannot be resolved, lies in a “rhetorical 
trick” Emerson employed: he would suggest “connections between things entirely 
disparate, without spelling them out,” and thereby activate, inspire and broaden his 
listeners’ minds.328 He worked with a technique Voelz terms “fractured idealism”; this 
means that “in one moment he suggested to his audience that they were on the brink of 
actualizing their universal potential, in the next moment this potential was declared 
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unreachable, and in the moment following the actual turned out to have been identical 
with the ideal all along.”329 
The characteristics of Emerson’s rhetoric that critics like Voelz and Wilson 
bring into view help to substantiate the claim that the lyceum provided Emerson with a 
fitting venue to translate insights he works out through his occupation with 
contemporary criticism into a lecturing style. Speech that oscillates between reassuring 
and eroding its listeners’ expectations performs what Emerson discusses throughout as a 
fundamental prerequisite to the mind’s revitalization and renewal. I pointed out earlier 
his stress on the human making of every aspect of human cultural history, including 
scripture, and that his emphasis on appropriating the past through modes of creative 
reading and writing follows naturally from this standpoint. In the essay “Circles,” he 
develops a similar claim by drawing an interesting analogy between history and speech. 
History, he writes, progresses in alternate rhythms of de- and re-composition 
where “new races fed out of the decomposition of the foregoing”: 
There is not a piece of science, but its flank may be turned tomorrow; there is 
not any literary reputation, not the so-called eternal names of fame, that may not 
be revised and condemned….The things which are dear to men at this hour, are 
so on account of the ideas which have emerged on their mental horizon….A new 
degree of culture would instantly revolutionize the entire system of human 
pursuits. (CW, “Circles”, vol. II, 183) 
 
As in the representations of history I discussed previously, “Circles” pronounces the 
dependence of certain literary standards and value judgments on the opinions humans 
hold at certain times, and Emerson turns this insight into a springboard for the 
                                                




promotion of a liberally-minded and innovative engagement with even “so-called 
eternal names of fame.” What is interesting now is that he employs this notion of 
history, proving that even the most powerful precepts can be overturned as a model for 
how to lead a conversation that helps us “to recover our rights, to become men”: 
Conversation is a game of circles….When each new speaker strikes a new light, 
emancipates us from the oppression of the last speaker, to oppress us with the 
greatness and exclusiveness of his own thought, then yields us to another 
redeemer, we seem to recover our rights, to become men. (CW, “Circles”, vol. 
II, 184) 
 
Conversations that have a truly expansive effect on the mind are those whose members 
inspire each other by taking turns in articulating compelling perspectives on a topic that 
seem to cancel each other out. So what they do in an alternate fashion is articulate 
statements that appear like “flower[s] of the world” (W, “Poetry and Imagination”, vol. 
VIII, 33) at the moment of their pronuncement to the speaker and his audience, while 
also then challenging the subsequent speaker to free everyone from the grip of the 
foregoing vision by weakening it with his own equally powerful one. When Emerson 
addressed his lyceum audience, he would fashion his speech in exactly this way; he 
would translate key insights regarding the human making of meaning over the course of 
history into a rhetorical practice by constructing his speech as a series of oppressing and 
redeeming statements. 
 According to Emerson, such a way of addressing and interacting with the 
audience authorizes the true orator. Not rank or degree but the ability to express the 




This is the dominion of the orator over his countrymen, that he speaks that 
which they recognize as part of them but which they were not ready to 
say….Whoever separates for us a truth from our unconscious reason, and makes 
it an object of consciousness, draws that is to say a fact out of our life and makes 
it an opinion, must of course be to us a great man. (EL, vol. II, “Philosophy of 
History,” 57) 
 
Very similar to what his Transcendentalist colleagues would highlight in their 
translations in which Schleiermacher and Herder develop the characteristics of their 
practices of preaching and lecturing (compare chapter three, part two), Emerson also 
warns against the danger of the speaker’s over-identification with his position and his 
turning it thereby into a tyrannical and oppressive one: “When a mind of powerful 
method has instructed men, we find the examples of oppression…. It is the delight of 
vulgar talent to dazzle and to blind the beholder. But true genius seeks to defend us 
from itself” (CW, Representative Men, vol. IV, 11). Emerson protected his audience 
from his own speech by consciously drawing attention to his lack of control over 
language, thereby leaving no one in doubt that “no man…is reason or illumination or 
the essence of what we are looking for; but is an exhibition, in some quarter, of new 
possibilities” (CW, Representative Men, vol. IV, 19). Speech needs to remain open and 
a true orator knows that he has to give up control and “consciously…make[…] himself 
the mere tongue of the occasion and the hour….Hence the French phrase l’abandon, to 









The chapter opened with an investigation of Emerson’s intensive intellectual 
engagement with scholarly findings and arguments that reached him through 
translations, reviews, and firsthand accounts by colleagues who had returned from their 
studies in Europe. I proposed that his involvement with this contemporary discourse 
would help to better understand why and how he develops the idiosyncrasies of his style 
of thinking which has been the focus of Emerson criticism. And a closer examination of 
the relationship between his critical engagements and the activities and skills he 
associates with the figure of the scholar, the poet, and with his own lecturing showed 
the vital impact historical scholarship had on his work. It demonstrated how important it 
is to go beyond the level of source studies and general observations, suggesting that the 
reception of crucial aspects of German historical research helped authorize Emerson’s 
trust in the independent power of the subject. 
The broader transnational context of classical and biblical research forges a 
nuanced perspective on a key concern that runs like a red thread through Emerson’s 
writings and public speaking: his objective to combine the abandonment of historically 
anachronistic rituals, dogmas, and aesthetic standards with the impetus of making 
regenerative forms of appropriation the main goal of any occupation with the past. The 
close lines of correspondence between his own purposes and those his colleagues work 
out in their addresses and translations help to isolate and contextualize the emotional, 




encounter with other cultures and their works a productive one. We saw more clearly in 
what ways he is both tied to and surpasses his contemporaries in working these 
capacities into widely applicable cultural practices in the fields of reading, writing, and 
public communication. My examinations thereby provided an idea of how these 







My study has focused on how three writers and their contemporaries from the 
late eighteenth- to the mid-nineteenth centuries contribute to and expand on 
reconstructive practices of rendering the ancient past contemporary for the revival of 
religious life, educational reforms, and cultural renewal. More specifically, I have 
worked out how Germaine de Staël, Johann Gottfried Herder, and American scholars, 
most notably Ralph Waldo Emerson, forge new relationships to the Bible and classical 
culture through their readings, reworkings, and translations of ancient texts as well 
through their reception of studies by other scholars and their preaching and lecturing. I 
have demonstrated that for Staël and the Transcendentalists Germany functions as a 
model in this regard because of the development that religious scholarship and the 
revival of Greek and Roman culture had taken there.  
It is no news that the publication of the first English translation of Staël’s De 
l’Allemagne in 1814 in New York sparked a large-scale preoccupation with German 
culture that resonated in multiple ways in nineteenth-century America. My own focus, 
however, was not on Staël’s role as an intermediary of German idealist philosophical 
thinking, which has received most of the critical attention. Rather, I took her 
investigations of the relationship between historical scholarship, philology, and what 
she introduces as the renewal of Germany’s educational institutions, religious life, and 
culture as an occasion to examine that relationship in the writings of individual authors 




domains of education, religion, and cultural life casts new light on Staël, Herder, and 
Emerson as well as on the connections between German Romanticism and the early 
years of American Transcendentalism. 
I showed how the erosion of the authority of classical texts by the historical 
research of scholars such as F.A. Wolf led to a fundamental rethinking of the modern 
educational functions of classical culture in the works of writers and scholars on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Drawing on a wealth of rarely examined writings by American 
classical scholars, on Emerson’s engagement with German scholarship, its discussions 
by Staël and her assessment of how it transformed methods of learning at educational 
institutions, on Herder’s ways of collecting and reworking ancient genres, and on his 
engagement with Winckelmann, I focused on different characteristics of the 
transformation of antiquity in light of new historical insights and research techniques. I 
showed that both European and American writers regard the encounter with the foreign 
culture and language as most productive if it is not just focused on gaining new 
historical insights but on supporting individuals in their striving for what American 
scholars refers to as self-culture and what Herder terms “Selbstschöpfung” or self-
creation. I worked out different ways in which they put practices of reading, writing, 
lecturing, and communicative interaction in the service of facilitating man’s self-
forming capacities.  
The texts I examined each show that while Herder’s, George Ripley’s, 
Emerson’s or James Marsh’s focus on self-culture bestows a new significance on the 




formation decentralizes the field at the same time. For them the value of classical 
learning lies no longer in didactic and rhetorical purposes but in the cognitive, 
imaginative, and emotional capacities that the individual exercises through philological, 
linguistic, and historical activities. It becomes obvious that other languages and 
literatures can potentially fulfill that same function. At the level of institutional reforms, 
this insight manifests itself in the opening of schools and universities toward the 
teaching and research of modern languages and literatures. In America we witness the 
rise of the liberal arts college model of education. To explore these developments in a 
transnational context is a larger research project I could only gesture at in this study. 
The same holds true for the impact new historical and imaginative strategies of 
reviving the past had on people’s broader understanding regarding questions of cultural 
and aesthetic value. Besides bringing into view how the authors under discussion 
concentrate their preoccupation with classical culture on matters of education and self-
formation, I also called attention to their interest in fashioning the relationship to 
antiquity in ways they consider beneficial for the thriving of modern cultural life and 
scholarship’s contribution to it. I noted, for instance, that Staël regards what she 
perceives as Goethe’s natural, unstylized poetry of common people as formed by his 
imaginative abilities to transport himself back into the most distant ages. Emerson 
makes similar remarks with regard to Goethe and articulates links between historical 
scholarship and the rise of an aesthetics of the low and common in “The American 
Scholar.” Staël’s and Herder’s discussion of Winckelmann is also focused on 




German cultural life at large. Herder lays emphasis on how Winckelmann’s ways of 
using a language of love and friendship draws attention to scholarly activities as cultural 
practices that garnered broader public interest. In short, what these writers stress in one 
or the other way are lines of connection between the popularization of historical 
criticism, philology, and a pluralization of aesthetic categories. I have found that the 
question of how the refashioning of the relationship between ancient and modern 
cultures contributes to aesthetic transformations opens up a research area that needs 
more attention than I could give to it in this study. 
Each chapter has shown that the techniques scholars and writers employ to 
revive antiquity for educational and cultural purposes are closely related to those used 
in theological research to rekindle people’s religious lives and institutions. I highlighted 
Herder’s announcement at the end of “Denkmal Johann Winkelmanns” that 
Winckelmann’s writings serve as a model for his own works on sacred and secular 
texts. We saw that his primary concern in Vom Geist der Ebräischen Poesie and in the 
Briefe, das Studium der Theologie betreffend is to make sure the Bible remains an 
attractive resource for people during times in which its superior position was coming 
under attack. With his commentary and style of writing, he seeks to ease his readers’ 
way into the world of humanity’s oldest poetry. I also pointed out, however, that 
although Herder emphasizes the human origin and poetic qualities of the Bible’s 
writings, he does not simply suggest reimagining them aesthetically within a secular 




contemporaneously human and divine affair. As I demonstrated, his discussions about 
the Bible’s origin are a vexed issue that does not resolve itself in easy explanations. 
Herder’s own qualms about regarding the Bible as an extraordinary book among 
many other equally extraordinary poetic compositions, however, are of no concern for 
Vom Geist’s international readership. Staël and the Transcendentalists are in the first 
place interested in detailing the nature of his reconstructive techniques, in how exactly 
he structures spiritual revival around a number of exercises. They emphasize how his 
way of combining empathy and imagination with scholarly erudition enables him to 
fashion himself as a “God-Man.” Ripley and Marsh focus on his poetic-philological 
activities, his modes of arranging, commenting, and personalizing the materials 
assembled in Vom Geist. Together with Schleiermacher, Herder emerges in American 
reviews, addresses, and translations as a modern theologian able to turn the most 
ancient religious records into powerful instruments for a timely and subject-centered 
mode of practicing religion. 
I have worked out how American scholars investigate the relationship between 
modern revelation and critical exercises not only through practices of reading and 
writing but also in the social domain of public oratory. Drawing on multiple American 
sources that engage primarily Herder and Schleiermacher, I focused on how 
Transcendentalists develop an understanding of religious revival based on people’s 
reciprocal formation, on interactions in the sphere of social life. I showed how this 
perspective sparks discussions about a fundamental unsettling and reorganization of 




the themes occupying his colleagues’ writings and Emerson’s own ways of premising 
active modes of commemoration on non-hierarchical structures of communication as 
well as undogmatic practices of engaging with Scriptures and writing about them. I 
demonstrated that while his explications resonate strongly with his contemporaries’ 
liberal perspective on the Bible and its poetic reworkings, he is the one who like no one 
else of his generation works the new insights into fully-fledged cultural practices and 
makes them the foundation of his new profession as a freelance lecturer. 
With its focus on how cross-cultural conversations over the modern role of 
ancient cultures shape practices of learning, preaching, and creative activities, this 
project has shed new light on writings by leading figures of the Romantic age and their 
relationships to one another. I have thereby chosen an angle different from those usually 
employed in the critical literature; most critics have concentrated their investigations on 
the philosophical or political facet of transnational cultural exchange processes. As I 
pointed out, particularly Emerson’s eclectic style has become a sounding board for 
examinations concentrated on how his engagement with literatures from around the 
globe may open up potential spaces of resistance to the ideological hold of the 
American nation state. By contrast, my own comparative approach to texts from the 
Transcendentalist period was motivated by questions and themes raised therein; in 
bringing together Emerson’s works and more obscure writings and translations by his 
contemporaries with well-known texts by Staël, Herder, and Schleiermacher, I found 
that American scholars’ search in them for specific practical advice. In engaging with 




may help to rekindle faith, or how fragments from classical works can become 
springboards for an aesthetic experience. In translating and commenting on the works of 
others, they ask about the use of activities such as of preaching, lecturing, or writing for 
the individual’s self-development. How can such activities assist the subject in working 
on itself?  
I discovered that by approaching the cultural relationships between Germany 
and America in the first half of the nineteenth-century from this angle, we find 
interesting points of connection to some of the best known American cultural and 
educational developments of the period that call for more detailed examinations. A 
question my research raises, for instance, concerns the relationship between the 
adoption and popularization of scholarly techniques on the one hand, and the turn of 
writers like Emerson or Herman Melville to an aesthetics of common places and objects 
on the other. Further points of connection that need to be scrutinized are those between 
the reception of Herder’s and Schleiermacher’s liberal theology and other neighboring 
religious reform movements such as the Calvinist tradition of life-long sanctification or 
the Pietist tradition. In the field of education, it would be important to examine the 
impact of the pedagogical writings by classical scholars on the transformation that 
modern language teaching and the humanities underwent at American educational 
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